Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USNATO409
2009-09-25 14:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

NAC STRESSES THAT KFOR DRAWDOWN MUST REMAIN

Tags:  PREL NATO PGOV MOPS MARR KV YI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000409 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS MARR KV YI
SUBJECT: NAC STRESSES THAT KFOR DRAWDOWN MUST REMAIN
CONDITIONS-BASED

Classified By: Political Advisor Kelly Degnan. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000409 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS MARR KV YI SUBJECT: NAC STRESSES THAT KFOR DRAWDOWN MUST REMAIN CONDITIONS-BASED Classified By: Political Advisor Kelly Degnan. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At a September 23 Council meeting in KFOR contributing nations format, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Di Paola highlighted the lack of national pledges to fill key intelligence and reserve requirements during the KFOR Force Shaping Conference on September 8. He relayed the concern of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) that some nations have indicated fixed end-dates for their participation in KFOR, which could jeopardize the conditions-based nature of the drawdown. Ambassador Daalder, with wide backing, reminded Allies that they had agreed that the move to deterrent presence was to be conditions-based without fixed timelines, and called on all to match their commitment in the field with the commitments they had made in Council. Given the 10.1 million euro shortfall in the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) stand-up trust fund, Ambassador Daalder urged all PermReps to go back to their capitals to seek the necessary resources. Deputy Secretary General Bisogniero closed by endorsing the conditions-based nature of KFOR downsizing, saying that the NAC would control the entire process. END SUMMARY -------------- KFOR Downsizing Must Remain Conditions-Based -------------- ¶2. (C) Deputy Secretary General (DSYG) Bisogniero opened discussion with the Council and non-NATO KFOR contributors by expressing optimism that KFOR would be able to downsize to a small reaction force or be withdrawn altogether by the end of Secretary General's Rasmussen's term (NOTE: SYG Rasmussen's initial term of office will end in 2013). Turkey, supported by Hungary and Italy, urged NATO to monitor closely the situation in Kosovo and broader region, particularly the Kosovo elections in November and impact of the Kosovo International Court of Justice (ICJ) case. Hungary added that the potential for destabilizing political developments made NAC control of KFOR downsizing critical. ¶3. (C) Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Di Paola highlighted the lack of national pledges during the September 8 KFOR Force Shaping Conference to fill the Theater Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) battalion, Strategic Reserve Force (SRF) battalion, and one Operational Reserve Force (ORF) battalion. He i
ndicated that ISR was particularly critical, given that KFOR's move to deterrent presence is predicated on shifting toward more intelligence-driven operations. He relayed the concern of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) that some nations have indicated fixed end-dates for their participation in KFOR, which could jeopardize the conditions-based nature of the drawdown (NOTE: We understand that Belgium and Slovakia and non-NATO KFOR contributors' Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Ukraine stipulated at least tentative end-dates for some or all of their forces). ¶4. (C) Ambassador Daalder praised non-NATO KFOR troop contributors for their participation in KFOR and questioned why Allies weren't stepping up to the plate to fill needed gaps. He reminded Allies that they had agreed that the move to deterrent presence was to be conditions-based without fixed timelines, and called on all to match their commitment in the field with the commitments they had made in Council. Germany, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Albania backed U.S. comments. ¶5. (C) Greece and Slovenia pledged to continue serving in KFOR. Portugal said it planned no changes to its force levels for the first phase (i.e., Gate 1). Switzerland indicated that it intended to maintain full support for KFOR, cautioning that the delicate situation in Kosovo demanded a USNATO 00000409 002 OF 002 broad vision for the situation. The Swedish Ambassador said she had taken note of the agreed approach and would relay this discussion back to capital. ¶6. (C) Turkey, supported by Germany, said KFOR's drawdown should be synchronized with the evolution of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). Ambassador Daalder added that building up indigenous security capabilities was key to creating the conditions that would allow KFOR to downsize. Italy stressed the important role the KSF has to play in ensuring Kosovo's stability. The DSYG closed the discussion by endorsing the conditions-based nature of KFOR downsizing, saying there would be no automaticity and that the NAC would control the entire process. -------------- Shortfalls Threaten KSF Stand-Up -------------- ¶7. (C) The DSYG noted that there is a 10.1 million euro shortfall in the KSF stand-up trust fund. Adm. Di Paola stressed that national contributions, particularly 1.3 million euros needed in the short-term, are critical to keeping the KSF on track to reach Full Operating Capability (FOC) within 2-5 years. ¶8. (C) Ambassador Daalder, backed by Turkey, urged all PermReps to go back to their capitals to seek the resources necessary to fulfill the commitment Allies agreed to undertake with regard to building up the KSF. Germany added that NATO should broaden participation in the trust fund beyond the Alliance and KFOR contributors. Slovenia and Albania said they were considering new contributions, and the Swedish Ambassador said she would check with Stockholm about making an additional pledge. ¶9. (C) Adm. Di Paola noted that the Senior Resource Board had agreed to continue common funding for NATO Training Teams (NTTs) working with the KSF until February 2010. The DSYG urged nations to volunteer personnel to man the NATO Advisory Team (NAT) for the Ministry of the KSF as the NAT was only at 66 percent manning. He highlighted the need to fill vacant slots in the areas of contracts and procurement, communications, and information systems. -------------- KFOR Remains Ready to Back EULEX -------------- ¶10. (C) In response to a Swedish request for an assessment of KFOR's relationship with the EU Law and Justice Mission in Kosovo (EULEX),Adm. Di Paola characterized KFOR-EULEX relations as excellent and said KFOR remains fully capable to back EULEX. In response to a Greek query concerning the implications for KFOR of recent violence against EULEX, Adm. Di Paola assessed that this situation has not fundamentally challenged the safe and secure environment in Kosovo. DAALDER

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