KFOR DRAWDOWN: CONDITIONS MUST BE RIGHT TO MOVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000433 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS MARR KV YI SUBJECT: KFOR DRAWDOWN: CONDITIONS MUST BE RIGHT TO MOVE BEYOND GATE ONE REF: USNATO 409 Classified By: Political Advisor Kelly Degnan. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (SBU) This is an action request. See para 10. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY. NATO International Military Staff Assistant Director for Operations Major General Li Gobbi and KFOR Military Civil Advisory Division Deputy Chief of Staff Brigadier General Polimeno on October 2 briefed the KFOR Policy Coordination Group on the KFOR drawdown and Kosovo Security Force (KSF) stand-up. MG Li Gobbi related the new KFOR commander's assessment that KFOR was on track to meet Gate 1 (10,000 troops) of the move to deterrent presence by January 2010, but that work would need to be done after January to create the conditions for subsequent movements. Deputy Assistant Secretary General (DASG) for Operations Rossin said that Serbian President Tadic had told NATO Secretary General Rasmussen that Belgrade will soon submit a letter to NATO requesting changes to the Kumanovo Military Technical Agreement (MTA). BG Polimeno and DASG Rossin highlighted the need for a coordinated effort--including by nations--to attract more Kosovo Serbs to join the KSF and for nations to provide the necessary trainers and resources to complete the job of standing up the KSF. We request Washington consider whether the USG can provide some of the additional short-term trainers required. END SUMMARY -------------- -------------- Conditions Must Be Right for KFOR Drawdown to Proceed -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) NATO International Military Staff Assistant Director for Operations Major General Li Gobbi on October 2 briefed the KFOR Policy Coordination Group (PCG) that, based on the Military Committee (MC) visit to Kosovo on September 29, the Alliance needed to ensure that the KFOR drawdown process remained conditions-based. MG Li Gobbi asked national representatives to relay this point to their capitals because it was evident that some KFOR contributors were making preparations to withdraw on fixed time-lines. He passed on new KFOR commander (COMKFOR) Lieutenant General Markus Bentler's assessment that KFOR was on track to meet Gate 1 (10,000 troops) of the move to deterrent presence by January 2010, but that work would need to be done after January to create the conditions for subsequent movements to Gate 2 (5,500 troops) and Gate 3 (2,500 troops). ¶4. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary General (DASG) for Operations Rossin expressed great confidence in LTG Bentler, saying he understood the political sensitivities regarding the KFOR move to deterrent presence and was integrating them well into how KFOR was operating on the ground. He said COMKFOR understood the extreme sensitivity of unfixing from the 9 KFOR-protected patrimonial sites and appreciated the need for the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to control the entire drawdown process. Rossin said that LTG Bentler assessed that border deconfliction issues would also affect the drawdown process; for example, NATO must take into account that the potential for Serbian forces and Kosovo Police to come into direct contact in border areas would increase as KFOR downsizes. ¶5. (C) Swedish officials approached PolOff after the meeting to relay that they had sought guidance from capital after Ambassador Daalder's intervention in the Council on September 23 regarding the need for nations not to set unilateral timelines for withdrawing their KFOR troops (reftel). They said Stockholm had advised that, due to the way the country's call-up system worked, Sweden would be unable to change the Fall 2010 date for their forces' drawdown unless KFOR faced USNATO 00000433 002 OF 003 an emergency situation. In November 2009, however, Sweden would provide an additional trainer for the NATO Advisory Team (NAT) that is charged with standing up the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force (MKSF). Stockholm also hoped to make an additional pledge to the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) Trust Fund in 2010. -------------- Belgrade Wants Changes to the MTA -------------- ¶6. (C) DASG Rossin reported that Serbian President Tadic had told NATO Secretary General (SYG) Rasmussen on the margins of the UN General Assembly that Belgrade would consider NATO willingness to change the Kumanovo Military Technical Agreement (MTA) as a positive political signal. According to Rossin, Tadic said Belgrade had drafted a letter outlining the MTA changes it seeks and would soon deliver the letter to the SYG. Rossin said that the SYG would inform nations when he has received the letter. (Comment: The SYG told participants in the Europe 2010 Pol-Mil Conference on September 30 that he favored responding positively to the Serbian request. However, a number of Alliance members consider this a very sensitive issue and will not be so inclined. Further, we understand that some of the changes Belgrade is likely to seek could have negative implications for Kosovo with regard to border demarcation. End Comment) -------------- KSF Needs More Serbs and More Resources -------------- ¶7. (C) In response to U.S., Italian, and Bulgarian interventions, KFOR Military Civil Advisory Division (MCAD) Deputy Chief of Staff Brigadier General Polimeno highlighted the need for a coordinated effort to attract more Kosovo Serbs to join the KSF. BG Polimeno, backed by DASG Rossin, asked for nations to weigh in with Belgrade to restore its links with KFOR, saying this could eventually break the top-down resistance to Kosovo Serbs' joining the KSF. He also reported that the NAT and MKSF were trying to work with local Kosovo Serb authorities and to find Kosovo Serbs to fill the KSF Deputy Commander and other senior positions. ¶8. (C) BG Polimeno, backed by the U.S., Germany, and Italy, also appealed to nations to volunteer KSF trainers at the SHAPE Manning Conference planned for October 28 and to fill the 10 million euro shortfall in the KSF Trust Fund, noting that delays in providing the needed resources after November would significantly lengthen the time needed for the KSF to reach Full Operating Capability (FOC). According to Polimeno, KFOR needed a small number of HAZMAT, fire-fighting, and EOD experts for a seven-week period to train KSF trainers. If nations provide the necessary resources, the KSF stand-up effort would shift from a training mission to a mentoring mission in February 2010 and the KSF could reach FOC around September 2011. ¶9. (C) Comment: We have heard almost universally positive responses to the new COMKFOR's rigorous, conditions-based approach to the KFOR downsizing process. The large majority of Allies here, ourselves included, share the view that we will not be in a position to consider Gate 2 until after KFOR reaches Gate 1 next year and that the political and security conditions must be right to authorize that move. An earlier recommendation by NATO Military Authorities to move to Gate 2 would not be welcomed by political authorities. We expect substantive and probing debate in the PCG and NAC concerning the Gate 2 decision, given the significant changes in KFOR structure and size envisioned with this move. Should nations not come forward to fill the current shortfalls in intelligence, reserves, and logistics necessary for KFOR success at Gates 2 and 3, this would have a very negative USNATO 00000433 003 OF 003 impact on that political debate. End Comment. ¶10. (C) Action Request: With regard to KSF stand-up requirements, KFOR is only seeking six KSF instructors for a seven-week period, two each for HAZMAT, Firefighting, and EOD training. USNATO requests that Washington consider whether the USG might be able to provide some of these trainers. DAALDER