ALLIES RECEIVE FURTHER DETAILS ON BALLISTIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000421 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2019 TAGS: PARM MARR PREL NATO SUBJECT: ALLIES RECEIVE FURTHER DETAILS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT, USG PLANS FOR EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE REF: STATE 96519 Classified By: Ambassador Ivo H. Daalder for reasons 1.4(B)&(D). ¶1. (C) Summary: An inter-agency team consulted with Allies at a special October 1 NAC on the evolving nature of the ballistic missile threat, and on additional details of the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to European missile defense (MD) first briefed to them September 17 (reftel). Allies were once again appreciative of the timeliness and detail offered by briefers, and elicited further details with their questions. Interest in Russia's reaction to the PAA was widespread. The team promised an additional consultation focused more closely on NATO's MD plans ahead of the October 22-23 Defense Ministerial in Bratislava. This message has not been cleared by ASD Vershbow. End Summary. -------------- UPDATED THREAT BRIEFING... -------------- ¶2. (C) A team headed by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow, and including Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon and Nancy Morgan of the Missile Defense Agency, updated a special October 1 North Atlantic Council meeting on USG plans for European MD. The team began with an update on the ballistic missile threat assessment focused on Iran, Syria and North Korea. They emphasized the numbers and ranges of respective ballistic missile arsenals, especially the short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs/MRBMs) that currently threaten NATO territory. (Note: SRBMs are those ballistic missiles with ranges under 1000 kilometers; MRBMs, 1000-3500 km; Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs),3500-5500 km; and Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs, over 5500 km. End Note.) -------------- ...AND FURTHER INFORMATION ON PAA -------------- ¶3. (C) ASD Vershbow underlined that U.S. PAA plans would reinforce and strengthen current and future NATO MD efforts -- both the NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) software backbone, and a potential NATO-wide, multi-layered territorial MD architecture. Given today's complex threat environment, any NATO MD system would need to be flexible, survivable, adaptable and updateable. ¶4. (C) ASD Vershbow then laid out in greater detail the proposed four-phase approach to MD in Europe: - Phase 1 (2011) - sea-based systems (Aegis cruisers equipped with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA interceptors), augmented by a forward-based radar system (AN/TPY-2) would focus protection on Southern Europe -- exact system locations would be flexible and have not yet been decided; - Phase 2 (2015) - SM-3 Block IB interceptors, in both sea- and land-based configurations, along with a broad net of sea-, land- and air-based sensors, will enhance defensive capabilities against the SRBM/MRBM threat and increase coverage to potential NATO targets; - Phase 3 (2018) - SM-3 Block IIA interceptors and additional sensor capabilities will protect all European NATO territory from the MRBM and IRBM threats; - Phase 4 (2020) - by the time the planned SM-3 Block IIB interceptor is deployed, distributed sensor assets will be even more capable, providing some MD capability versus ICBMs. All NATO territory will be protected by land-based systems only, allowing sea-based systems to be used in crisis situations as an additional surge capability against salvo-fired ballistic missiles. ASD Vershbow noted plans to send another briefing team to NATO in advance of the October 22-23 Defense Ministerial meetings in Bratislava. This team would focus more specifically on how PAA would interact with NATO's ongoing MD plans. -------------- ALLIED PRAISE WIDESPREAD, QUESTIONS FOCUSED -------------- ¶5. (C) Italy led off by asking whether, if PAA were truly USNATO 00000421 002 OF 002 threat-based, a diminution or halt to the ballistic missile threat to Europe from the southeast would slow down or halt MD deployment. ASD Vershbow replied that President Obama had said from the beginning that, in the absence of a threat, the rationale for MD disappeared -- but, that said, at present the threat was real and growing. Denmark praised both the briefing and the pledge to have another, more NATO-centric, briefing before the Bratislava ministerial, and wondered (along with Germany) what Russia's reaction had been to the PAA announcement in September. A/S Gordon replied by reiterating that PAA was never designed with Russian reaction in mind, but was rather based on changes to the threat assessment and improved technological MD capabilities. If Russia chose to cooperate with the U.S. and NATO on MD, so much the better. ¶6. (C) Germany also appreciated both the two past PAA briefings and the upcoming NATO-centric session, which would be of great benefit to defense ministers in Bratislava. The architectural options on which the Bucharest Summit MD language was based had changed, a point with which ASD Vershbow agreed. Backed by Norway, Germany then asked if PAA was seen as a NATO MD program with U.S. inputs, or as a U.S. national MD program with NATO inputs. (The Norwegians added that, if the USG was interested in "fly before you buy" MD systems, who would be buying?) A/S Gordon replied that today's briefing was intended to move the dialogue forward, that NATO experts were already studying the impact of PAA on NATO's MD plans, and that possible contributions by Allies might range from a statement of support for PAA to considerable involvement and investment. That said, the planned MD system in question was NATO's, and today's briefing was intended to highlight planned U.S. contributions to that NATO MD system. ¶7. (C) Romania noted that the updated threat assessment had clearly mentioned Romania as at risk from the current ballistic missile threat from Iran, and wondered if any decisions had been made on the placement of land-based system components. ASD Vershbow noted that it was too soon in the process to specify locations, since only the Czech Republic and Poland had had bilateral consultations on PAA so far. The Netherlands asked if the repositioning of mobile MD components might be considered provocative by potential aggressors (Note: It was unclear whether the Dutch representative was speaking of Iran or Russia in this context, and his attempt to clarify the question added little light. End Note.) ASD Vershbow noted that only sea-based systems were truly mobile, and could be moved quickly in crisis situations. On the question of provocation, an effective MD system would actually enhance Alliance deterrence. ¶8. (C) Norway asked whether a decision had already been made to go ahead with Phase 2 and future phases of the program. ASD Vershbow replied that PAA was a package that would be implemented by stages, and was adaptable to future changes to the threat assessment. Based on the current threat, Phase 2 would proceed as planned for 2015. Portugal noted the continuing need for diplomacy in nonproliferation, and asked for Allies to be updated on nonproliferation efforts in addition to MD developments. Finally, Hungary asked whether Israel and its considerable MD capabilities were included in U.S. MD plans for Europe. ASD Vershbow replied that Israel's capabilities were in large part the fruit of cooperation with the U.S., and that they could potentially enhance European MD performance. ¶9. (C) The Acting Secretary General thanked the team and the USG for its "continuous updating" of Allies on MD plans, and for distributing briefing materials at the NAC. All of the information provided would help inform the deliberations of defense ministers in Bratislava. Meanwhile, NATO's Executive Working Group, reinforced from capitals (EWG(R)) had been tasked with preparing an initial analysis of PAA's impact on NATO MD plans, and that report would be considered by the NAC before the Bratislava ministerial. DAALDER