NEW SECRETARY GENERAL'S PRIORITIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 USNATO 000336 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO EWWT MARR MOPS AF PK RS TZ XW SUBJECT: NEW SECRETARY GENERAL'S PRIORITIES REF: SG(2009)0675 Classified By: A/DCM A. "Hoot" Baez. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: New NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen used the August 4 North Atlantic Council meeting--his first as the Secretary General--to set out the priorities for his term, including: Afghanistan, NATO-Russia, the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partnerships, Kosovo, counter-piracy, defense transformation, the Strategic Concept, and NATO-EU relations. While receiving a generally positive response, several Allies--including the U.S.--stressed that his goal of significantly reducing or ending the KFOR mission should only be achieved through a conditions-based process, not a timeline. Allies also reacted to what was not in his list of priorities, including Article 5 and the Partnership for Peace. Many Allies also commented on his omission of the Western Balkans, although there is reason to believe that this may simply have been an oversight on his part. Membership for Ukraine and Georgia was also notably absent from the list. Rasmussen's full speaking notes are included at the bottom of this message. END SUMMARY Rasmussen's Priorities -------------- ¶2. (SBU) New NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen set out his priorities at the August 4 meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC),his first as the NAC's chairman. He said his priorities include: Afghanistan, NATO-Russia relations, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partnerships for the countries of north Africa and the broader Middle East, Kosovo, counter-piracy, defense transformation, the development of NATO's new Strategic Concept, and NATO-EU relations. In a section delivered in French, Rasmussen also said that he wanted to make NAC meetings and other PermRep formats as productive as possible, adding that this would be the topic for the first PermRep lunch in September. But PermReps Lay Down Markers, Especially on Kosovo -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C/REL NATO) While PermReps largely offered support for Rasmussen's priorities, Allies also laid down markers on a couple of issues. Rasmussen, for example, stressed the need to transfer lead security responsibility for Afghanistan to the Afghans. He also said that his aim with regard to Kosovo was "to see KFOR reduced to just a small reaction force, or out altogether." While acknowledging the need to move with all deliberate speed, Ambassador Daalder responded that any such changes--in both Afghanistan and Kosovo--needed to be based on conditions on the ground, not on a timeline. The Hungarians and Czechs were particularly strong in supporting Daalder on Kosovo, with Hungary arguing that a political assessment was needed before decisions were taken to walk USNATO 00000336 002 OF 006 through each "gate" as KFOR transitioned to a deterrent presence. Following some of these statements, it was notable that Spain--which has not recognized Kosovo--stated that it shared Rasmussen's program "completely." What Does Not Make the List -------------- ¶4. (C/REL NATO) Allies also reacted to some of what was not on Rasmussen's priority list: the Western Balkans, enlargement, the Partnership for Peace, and Article 5. UK PermRep Eldon led Allies in stressing the need to keep the Western Balkans on the NATO agenda, calling for the Political Committee to have a broader political look at the region--including the issue of MAP. Eldon also said that he hoped a NAC trip to the region could soon be organized. Albania, Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Croatia, and Italy all stressed the need to keep the Western Balkans high on NATO's priority list. Romania, a strong supporter of the Partnership for Peace, urged Rasmussen not to exclude from his priority list those countries located in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the wider Black Sea region. The Estonian PermRep said that thought Article 5 needed to an important part of the defense reform agenda. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: At least one or two of the omissions may have been unintentional. In his statement at an August 3 press conference (available on the NATO website),Rasmussen outlined virtually the same priorities. In that statement, however, he included a section on the need to keep NATO's door open for countries in the Balkans. The Private Office told us after the NAC that the Secretary General had "gone off the script" a couple of times and that before they could distribute his speaking notes they had had to change them to reflect what he had actually said. At the same time, it is also clear that Rasmussen made a point of mentioning the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Mediterranean Dialogue in both places while not mentioning the Partnership for Peace in either. While he may have intended to raise NATO enlargement to the Balkans, there is no indication that he intended to tackle the much more controversial issues of eventual Georgian or Ukrainian membership. END COMMENT Rasmussen's NAC Statement -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The text of the Secretary General's speaking notes for his statement to the NAC was distributed by the Private Office (ref). The text, including the first five paragraphs in French, is reproduced below: BEGIN TEXT Mesdames et Messieurs les Ambassadeurs, Bonjour. Voici venu le moment que j'attends depuis quatre USNATO 00000336 003 OF 006 mois. Avant de passer au premier point a l'ordre du jour de notre reunion d'aujourd'hui, j'aimerais tout d'abord vous dire quelques mots. C'est pour moi un tres grand privilege et un immense honneur que de me voir confier la responsabilite de secretaire general de cette grande Alliance. Je voudrais tout d'abord exprimer mon admiration pour tout le travail mene par mon predecesseur Jaap de Hoop Scheffer et pour son leadership. A l'heure ou je prends mes fonctions, je suis tres conscient des exigences de plus en plus fortes qui pesent sur l'OTAN et des grands defis qu'elles representent pour le Conseil et pour moi personnellement. Neanmoins, je suis persuade qu'ensemble, nous pouvons non seulement relever ces defis, mais aussi renforcer encore le role unique de l'OTAN en tant que garant de la stabilite et de la securite de nos pays et de leurs citoyens. Depuis de nombreuses annees, j'observe de pres cette Alliance, dont je suis l'un des plus fervents partisans. J'ai bien conscience que les conditions prealables essentielles a la reussite des entreprises de l'Alliance sont toujours les memes : tout d'abord une preparation et des consultations approfondies, puis des decisions claires, et enfin l'affectation des ressources voulues. Le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord joue un role capital a cet egard. Il lui incombe de prendre les decisions strategiques qui orientent l'action de l'Alliance et ensuite de prendre les decisions journalieres afin que celle-ci garde le cap. Il est dans notre interet a tous de veiller a ce que le Conseil travaille de maniere efficace, rationnelle et harmonieuse. C'est pourquoi je me rejouis a la perspective do nouer avec chacun d'entre vous autour de cette table, ainsi qu'avec vos delegations, des relations de travail etroites. L'ordre du jour de notre reunion d'aujourd'hui se presente comme d'habitude. Je pense cependant qu'il nous faut reflechir attentivement non seulement a la question des ordres du jour, mais aussi, de maniere plus generale, a la distinction entre cadres formels et informels. Nous devons consacrer le temps precieux qui est le notre aux sujets prioritaires, sans le gaspiller pour des questions secondaires. Jo vous propose d'examiner, lors de notre premier dejeuner a la rentree de septembre, comment rendre nos reunions et en particulier les reunions ordinaires du Conseil, aussi productives que possible. Je pense avoir assez parle de ce sujet pour aujourd'hui mais je vous en reparlerai dans les semaines a venir, et je compte bien que vous aurez aussi des elements a apporter au debat. Mais laissez-moi vous redire ma tres sincere intention de travailler etroitement avec vous tous au sein du Conseil dans les semaines, les mois et les annees a venir. But one thing is procedure. Another is substance. Yesterday USNATO 00000336 004 OF 006 as I took office I gave a press conference setting out. I emphasised that NATO is doing more, in more places, than it ever has before but remains the ultimate insurance policy for the peace, security and freedom of nearly one billion people in 28 countries. My intent, as NATO SG, is to make the most of this enormous capability: in our operations, in our partnerships; and by transforming the way we do business. For me, that means starting with success in Afghanistan. A lot has been accomplished already. But this year will be key. This month's elections will not be to the same standards we might expect elsewhere. But they must be credible, particularly with the Afghans themselves. So most immediately we have to focus on credible elections, while in longer-term we must move forward, concretely and visibly, in transferring lead security responsibility for Afghanistan to the Afghans. That means that during my term as NATO SG, we should see Afghans in the lead not only in Kabul, but also in the North and the West, and moving into a leadership role wherever possible in the South and East. I was clear with the press referring to "LEAD" responsibility for the Afghans, with NATO there in support. The Afghan need to believe that we are there for as long as it takes. However, supporting them means helping them stand on their own feet. Which means more trainers, more civilian support, and more help for the Afghan to build their institutions. But this has to be an international team effort, NATO can't do it alone, and essentially, we need more effort from the Afghans themselves. We can't wait. We now have to show the Afghan people, and the people in troop contributing nations, more light at the end of the tunnel if we are to maintain their support. The past month has made that bitterly clear. I believe it can be done. We shouldn't doubt that. Second priority: NATO-Russia relations. Resumption of work by the NRC at political level and the restarting of military cooperation is good. Clearly there is also scope for us to work together, on Afghanistan, on piracy, on counter- terrorism. However, it is also obvious that there will be fundamental issues on which we disagree. We must insist, for example, that Russia fully complies with its international obligations, including respecting the territorial integrity and political freedom of its neighbours. But I don't want those areas of disagreement to poison the USNATO 00000336 005 OF 006 whole relationship. I made clear my message to the Russian leadership and people: Let us talk and find areas to work together. The NRC holds considerable potential for cooperation and understanding- on Afghanistan, on piracy, on counter-terrorism for example. We should exploit that. Another partnership will be a third priority for me: our relationship with the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries. This Alliance has, over years, built up a strong relationship and cooperation with our MD and ICI partners. I intend to build on the work done by my predecessor in this area. On Kosovo, my aim is clear. By the end of my term, I want to see KFOR reduced to just a small reaction force, or out altogether. It should not be rushed. But I believe that the conditions will, in time, be right to retire KFOR with success. I want to see NATO having a standing anti-piracy role, with the capabilities, legal arrangements and force generation in place to make it happen. This problem won't wait, so I will be coming back to you in the very near future on this. I won't forget defence transformation however, and intend to push ahead on issues including common funding, and joint projects like the SAC. With global finances the way they are, we cannot afford anything but efficient, modern and, where appropriate, multinational approaches to defence. All of this work - taking forward our operations, building stronger capabilities, developing our capabilities, and strengthening our partnerships will be quantified in the new Strategic Concept process. On the Strategic Concept, it is, of course, a bit early for me to say what I think should be in the final document. But I can tell you what I think need to be some important principles guiding the work: -- That it must be ambitious, but also realistic with regards to resources; -- That it should firmly establish NATO as a part of the global community of international actors; -- That it should take a holistic view of security, and then set out how NATO can play its part; -- It should not neglect reform of NATO itself. -- It should also be by far the most open and the most inclusive process of policy development NATO has ever conducted. On NATO-EU relations, I intend to push very hard, at the highest level, to try to make progress on this front as well. This is something which I know frustrated my predecessor and I am determined to give this my personal attention. I want to see more political consultation, formal and informal; and more practical cooperation. All, let me be clear, without USNATO 00000336 006 OF 006 replacing the agreed framework or undermining the autonomy of decision-making of the two organisations. END TEXT DAALDER