JANUARY 29 HLTF: ALLIES WILLING TO WAIT FOR U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000052 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019 TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL SUBJECT: JANUARY 29 HLTF: ALLIES WILLING TO WAIT FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP ON CFE, BUT HOPE FOR CLEAR SIGNAL ON WAY AHEAD BEFORE NATO SUMMIT REF: STATE 7036 (29 JAN 09 HLTF GUIDANCE) Classified By: Political Advisor Walter S. Reid for reasons 1.4(B)&(D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. At the January 29 NATO High Level Task Force (HLTF) meeting, two clear messages - pointedly directed at the U.S. - emerged. First, Allies continue to place high importance on a unified NATO strategy for retaining the CFE regime and getting it back on track. Many specifically noted that CFE is a critical component of the existing European security architecture; they want to tell Russia plainly that any future European Security Treaty concept needs CFE as one pillar. Second, Allies are keen for the U.S. to continue to play the lead role in resolving the CFE impasse, via continued efforts to get Russia to agree to the Parallel Actions Package. Allies expressed understanding for the implications of the U.S. political calendar and realize that the new team needs time to get organized, but at the next HLTF, in mid-March, they expect to hear more regarding USG plans to engage Russia on CFE. The Turks, specifically, suggested this would be the right moment for a U.S.-led "stocktaking" discussion. In discussions at the HLTF and on the margins: -- There was a common assessment that Russia - likely still not certain what its goals are on CFE other than perhaps to abolish the flank regime - is in a "wait and see" mode, awaiting engagement with the new U.S. Administration while also probing for differences among Allies through bilateral discussions. -- Allies want to ensure that CFE is included in the April 3-4 NATO Summit communique to emphasize its continued importance. They believe the December Ministerial language sends the right balanced message, barring any major developments diplomatically or on the ground. -- Most Allies have not thought seriously about changing the NATO negotiating position as encapsulated in the Parallel Actions Package and the March 28, 2008 NAC statement on CFE. No ally suggested any alternative to the agreed sequencing: first agreement on the Parallel Actions Package to enable Russia to move on its commitments in parallel with Allies proceeding with ratification of the Adapted Treaty and then, after a/CFE enters into force, a review and consideration of possible changes. -- Germany, helpfully, did not circulate a paper at this time related to plans for the Steinmeier-proposed June CFE conference in Berlin. In the full HLTF, the German rep noted the intention to have several rounds of consultations with Allies before consulting with the Russians; on the margins he offered that Germany would not circulate a paper before first having a Quad discussion, including at a senior level. At the same time, also on the margins, the Germans (supported by the French) underscored the need for visible progress and suggested that, aside from sustaining the current, agreed process, the June meeting could serve as an opportunity to explore new ideas. ¶2. (C) On other issues, all Allies who spoke on Georgia's rejection of Russian Vienna Document inspection and evaluation requests in January expressed understanding for Georgia's reasons as a political matter, but also disappointment at its decision. Allies stressed their hope that Georgia's action would not undermine implementation of the VDOC elsewhere or damage existing arms control regimes in general. Allies agreed that current VCC papers could be deployed on a national basis at the March Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) in Vienna with the understanding that Allied participating States (pS) would likely raise varying opinions on any issues for which there was not yet consensus at the VCC. Regarding the Allied CFE inspection plan for the new Treaty year, none disagreed that Allies should continue to attempt to execute inspections of Russia in accordance with the agreed schedule. END SUMMARY. - - - - - - - - - - - - CONTACTS and BILATERALS - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Allies welcomed a briefing (per reftel) from U.S. Rep Davis on the main themes of A/S Fried's December 17 CFE meeting with Antonov in Geneva. The capsule version of that meeting - that the Russians stuck to familiar positions, although a frank discussion took place on Georgia and the flank - elicited from a number of Allies (Turkey, Romania, UK, Norway) the same reaction: that the Russians were marking time, waiting to deal with the new U.S. Administration. Norway, the UK, and Romania all expressed concern - based on their own bilateral meetings with Russia - that the Russians were visibly probing for differences among Allies, not trying to find common ground, and that the Russians themselves may not be certain, even now, what their goals are on CFE. -- Norway: Norwegian rep Loken reported on a December 12 bilateral meeting in Moscow at the Director General level during which Russia repeated its maximalist positions and emphasized Russia's intent to abolish the flank and to increase the involvement of other CFE States Parties via bilateral discussions and broader negotiations. During a bilateral discussion between the Norwegian and U.S. dels the day prior, Loken specified that Antonov had pushed for Norway to soften its insistence on retaining the flank limits by claiming that Turkey was more flexible on the flank than Norway. (Comment. In his December 17 meeting with Fried, Antonov portrayed Norway as the more flexible of the two. See below for more specifics on the U.S. bilat with Norway. End comment.) -- United Kingdom: UK Rep Ford noted that Nick Pickard, Head of the FCO Security Policy Group, had a meeting on counter-proliferation issues with MFA Director Antonov on January 22 in Moscow. Ford reported that Antonov, who had added CFE to the agenda, moved it to the top and "lectured" Pickard for 90 minutes. Pickard stuck to the NATO position despite Antonov's attempt to seek out intra-Alliance differences via a line-by-line run through of the Parallel Actions Package and insistence that issues pertaining to host nation consent were above his pay grade. Ford noted that following the CFE discussion Antonov was "charm personified." -- Romania: Romanian rep Micula reported on January 19 non-proliferation and arms control consultations with Antonov in Moscow. Russia's message on CFE was familiar: NATO's position fostered a bloc-to-bloc approach; the Parallel Actions Package had been walked back from the original October 2007 version; there was no independent engagement by each State Party; and the flank was a definite deal breaker. Antonov stressed that "with no progress on the flank, Europe could forget about CFE" and also attempted a line-by-line review of the package. Micula stated that Romania avoided the "trap" by noting that the U.S. was negotiating on behalf of NATO and stressing the importance of both implementation and the flank. Romania opined that Russia is in a "wait and see" mode and attempting to pocket further gains. -- France: During a meeting with the U.S., UK and Germany the day prior to the HLTF, French rep Raharinaivo noted that the French Director for Security and Disarmament would meet with MFA Director Antonov in Moscow on February 10 on a range of issues and expected the meeting would touch on CFE. -- Germany: Also in the quad meeting only, German rep Biontino noted that in a Russian readout following the Fried-Antonov Geneva discussion, the Russians characterized the U.S. proposal on Georgia as "unrealistic." The U.S. del remarked that this reaction was consistent with Russia's suggestion in Geneva that the U.S. proposals were "ambitious." - - - - - - - THE WAY AHEAD - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) The HLTF Chair (Erdmann) briefed in general terms on plans for key upcoming events (Feb 6-8 Munich Security Conference, Feb 19-20 Informal Defense Ministerial in Poland, Mar 5 Informal Ministerial at NATO, April 3-4 NATO Summit, March 25-26 Berlin Seminar on Conventional Arms Control at RACVIAC in Zagreb, Croatia, and June 10 FM Steinmeier-proposed high-level CFE experts meeting on "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe") as a framework for HLTF discussion of next steps on CFE. Key themes that emerged from a poorly ordered discussion included: -- Patience will have its Limits: In the HLTF and on the margins, Allies expressed understanding for the implications of the U.S. political calendar and the need for time for the new team to get organized on a number of nonproliferation and arms control issues, including START. They were reassured by Secretary Clinton's public comments about the importance of arms control. But they want to be sure the U.S. remains committed to CFE and its leadership role in resolving the impasse. Allies were clear about their expectation to hear more from the U.S. delegation at the next HLTF, in mid-March, regarding USG plans to engage Russia on CFE. Turkish rep Gun emphasized Turkey strongly supported the Parallel Actions Package, strongly encouraged the U.S. to remain engaged, and he specifically suggested that the March HLTF would be the right moment for a U.S.-led "stocktaking" discussion with the Allies. -- CFE at the Summit: Looking ahead to the NATO Summit in April, Allies strongly supported including CFE language in the communique, especially to avoid any hint to the Russians that NATO attaches diminished importance to CFE. Those that spoke to this issue (Italy, Romania, Germany, U.S., Czech Republic, Netherlands, Poland, Belgium and Turkey) remarked that the December Ministerial language is appropriate and balanced, and should serve as the basis for CFE language in April, barring any major developments diplomatically or on the ground. -- No Change to the NATO Position: The corollary to sticking to the agreed NATO position (encapsulated in the Parallel Actions Package and the March 28, 2008 NAC statement on CFE) is that most Allies appeared not to have thought seriously about changing the NATO negotiating position. On this point the Turks, as well as Romania and Norway, were very explicit with the U.S. on the margins: they agree with and staunchly support the "forward-leaning" deal in the Parallel Actions Package, which trades Allied ratification of Adapted CFE for steps on the Istanbul commitments and resumption of CFE implementation by Russia, together with a commitment to a future review of the Adapted Treaty in which "any nation could raise any issue, including the flank." But, Turkish rep Gun made clear, Turkey is not about to go further than that, particularly in a context where Russia has not resumed Treaty implementation, and has said it will never resume implementation of the flank limits (only, perhaps, information and verification provisions). -- (Comment: Just as no Ally suggested changes in the NATO position, none at this stage appears ready to consider changing the sequence of events that is built into it. Turkey and others (Norway, Czech Republic, Greece, Romania) were clear on sequencing: first the Parallel Actions Package needs to be agreed so that Russia can move forward on its commitments in parallel with the Allies who will undertake ratification of the Adapted Treaty, and then, once a/CFE enters into force, there can be a review of the Treaty to consider possible changes. Most Allies recognize the scope of the problem CFE faces if no deal is possible other than one which eliminates the flank for Russia. But in the interest of maintaining Allied unity, nobody is prepared to take this on openly, recalling that only intense effort by the U.S. made it possible for Allies to agree on the forward-leaning Parallel Actions Package in the face of divergent Allied priorities. In the main meeting and on the margins, no ally suggested any alternative to that sequence. The Germans - who have done the most thinking of any Ally other than the U.S. about the way forward - were careful to say in the quad meeting that their paper on Steinmeier's June CFE conference was "only a first draft" and there was no intent to negotiate future changes to the Adapted Treaty in advance of its ratification. End comment.) -- German Seminars: German rep Biontino commented at length on the Steinmeier-proposed June seminar on the Future of Arms Control in Europe. Berlin envisions this will be at the Director General level and include all countries that could eventually join a/CFE (that is, current CFE countries, plus the Nordics, Balkans, and neutrals). Biontino proposed elaborating the seminar objectives through several rounds of consultations with Allies before consulting with Russia. He explained that FM Steinmeier had announced this seminar (without prior coordination) at the December OSCE Ministerial because he wanted to stress to Russia the importance of arms control, and because of Germany's desire to sustain ongoing efforts. The objective, he insisted, was not to initiate a separate process (he called the parallel actions package "the best show in town"). Rather, Biontino remarked it would be useful to take stock and openly discuss possible ways forward through an informal exchange of ideas. We should seek to 'make progress now' in areas where agreement can be reached while continuing to work towards agreement on issues that will require longer to resolve. He argued that time was limited, given the erosion of the CFE regime, and that Steinmeier's initiative could explore possibilities for compromise and identify steps to speed the pace of the negotiations. The result might simply be a framework to keep the process going. U.S. rep Davis remarked that whether the German meeting was formal or informal it would be an important part of the current process, and critical to carefully consider goals and ensure the Alliance gets the most out of it to achieve progress. Biontino also noted that the upcoming seminar at RACVIAC in March was another in the series of seminars and would focus on conventional arms control in a strategic environment post-1996 and 1999 and the implications of progress in technology. -- CFE and the Medvedev Security Treaty: Several allies, including Biontino, also stressed that the future of European security cannot be envisaged without effective arms control - without CFE. Biontino noted that the German June 10 seminar is also, in part, an answer to Russia's security treaty proposal. Several Allies - most insistently the Germans, on the margins - noted that they did not want CFE to get caught up in political issues such as Georgia. Many felt strongly that there should not be a European security Treaty discussion in the absence of a CFE pillar. The Belgian rep (De Witte) was clear that Belgium had no interest in discussing security architecture, institutions, or a treaty with Russia, but very much wants to keep CFE. Greek rep Daskarolis called for preserving the "acquis of the Parallel Actions Package" and isolating CFE efforts from debates on the future of European security architecture - debates that Greece (OSCE CiO) argued should take place in Vienna at the OSCE. Czech rep Zvonkova echoed the Belgian and Greek sentiments. UK rep Ford stressed that CFE and other European security issues were inextricably linked by the core principles that underlie them and warned that by isolating either there would be a serious risk of undermining these core principles. ¶5. (C) The Chair (Erdmann) noted, with regard to the paper on "Raising NATO's Profile in the Field of Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation," that the SYG's intent is for an agreed document rather than a Chairman's Report. This caught a number of Allies by surprise, and several stated that moving from a chairman's paper to an agreed document would require more than a head-nod. Several Allies (UK, Turkey, Germany and U.S.) noted that the current CFE language in the paper was a reasonable starting point but would need to be reviewed and possibly revised, an effort that the HLTF-D will undertake. (Comment: the CFE language is in fact not the most controversial element of this paper, as Allies were well aware. End comment) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - UNDERSTANDABLE BUT INEXCUSABLE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Georgia's rejection of Russian Vienna Document inspection and evaluation requests was briefly discussed in the HLTF and on the margins. All Allies who spoke on this (Netherlands, France, Germany, Turkey, Greece, UK, U.S.) expressed disappointment that Georgia had rejected the Russian requests noting "we understand the reasons as a political matter, but we cannot excuse the decision." Allies underscored their hope that Georgia's action would not have the effect of undermining implementation of the VDOC elsewhere. The Turks were worried about a spillover effect on other regional players - Armenia and Azerbaijan, for example. The UK and U.S. underscored that Russia was in the position of the pot calling the kettle black: Russia was preventing transparency in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and had been turning down inspections in key parts of the NCMD for years. But all agreed that lack of transparency was the wrong answer and that the preference was for the issue to be addressed in Vienna without furt her escalation. - - - - - - - - - - - - IMPLEMENTATION MATTERS - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Preparation for the AIAM: The International Staff (Miggins) noted that the VCC had requested HLTF guidance on taking forward VCC papers to the AIAM. Miggins reported there were four papers that had already achieved consensus. Allies agreed that current VCC papers should be used to enrich discussion at the AIAM and could be deployed on a national basis, and not/not as a NATO position, with the understanding that any topic without VCC agreement would not get agreement in Vienna. ¶8. (C) CFE Inspections: Regarding the Allied CFE inspection plan, U.S. rep reiterated (per reftel) that all should continue to attempt to execute inspections of Russia in accordance with the agreed schedule for the remainder of the current Treaty year and the upcoming Treaty year. No Ally disagreed. On the margins, the U.S. rep noted to France that it was not clear whether or not France had notified inspections in 2008 as scheduled. The French rep did not appear aware of the situation; this matter should be further pursued in the VCC or on the margins. - - - - - - - - - - - - MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) On the margins of the HLTF, the U.S. met with quad reps from Germany, France and the UK, as well as conducted bilateral meetings with Turkey, Romania, and Norway. For the most part, Allies previewed and discussed the same points that they made in the main HLTF meeting with a few exceptions. -- Quad: Much of the discussion in the quad mirrored points made in plenary; however, in the quad meeting there was a deeper discussion of German plans and intentions for the June 10 CFE conference in Berlin. Germany (Biontino) helpfully offered that Germany would not circulate a paper on the meeting before first having a quad discussion, to include - he noted after being prompted - at a senior level. He said Germany had already informed the Russians of the date and general purpose of the meeting. Asked by the U.S. about possible flexibility on timing, Biontino suggested that it would not be possible to shift the meeting to later in the summer because Steinmeier did not wish to politicize the meeting by scheduling it close to the German elections in the fall. He noted that FM Steinmeier would likely send out invitations in early April. Germany would need a clearer idea of the purpose and goals for the meeting by then. The U.S. and UK expressed concern about the apparent intention of the German meeting, to identify the parameters of a future renegotiation of the CFE Treaty, noting that it appeared at odds with the current mainstream of Allied thinking. Germany agreed that Alliance cohesion was important, but remarked that it was also a "double-edged sword." The Germans, supported by the French, underscored the need for visible progress to halt further erosion of the regime, citing Georgia's VDOC refusals as evidence of contagion. Germany suggested that while the June meeting is intended to help sustain the current, agreed process, it could also serve as an opportunity to explore new ideas and any room for compromise. -- Turkey: Turkish Rep Ahmet Gun's basic message to the U.S. delegation was unequivocal: Turkey stands solidly behind every element of the NATO proposal and expects the U.S. to remain in the leading role. Turkey does not want to change NATO's position; Ankara thinks Moscow is taking a maximalist view and playing wait-and-see. Gun sharply underscored that changes to the Adapted Treaty could only be considered after it has been ratified and entered into force. He also made clear a preference to retain the U.S.-RF bilateral dialogue as the way forward with Russia on CFE, but would be willing, if the U.S. felt it would be helpful, to join in an expanded format discussion among interested Allies, provided the agenda was not exclusively focused on the flank and Turkish participation was not limited to flank issues. Such an enlarged group - maybe 8-11 Allies with Russia - would need to engage on the full Parallel Actions Package agenda, he said. -- Romania: Romanian rep Micula delivered a similar (if maybe tougher) message. Micula stressed that the recent administration change in Bucharest meant that CFE would be at the top of the agenda across key agencies. He noted concerns with the potential legitimization of Russian forces in Transnistria and Georgia, repeating Romanian preferences for definitive timelines regarding Russian withdrawal from Moldova and Georgia as necessary positive signals from Russia. Regarding the German seminar, Micula expressed concern with the timing and the context, offering that there was a clear linkage to upcoming German elections. Romania has no expectations of any serious evolution in the NATO position or the situation on the ground between now and the Summit that would support any changes to the December communique CFE language. -- Norway: The bilateral meeting with Norway resulted in a wide-ranging, interesting and largely off the record discussion especially with regard to the flank and to existing political commitments between Russia and Norway. The U.S. and Norwegian teams exchanged candid readouts of their respective bilateral meetings with Antonov. EUR expert Laurendeau recounted in detail A/S Fried's exchange with Antonov on the status of Russia's political commitments in the north. Asked by the U.S. whether they would stand by their political commitments regarding equipment levels in the north, the Russians had dissembled briefly, noting changes that had taken place in the political situation since the commitments were made, such as Baltic membership in NATO. But then the Russians had indicated they expected Russia would honor the commitments. The Norwegian team commented that they had assumed that when Russia suspended CFE they suspended the related political commitments as well, and had not raised the issue in their bilateral meeting with Antonov in early December. The U.S. team observed that in A/S Fried's discussion in Geneva, it had appeared that the Russian side was interested in whether the U.S. or its Allies would consider political commitments as an alternative to the flank limits. The U.S. team noted that A/S Fried had responded consistent with the NATO position, underscoring that Russia's military action in Georgia had if anything heightened the importance Allies attach to the flank limits. But Russian probing on this matter was of interest nonetheless. ¶10. (SBU) NEXT MEETINGS. Allies agreed, largely in deference to the U.S. transition process, that there was no need for a meeting in February. The next meeting should be scheduled prior to the April 3-4 Summit with sufficient time to coordinate any CFE-related language. The next HLTF is now set for March 12, 2009. VOLKER