RUSSIA SAYS IT FACES FINANCIAL CONTRAINTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000492

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MOPS NATO AF PK RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA SAYS IT FACES FINANCIAL CONTRAINTS
PROVIDING AID TO AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Political Advisor Kelly Degnan for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Russian MFA Second Asia Department Deputy
Director Ali Mustafabeli told Deputy to the Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (D/SRAP) Paul
Jones on October 21 that Moscow was considering additional
aid to Afghanistan, but was limited by the difficult
financial situation Russia faced. The GOR was ready to
provide weapons and engage in infrastructure reconstruction
projects, and looked to the U.S. and others to help cover the
costs. Mustafabeli could not fully explain the disparity
between Russia's political commitment to expand cooperation
in Afghanistan and the level of practical cooperation on the
ground. Russia was concerned that electoral irregularities
had further diminished Afghans' faith in their government,
and advised the U.S. and international community to provide
greater political support to Karzai, while remaining in the
background. Russia hoped that Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) would become more effective against extremists,
while power relationships between Kabul and tribal leaders
needed to be addressed. Mustafabeli expressed Russian
concern over the threat from Afghan narcotics, and asked that
the U.S. and NATO consider cooperating with the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on counter-narcotics
efforts. End summary.

Russian Assistance to Afghanistan
--------------


2. (C) During an October 21 bilateral meeting held in advance
of a NATO-Russia Council meeting on Afghanistan and Pakistan,
D/SRAP Paul Jones acknowledged to Mustafabeli previous
Russian assistance to Afghanistan and asked what more the GOR
could provide. Mustafabeli explained that Russia was doing
its best in the "framework of our financial possibilities,"
leading Jones to respond that for a country of Russia's
stature, the aid under discussion was not large. He pressed
for Russian in-kind contributions, such as the 50,000 AK-47s
recently requested by Afghan Interior Minister Atmar.
Mustafabeli responded that this request was still under
consideration, and asked why the U.S. would not purchase
Russian weapons for Afghanistan when Moscow was offering them
at low cost.


3. (C) Mustafabeli said that Russia was ready to work on
Afghan infrastructure projects, and might cover some costs,
but there was the question of who would pay for the rest.
Jones explained the difficulty in asking Congress to
appropriate funds for Russian firms to work in Afghanistan.
He and Mustafabeli agreed that the bilateral discussion on
potential Russian assistance to Afghanistan had been going in
circles. Possible ways forward include political level
meetings on our practical cooperation, such as when
Ambassador Holbrooke visits Moscow, and interagency expert
level meetings that could expand and clarify specific areas
for cooperation.

Afghan Election and Governance
--------------


4. (C) Mustafabeli lamented that the hopes placed upon the
recent Afghan election had been ruined by the scale of
irregularities, which had discredited the electoral process,
and perhaps the presidency itself. He stressed the need to
cultivate among Afghans a positive image of the central
government, and advised that the international community have
Karzai publicly announce new initiatives, even if these were
actually directed by the U.S. and other outside contributors.
Jones responded that no one had expected the election to be
perfect, but that the scale of irregularities were such that
they could not be ignored. He explained that the U.S. agreed
with Mustafabeli's observations, and had advised Karzai to
focus on local governance and delivering basic services to
the population.


5. (C) Mustafabeli stressed the need for the international
community to help the central government develop a

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sustainable capacity to combat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. He
posited, however, that the issue went deeper than simply
defeating extremists, and was a question of settling the
division of power between the central government, the
provinces, and tribal leaders. Mustafabeli warned that
despite progress overcoming these divisions, the fight would
start again the day after international forces left the
country. Jones made clear to Mustafabeli that the U.S. did
not want permanent bases in Afghanistan, but remained
committed to achieving our core goal. This required building
up ANSF quickly and effectively, as well as working with
Afghanistan's neighbors.

Counter-Narcotics
--------------


6. (C) Mustafabeli said that Moscow looked forward to SRAP
Holbrooke's visit, and stressed that it would be politically
important for him to meet with Russian drug enforcement
officials to demonstrate U.S. commitment to counter-narcotics
efforts in Afghanistan. He suggested that Ambassador
Holbrooke also meet with members of the Russian Duma, where
rumors circulated that Afghan drug trafficking was purposely
aimed at Russia. Mustafabeli raised the issue of the U.S.
and NATO cooperating with the CSTO's counter-narcotics
effort, Operation Canal, explaining that this was merely
practical, and not political, cooperation on a matter of
concern to Russia and the Central Asian states.


7. (U) This cable was cleared by D/SRAP Jones.
HEFFERN