NOVEMBER 5 HLTF MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000522 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2019 TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 5 HLTF MEETING REF: STATE 113659 Classified By: Deputy POLAD A. "Hoot" Baez for reasons 1.4(B)&(D). ¶1. (C) Summary: At the November 5 HLTF, Allies welcomed the U.S. proposal to revise NATO's NAC Communique message on CFE to reflect the Alliance's growing concern about Russia's continuing suspension of implementation of CFE. Most Allies also agreed in principle to the U.S.'s specific suggestion that Allies provide CFE data to all Treaty partners, including Russia, again this year, but record in the NAC Communique and at the OSCE Ministerial that unless the Alliance sees progress regarding Russia's implementation, it will be difficult to do that again. Turkey and Germany, however, remain averse to any language that would appear to commit the Alliance to a timeline for further action on CFE, and it is not clear whether they will accept the U.S. concept for the Communique. Critical to achieving a positive NATO response to our ideas were two U.S. messages: 1) that the U.S. wanted a unified NATO approach, whatever it was, and no Ally should act alone; and 2) that the U.S. had not given up on finding a solution on CFE and believed we should continue to try. These themes are the core of current NATO sentiment. ¶2. (C) In the Quad meeting, Germany strongly argued in favor of responding positively in Vienna to Russia's proposed Ministerial Council Draft Decision calling on the FSC to conduct a review of Vienna Document 1999 (VD99). France supported Germany's general approach, albeit less passionately, while the UK said it would develop and circulate compromise language that responded positively to reviewing VD99 without a timeline or Ministerial mandate. ¶3. (C) In other bilateral and Quad contacts, France announced that Security Policy Director Maisonnave would travel to Moscow the following week to discuss Russia's European Security Treaty, a follow-up meeting to a recent Russian-French two-plus-two meeting of Defense and Foreign Ministers in early October. Germany announced that FM Westerwelle would give Secretary Clinton a paper on A/CFE that recommends further flexibility on the flanks. On the margins, both the Germans and UK (separately) proposed to meet with the U.S. bilaterally at an expert level to discuss next steps on CFE. End Summary. -------------- KEY OUTCOMES -------------- ¶4. (C) In the HLTF Plenary, Allies generally welcomed U.S. ideas on the how the Alliance should approach the annual CFE Data Exchange in December and how that position could be incorporated into a fresh message to Russia. Most Allies agreed with the U.S. assessment that simply repeating the tired phrase from past NATO Communiques - "... the current situation...cannot last indefinitely" - is not good enough. Most Allies welcomed the U.S. proposal to revise NATO's Communique language on CFE to send a strong message to Russia reflecting our growing concern about Russia's continuing suspension of implementation of CFE; however, Germany and Turkey argued against any shift in the Alliance position that implied a timeline for action. ¶5. (C) Most Allies agreed in principle to the four main themes U.S. Del identified for the NAC Communique text on CFE: -- record Alliance commitment to CFE and continuing to seek a creative way forward on all current issues, including those related to Georgia and Moldova; -- state that the Alliance will continue to provide data to Russia this year and urge Russia to do the same; -- record our shared assessment that unless Russia reverses its failure to fulfill its Treaty obligations, it will be difficult to provide data in the future. -- express our readiness for an intensified engagement on CFE next year. Nevertheless, a number of Allies cautioned that translating these themes into operational text will have to be done very USNATO 00000522 002 OF 004 carefully. Some Allies - notably Germany and Turkey - remained skeptical about the third theme, which in their view could commit the Alliance to future action as early as December 2010. ¶6. (C) In addition to the four U.S. themes, Italy sought an explicit endorsement of the Parallel Actions Package and a call for Russia to return to full compliance, while Turkey recommended a reference to prior NATO statements. In the end, HLTF Chair Erdmann announced that the International Staff would draft Communique language on the basis of the U.S. themes combined with Italian and Turkish points. -------------- ALLIES SKEPTICAL OF MORE DRAMATIC STEPS -------------- ¶7. (C) Comment: It was very clear from all of the U.S. team's discussions - in the plenary and on the margins - that the U.S. proposal is as far as the vast majority of Allies are prepared to go at this time, and it may be too far for the Germany and Turkey. Erdmann wanted to get agreement at this meeting on the themes and main message of the Communique on CFE, but he explicitly did not/not want to draft text. While most Allies considered that the U.S. language was sufficiently open-ended to avoid any categorical judgments about the future that Allies might regret, Spain and Romania were wary, Turkey remained skeptical, and Germany stopped just short of opposing the suggestion that the Alliance may have difficulty providing data to Russia in the future. Only in negotiation of Communique text will it become clear whether Germany and Turkey are prepared even to hint that Allies' operational approach on CFE might change if progress with Russia in 2010 proves unattainable. End Comment. ¶8. (C) During the debate on the U.S. proposal, it was clear that many Allies anticipated the U.S. would propose not to provide data to Russia in December, and came armed for that discussion. The exchange was indicative of Allies' worries. A number of Allies (including The Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and France) expressed skepticism that the Alliance could deliver an implied threat to withhold data from Russia without playing into Russia's arguments about the failings of the CFE. NATO should continue to hold the "moral high ground" on CFE implementation and avoid any step that could cause NATO to be blamed for hastening the demise of the Treaty. Some Allies were also worried about committing now to a future action that they had not fully studied from a legal perspective. There were many nods around the room as the U.S. explained the concept of countermeasures against Russia under customary international law, even while Allies continued to implement the Treaty in good faith. Others indicated their political and legal systems differed from the U.S. ¶9. (C) A brief exchange between Italy and Spain highlighted the extent to which a number of Allies - not just the key players - have thought about how to engage Russia on CFE. Italy affirmed the U.S. idea that we should use the Communique to invite Russia, in a positive spirit, to join NATO Allies in providing CFE data this year; Spain suggested that we should call upon Russia to resume accepting on site inspection requests as well as providing data. Turkey agreed that we should call upon Russia to resume implementation across-the-board, and initially Allies appeared to agree that this was the right approach. Italy then rejoined that it would be preferable to identify participation in the data exchange as a specific cooperative step Russia could take to signal its intentions, and that argument appeared to win the day. -------------- WAY FORWARD ON COMMUNIQUE -------------- ¶10. (C) HLTF Chairman Erdmann reported that Secretary General (SYG) Rasmussen wished to press for a succinct Ministerial statement summarizing the deliberations of Ministers rather than issuing the traditional, omnibus communique reinforcing Allies' support for the full range of NATO policy. Under the new formulation, a paragraph on CFE would only be included if NATO Ministers discussed CFE. In addition, Erdmann noted that if a CFE paragraph were included its length would need USNATO 00000522 003 OF 004 to be significantly shorter than in previous years in order to match the format of the statement. ¶11. (C) Most Allies were not aware prior to this meeting of the NATO SYG's determination to avoid addressing issues in the Communique that are not actually discussed by Ministers in December. All Allies who addressed the issue, in the plenary and on the margins, argued that it was essential to include a paragraph on CFE in the NAC Communique in order to send a consistent message to the Russians. Virtually all Allies agreed that Russia would interpret the omission of CFE as an indicator of declining NATO engagement on CFE, rather than as a sign of a fresh approach to communique drafting. Canada suggested that if the NAC Communique text was a genuinely transformed document that only addressed a handful of issues, it would be important for NATO to issue a separate statement on CFE. Several Allies noted that if the criterion for inclusion in the Communique is that Ministers discuss CFE in the NAC, then that is what should happen. ¶12. (C) HLTF Chair Erdmann and the I.S. will produce two versions of Communique text on CFE: a short form based on the four themes tabled by the U.S.(see para 5 above),and a long form based on the existing Strasbourg-Kehl Summit Declaration paragraph plus two additional U.S.-suggested themes: -- call on Russia to join us in providing data this December; and -- record our shared assessment that unless Russia reverses its failure to fulfill its Treaty obligations, it will be difficult to provide data in the future. The I.S. will seek to get these two versions agreed via HLTF deputies meetings later this month. However, a number of Allies expressed skepticism that it would be possible for Ministers to agree on a short NAC Statement as proposed by the SYG. (Comment: On the margins, a number of Allies noted that sometimes CFE is raised in the NATO-Russia context, but not in the NAC; they recalled that this is because Allies have an agreed position on CFE and do not feel a need to use scarce minutes of NAC time to confirm it. They expressed concern about the SYG's reported criteria for inclusion of issues in the NAC text. End Comment.) -------------- BILATS AND QUAD DISCUSSION -------------- ¶13. (C) Franco-Russian discussions on European Security Treaty: French HLTF rep Jacques Raharinaivo surprised Allies by reporting that during the Russian-French two-plus-two meeting of Defense and Foreign Ministers in early October, Kouchner had asked Lavrov whether Russia had developed a text of the European security Treaty. When the Russians suggested Franco-Russian expert consultations on the matter, the French agreed. Raharinaivo said Security Policy Director Maisonnave would travel to Moscow the week of November 9. ¶14. (C) Bilateral Consultations: On the margins, both Germany and the UK (separately) proposed to meet with the U.S. bilaterally at an expert level to discuss next steps on CFE. Romania returned briefly to the idea of a small group meeting on the topic. Turkish HLTF Rep Tusel noted that Russia had invited bilateral discussions with Turkey on CFE, but that presently there is nothing to discuss. He added that Turkey would prefer to hold off on bilateral discussions until there is a clear way forward. ¶15. (C) Germany's new coalition government on CFE: German HLTF rep Michael Banzhaf said that the new German government's coalition agreement explicitly reaffirms support for the CFE Treaty and underscores its importance. In a private meeting with the U.S., he said FM Westerwelle would give Secretary Clinton a paper on CFE at their scheduled meeting November 5 (see para 17). He urged U.S.-German expert consultations to brainstorm on CFE, arguing that one approach would be to "de-link a CFE solution from the Istanbul commitments." U.S. Reps welcomed the idea of consultations, but cautioned that as a political matter a resolution on Georgia and Moldova would be needed if all 30 CFE states, including the U.S., were to ratify the Adapted Treaty. USNATO 00000522 004 OF 004 ¶16. (C) Vienna Document 1999: In the Quad meeting, U.S. Rep Davis turned attention from CFE to Vienna Document 1999 (VD 99),noting Washington's interest as to why Allies in Vienna have responded so actively to Russia's most recent proposed Ministerial Council Draft Decision on conducting a review of the document. Davis reiterated the U.S. position and indicated support for the UK Chair's draft language, which could be expanded to incorporate some of Russia's proposed language. UK HLTF Rep Michael Clark supported the U.S. position, and proposed to move forward with a modified text that reiterated support for continued FSC work on VD99 without succumbing to this "gambit to split the Alliance." German HLTF Rep Banzhaf, and to a lesser extent French HLTF Rep Raharinaivo, argued at length that a mandate to review VD 99 was necessary, and that it was important to respond positively to Russia. Clark responded that there are other ways to signal to Russia that the Alliance is listening to its concerns, and that in the meantime the Alliance should develop a position on VD99. In the end, all could agree that of primary importance was to maintain Alliance unity. ¶17. (C) Paper on CFE delivered by German MFA State Secretary Hoyer to Under Secretary Burns on 5 November in Washington. -- Begin Text of German Position Paper on CFE - (note internal numbering) Position Paper on Conventional Arms Control in Europe ¶1. Arms control is currently gaining new momentum. The START negotiations demonstrate that progress on arms reduction is possible if there is a strong political commitment between partners. As we approach two years of Russian CFE non-implementation the opportunity should now be used to put conventional arms control in Europe back on track. ¶2. Nuclear and conventional arms control in Europe are closely interconnected. A perceived conventional inferiority may nourish claims to seek compensation with substrategic nuclear weapons. Building confidence with conventional arms control agreement could be an effective counter-argument. ¶3. The CFE regime remains a cornerstone of European security. Today we see a new opportunity to move forward towards agreement on the adapted CFE-Treaty. This will require a reassessment by all concerned. We should reconsider our approach of linkage to the fulfillment of the Istanbul Commitments. Instead, we could focus on the already existing fora to solve the problems of territorial integrity in Moldova and Georgia. ¶4. The Parallel Actions Package continues to be the negotiation basis for discussing further steps. Dialogue with Russia could start with a discussion on the definition of substantial combat forces and political declarations of restraint on both sides in order to prevent destabilizing concentration of forces. -- End Text of German Position Paper on CFE -- DAALDER