NATO SYG MEETS RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ROGOZIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000348


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019
TAGS: NATO PGOV PINR PREF
SUBJECT: NATO SYG MEETS RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ROGOZIN

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Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (U) This is an Action Request. See paragraph 8.


2. (C) Summary: On August 11, 2009, new NATO Secretary
General Rasmussen held his first meeting with Russia's
Ambassador Rogozin, following Rasmussen's announcement that
improving NATO-Russia relations is one of his three
priorities as Secretary General. Rasmussen reported to
Allies that the meeting was "overall very positive" and that
the two discussed the future of the NRC, Russian support for
Afghanistan, and the NATO Strategic Concept. Rogozin
provided Rasmussen with a non-paper on NATO-Russia
cooperation, the text of which is provided below. Unless
otherwise directed, USNATO will express concern about the
lack of any mention of the territorial integrity of Georgia
in the discussion between Rasmussen and Rogozin, as well as
point out our reservations about several of the suggestions
in Russia's non-paper. End summary.

Rasmussen's Meeting with Rogozin
--------------


3. (C) During their first bilateral meeting on August 11,
NATO SYG Rasmussen and Russian Ambassador to NATO Rogozin
discussed the future of the NATO-Russia relationship a year
after the Georgia-Russia War. Rasmussen stressed his desire
to strengthen NATO-Russia cooperation and added that the NRC
had not reached its full potential as an efficient,
results-oriented body. Rogozin said he wanted to work on the
"Taking the NRC Forward" draft in preparation for the NATO
December Ministerial and stressed that he did not/not want to
eliminate any existing NRC groups, but rather reform those
that were not working or were dormant. Rogozin indicated
that Russian FM Lavrov wanted to meet Rasmussen on the
margins of the UN General Assembly in New York and that
Russia wanted Rasmussen to visit Moscow shortly thereafter.
Rogozin also proposed a meeting in the near future between
NATO International Staff and members of the Russian Mission
to NATO to discuss specific aspects of NATO-Russia
cooperation.


4. (C) In Afghanistan, Rogozin said that Russia wanted to
intensify its assistance by creating a special working group
on Afghanistan in the NRC and by enlarging the NRC
Counter-Narcotics training project to focus on drug
trafficking in Afghanistan. Rogozin also suggested an NRC
Ambassadorial meeting on Afghanistan/Pakistan to which all
delegations could bring experts. Rasmussen agreed that the
NRC Ambassadorial meeting could be useful, but did not
respond specifically to Rogozin's other proposals.


5. (C) Regarding the Strategic Concept, Rogozin said Russia
was eager to contribute to its formation and would suggest an
NRC Ambassadorial meeting with the Chairman of the relevant
committees in the Russian and Allied Parliaments to discuss
its content. Rasmussen replied that he was committed to
making the process of drafting the Strategic Concept a
transparent one and commented that Russian suggestions would
be welcome. Rasmussen noted that Rogozin had participated in
former SYG de Hoop Scheffer's Strategic Concept seminar on
July 7th.


6. (C) To conclude the meeting, Rasmussen stressed that NATO
wanted to improve the NRC to face common security challenges
like terrorism, piracy, and non-proliferation. At the same
time, he added NATO is dedicated to certain principles,
including its Article 10 commitment to enlargement and the
right of any state to choose its own security alliances.
Rasmussen also expressed concern about recent proposals in
the Russian Duma authorizing military deployments abroad in
defense of Russian interests, noting that Allies see this as
a threat to their security. Rogozin said the legislation was
merely "symbolic" and was meant to make more precise the
procedures for a power that always existed. After the
meeting with Rogozin, Rasmussen requested to speak with the
PermReps about NATO-Russia relations and the way ahead at a
lunch before the next NRC in Ambassadorial format.


7. (C) Comment: We find it troubling that Rasmussen did not
expressly reiterate NATO's position supporting Georgian
territorial integrity. The agreement we brokered which
allowed for re-engagement with Russia emphasized the
importance of speaking frankly with Moscow on areas where we
disagree. NATO's Article 10 is important, but it is not the

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issue here. What is at issue is Russia's failure to live up
to its commitments in numerous international agreements, such
as the Helsinki Final Act, affirming the principle of
territorial integrity. This principle is also enshrined in
the founding documents of the NATO-Russia relationship. As a
result, we would have hoped that Rasmussen would have set out
a clear marker that the Alliance expects Russia to live up to
its commitments.

Post's Concerns About the Russian Non-Paper
--------------

8. (C) Action Request and Comment: Rogozin provided
Rasmussen with a non-paper on the future of the NATO-Russia
relationship (the text of which is provided below in
paragraph 9). While some suggestions in the Russian
non-paper are unobjectionable, several are problematic.
Unless otherwise directed, Post will express the following:
-- 1. Post supports the continuing work of improving the NRC
and the "Taking the NRC Forward" paper. Post will stress
that several committees of the NRC are ineffective and/or
unnecessary and we should not simply return to an NRC
structure that has been proven not to work. Resetting the
relationship also means we need to reset the structure of the
NRC.
-- 2. While we do not object to Rasmussen meeting with
Russian FM Lavrov on the margins of UNGA in September, Post
feels strongly that Rasmussen should visit each Ally before
visiting Moscow. A visit to the Baltic states prior to a
Moscow trip will be particularly important if we are to
manage the Alliance through our reengagement with Russia.
Post also believes that, rather than continually sending NATO
representatives to Russia, Russia should consider sending
high-level visitors to Brussels, like all other Ally and
Partner nations, if improving NATO-Russia relations is a
sincere goal.
--3. Post believes the proposed meetings between NATO
International Staff and members of the Russian delegation are
ill-advised. The work of reforming the NRC must be done
among all 29 NRC countries, not by Russia and the support
staff of the Alliance.
--4. Post agrees that Afghanistan is a common security
challenge to both Russia and NATO and a key area where our
interests coincide.
--The use of flexible formats to hold meetings with the
Central Asian states and Afghanistan has proven effective
precisely because Russia is not in the room. In the full
EAPC, these states rarely talk, largely because they defer to
Russia. While it may from time-to-time make sense to include
Russia on certain topics, we would recommend against changing
the usual nature of these meetings.
--Post remains opposed to the inclusion of Russia in the
ISAF contributors forum. Currently, NATO meets with Non-NATO
Troop Contributor Nations (NNTCNs). Expanding this forum to
include nations not serving in country would undermine the
effectiveness of the discussion and mean that sensitive
subjects could not be discussed.
--Post does not object, in principle, to enlarging the NRC
counter-narcotics training project, but needs more details to
fully assess the proposal.
--Post objects to any contact or "exchange of experience"
between NATO and CSTO.
--5. Post does not object to enhancing the public diplomacy
of the NRC and, in particular, making the NRC website more
interactive and informative. In this context, as in all
others, Post will ask about cost-sharing with Russia. Post
does not object to a meeting among the directors of MFA
Disarmament Departments of the NRC member states, provided an
agenda is agreed upon beforehand.
--6. Post objects to the suggestion that the Georgia-Russia
war "showcased the fragile and imperfect existing security
architecture in Europe" and instead views the war as the
violation by Russia of Georgia's territorial sovereignty.
Post had understood that discussion of Russia's proposed
European Security Treaty initiative had already occurred, but
nonetheless believes that any future discussion of it should
occur within the framework of the OSCE, not NATO.
--7. Post agrees that the NATO Group of Experts should visit
Moscow and has no objection to transparent Russian input into
the drafting of the Strategic Concept through the avenues
available to all NATO partners. The Group of Experts also
should visit other partner countries.
--8. Post does not object to finalizing the MOU between
Russia and NAMSA.
--9. Post agrees that better NATO-Russia mil-to-mil
cooperation is beneficial, but objects to the proposed

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meetings between Rogozin and SACEUR and SAC-T. Post,
however, would not object to Russia sending appropriate
high-level military representatives to meet with SACEUR and
SAC-T. End Action Request and Comment.
Text of the Russian Non-Paper
--------------

9. (C) The text of the Russian non-paper is below:
"1. The NRC should be an all-weather body and work in spite
of existing disagreements. Thus we deem it important to
continue work on taking the NRC forward and put forward
proposals on the basis of the consolidated paper, to be
approved at the next NRC ministerial.

2. We are ready to intensify our political contacts. Foreign
Minister Lavrov is prepared to discuss NATO-Russia
cooperation and a possible visit of the Secretary General to
Moscow on the margins of the 64th UN General Assembly in New
York.

3. We propose to organize a meeting between the division
heads of the International Secretariat and respective staff
members of the Russian Mission in order to have working-level
discussions of specific aspects of our cooperation and
conducting a working review of the state of affairs in our
practical interaction. All current NRC projects are a result
of the work started several years ago. It,s important to
broaden the range of our practical cooperation and enhance
its capitalization.
After a review of programmes and projects of our cooperation
we are prepared to receive the Assistant Secretary General
Erdmann in Moscow during the week of September 28.

4. Afghanistan is a common security challenge to both Russia
and NATO and a key area where our interests coincide.

-- We find it necessary to create a special working group on
Afghanistan in the NRC. It would be a format where we could
integrate all projects and issues pertaining to Afghanistan.
-- Russian participation in the ISAF contributors format
would enable us to intensify our cooperation on Afghanistan
and to be involved in discussing important issues directly
affecting our security interests.
-- Engaging Russia in the NATO plus Central Asian states
format would also enable to alliance to make use of our
experience in the region.
-- It might be time to enlarge the NRC Counter-narcotics
training project which could also fulfill the task of halting
the precursor traffic to Afghanistan and the drug trafficking
out of Afghanistan.
-- We expect the Bucharest transit arrangements to become
effective in the nearest future. The Russian authorities are
ready for the regular transit of goods for ISAF.
-- The CSTO is an important organization dealing with
security issues in the region, particularly in fighting the
drug trafficking. Contacts and exchange of experience between
NATO and CSTO in solving the security problems of the region
could be part of our contribution to assisting Afghanistan.

5. Practical cooperation issues.
Enhancing the public diplomacy of the NRC and, in particular,
making the NRC website more interactive and informative.
In order not to marginalize the NRC in the arms control and
disarmament sphere we insist that a meeting be organized
between the directors of MFA Disarmament Departments of the
NRC member states.

6. The fragile and imperfect existing security architecture
in Europe was showcased during the crisis in August 2008. We
deem it important to discuss topical issues of the European
security in the NRC. Among them is the European Security
Treaty initiative which is becoming more substantial by day
and which should be discussed in the NRC as well, even while
keeping in mind the known role of the OSCE in this process.


7. Considering that both NATO and Russia are working on their
doctrinal documents right now, it would be useful to
coordinate our approaches. Transparency in this process would
enable us to minimize the discrepancies in our views. In this
light we propose to examine the possibility of organizing a
visit to Moscow of the NATO Group of Experts.


8. The MOU between the Government of the Russian Federation
and NAMSA. We have worked on it for several years now and
given a needed impetus, finishing the work on this agreement
could make it a real deliverable of our cooperation.


9. The mil-to-mil cooperation should be given a new impetus.
Meetings between the Permanent Representative of the Russian
Federation to NATO and SACEUR J. Stavridis as well as Supreme
Allied Commander Transformation Stephane Abrial would be of

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use as well."
DAALDER