RETHINKING U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000329 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2019 TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PINS PREL PTER XG SUBJECT: RETHINKING U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE Classified By: AMBASSADOR IVO H. DAALDER. REASON 1.4(B/D). ¶1. (SECRET NF) Summary: As the Department of Defense conducts its Quadrennial Defense Review, we want to raise serious questions about the consequences of further significant reductions to U.S. forces currently stationed in Europe. At issue are the envisioned reduction from four to two Brigade Combat Teams, and the planned FY10 loss of one and one-half F-15/ F-16 squadrons. We believe our European friends will view this force reduction as preemptive and unilateral retrenchment by the United States, just as the Alliance launches its new Strategic Concept debate. Furthermore, these moves could markedly diminish our ability to reassure Allies in the aftermath of Russian aggression in Georgia. They would also severely degrade our capacity for Theater Security Cooperation and deployment preparation with the Allies and partners who comprise 88 percent of our ISAF/OEF coalition, with eventual negative impact on this and future Alliance missions. Thoughtful consideration of all aspects and outcomes of possible decisions -- some possibly coming as soon as August 4 ) is needed. End Summary ¶2. (SECRET NF) The U.S. cannot face the threats of the 21st Century alone. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us, Europe is not just a staging ground for sending U.S. troops to the field. To sustain the capability of our European Allies to fight along-side us, we need to be where they are. With NATO,s next Strategic Concept currently under discussion, any withdrawal will be seen as a preemptive and unilateral retrenchment by the United States, possibly provoking a European strategic run for the door that commits the Alliance only to do less with less. With our European Allies straining to meet our objectives in Afghanistan under the current financial crisis, such action will have serious consequences both today and in the future. Ultimately, this approach could leave the United States holding the bag with even fewer capable Allies. ¶3. (SECRET NF) U.S. forces stationed in Europe also play an indispensible role in reassuring Allies in the face of recent Russian aggression in Georgia. The European theater has already witnessed deep reductions in troop levels, a fact that is not lost on Allies having angst over the Alliance,s commitment to Article 5 mutual defense provisions. Additional force reductions will only further complicate what already promises to be difficult negotiations during the Strategic Concept debate over this bedrock principle of the Alliance. Furthermore, following President Obama,s call for additional defense planning to help reassure Allies, these reductions would dramatically reduce the immediate response capability in Europe which could be called upon by that planning. Beyond that, the fighter reductions alone could remove our capability to support ongoing exercises in the Baltics in conjunction with NATO air policing deployments, which is the most visible sign of the Article 5 commitment the Balts cling to today. ¶4. (SECRET NF) Like our Allies, we face severely constrained resources. Forces stationed in Europe do not have to be deployed and redeployed to conduct Theater Security Cooperation and build partner capabilities, and can therefore conduct these missions as part of routine operations. The impact of losing this on-site force multiplier should not be taken lightly. In the macro sense, 88 percent of ISAF/OEF coalition partners are from Europe, as were 65 percent of OIF coalition partners, and 65 percent of the world,s expeditionary capability lies within Europe. In Afghanistan today, the Romanian maneuver force teamed with the U.S. PRT in Zabol province is just one very concrete product of the relationship built between our forces in Europe and this valuable pool of Allied/partner capability. Trying to accomplish this partnering with CONUS-based forces would be undoubtedly less effective, and would likely be more costly in both money and impact on planned U.S. deployment rotations. ¶5. (SECRET NF) In short, America,s commitment to European peace and security has been the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy since the Second World War. In today,s world of mounting security threats, we need our European Allies more USNATO 00000329 002 OF 002 than ever. Pulling forces out of Europe is not the way to signal our desire to build international resolve to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. STEIN