Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USNATO432
2009-10-07 05:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:
RUSSIAN CANDOR IN THE NATO-RUSSIA PREPCOM
how-toVZCZCXRO3880 PP RUEHDBU RUEHSL DE RUEHNO #0432 2800531 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 070531Z OCT 09 FM USMISSION USNATO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3456 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM EXERCISE VAIHINGEN GE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000432
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN CANDOR IN THE NATO-RUSSIA PREPCOM
Classified By: Political Advisor Kelly Degnan for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000432
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN CANDOR IN THE NATO-RUSSIA PREPCOM
Classified By: Political Advisor Kelly Degnan for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) A mid-level member of the Russian Mission to NATO
struck a notable tone of candor by admitting that significant
daylight existed between Moscow and the Russian Mission to
NATO on improving the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and focusing
the organization on meaningful areas of cooperation. In
response to questions from the U.S. and other Allies during
an October 6 NRC Preparatory Committee meeting on
restructuring, Second Secretary Anna Zakharchenko explained
that the only instructions provided by Moscow on this topic
were to stop eliminating any existing NRC committees or
working groups and to push for the creation of a new working
group on Afghanistan. In contrast, she said that the Russian
Mission saw the benefits of restructuring and wanted to
cooperate with other NRC members to make this a more
effective forum producing tangible results. Allies received
her candor positively, but were concerned that this situation
could mean the NRC would once again move toward significant
improvements only to have the exercise torpedoed at the last
minute because the Russian Mission did not have Moscow's
support.
2. (C) Zakharchenko explained to us on the margins that much
of her Mission's problem stemmed from the difficulty in
reaching consensus on the NRC within the Russian interagency.
The MFA was more inclined to support closer cooperation with
NATO, while the MOD and other bodies remained skeptical,
thereby limiting Moscow's ability to transmit constructive
instructions. We told Zakharchenko that the U.S. and other
Allies were anxious to work with the Russian Mission to help
convince Moscow that NRC restructuring would reinvigorate the
organization and demonstrate that NATO and Russia were
committed to effective political collaboration and practical
cooperation.
3. (C) Comment: While we may receive cooperation from
working-level Russian officials, Russian Ambassador to NATO
Dmitri Rogozin remains the unknown factor in this equation,
as we are not certain if he is included when our Russian
interlocutors describe the views of their Mission. In
contrast to Zakharchenko's candor, Rogozin stuck to the
instructions received from Moscow during an October 5
informal NRC Ambassadorial, arguing for preserving all
existing NRC working groups and creating a new Afghan group
(septel). Convincing Rogozin of the need to accept NRC
reform will be the real challenge, although even this may not
be sufficient to bring Moscow on board as Rogozin's influence
within the Russian foreign policy apparatus is questionable.
DAALDER
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN CANDOR IN THE NATO-RUSSIA PREPCOM
Classified By: Political Advisor Kelly Degnan for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) A mid-level member of the Russian Mission to NATO
struck a notable tone of candor by admitting that significant
daylight existed between Moscow and the Russian Mission to
NATO on improving the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and focusing
the organization on meaningful areas of cooperation. In
response to questions from the U.S. and other Allies during
an October 6 NRC Preparatory Committee meeting on
restructuring, Second Secretary Anna Zakharchenko explained
that the only instructions provided by Moscow on this topic
were to stop eliminating any existing NRC committees or
working groups and to push for the creation of a new working
group on Afghanistan. In contrast, she said that the Russian
Mission saw the benefits of restructuring and wanted to
cooperate with other NRC members to make this a more
effective forum producing tangible results. Allies received
her candor positively, but were concerned that this situation
could mean the NRC would once again move toward significant
improvements only to have the exercise torpedoed at the last
minute because the Russian Mission did not have Moscow's
support.
2. (C) Zakharchenko explained to us on the margins that much
of her Mission's problem stemmed from the difficulty in
reaching consensus on the NRC within the Russian interagency.
The MFA was more inclined to support closer cooperation with
NATO, while the MOD and other bodies remained skeptical,
thereby limiting Moscow's ability to transmit constructive
instructions. We told Zakharchenko that the U.S. and other
Allies were anxious to work with the Russian Mission to help
convince Moscow that NRC restructuring would reinvigorate the
organization and demonstrate that NATO and Russia were
committed to effective political collaboration and practical
cooperation.
3. (C) Comment: While we may receive cooperation from
working-level Russian officials, Russian Ambassador to NATO
Dmitri Rogozin remains the unknown factor in this equation,
as we are not certain if he is included when our Russian
interlocutors describe the views of their Mission. In
contrast to Zakharchenko's candor, Rogozin stuck to the
instructions received from Moscow during an October 5
informal NRC Ambassadorial, arguing for preserving all
existing NRC working groups and creating a new Afghan group
(septel). Convincing Rogozin of the need to accept NRC
reform will be the real challenge, although even this may not
be sufficient to bring Moscow on board as Rogozin's influence
within the Russian foreign policy apparatus is questionable.
DAALDER