JULY 9 MEETING REAFFIRMS NATO CONSENSUS ON CFE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000309 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019 TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL SUBJECT: JULY 9 MEETING REAFFIRMS NATO CONSENSUS ON CFE REF: A. USNATO 304 ¶B. STATE 70159 Classified By: A/POLAD A. "Hoot" Baez for reasons 1.4(B)&(D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Keying off of U.S. briefings on CFE discussion at the U.S.-Russia Summit in Moscow and shared experiences at the June 9 Berlin CFE meeting and the Corfu Ministerials, Allies used a brief HLTF meeting to reaffirm a general consensus on next steps with regard to CFE. Allies reaffirmed the importance they attach to CFE; their support for continued U.S. bilateral engagement with Russia to find a CFE solution based on the parallel actions package; and readiness to pursue some type of Allied small group discussion with Russia in the fall if the U.S. considers that desirable. All Allies welcomed A/S Gottemoeller's assurance to the July 8 meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) that she and Russian negotiator Antonov planned a CFE meeting at the end of August and expect to regroup on next steps at an HLTF meeting September 17. End Summary. -------------- CONTACTS AND BILATERALS (AND SIDE MEETINGS) -------------- ¶2. (C) Discussion regarding the series of arms control events since the HLTF away day in May (including the June 10 Berlin high level meeting on "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe," the June 24-25 OSCE Annual Security Review Conference, and the June 27-28 "Informal" OSCE Ministerial on European security) were overshadowed by the readout of President Obama's July 6-7 Summit discussions in Moscow. Although all Allies were familiar with the general points from the Summit as briefed to the NAC by A/S Gordon and A/S Gottemoeller on July 8 (ref A),CFE-related points were highlights of both the July 9 HLTF plenary and related meetings the previous day. U.S. HLTF rep Rich Davis briefly summarized for the HLTF: CFE was not a central issue at the Summit, which focused on bilateral issues. However, CFE was raised by Prime Minister Putin in his private meeting with President Obama. Putin laid out in stark terms his concern that the CFE Treaty is "unfair" to Russia and reiterated familiar complaints about the flank limits. In a meeting on the margins of the Summit, A/S Gottemoeller and Disarmament Director Antonov agreed to hold a meeting on CFE at the end of August or in early September, when they are scheduled to meet on START issues. Davis also provided a brief readout on Gottemoeller's June 3 discussion with Antonov in Geneva, and the June 11 roundtable discussion with DFM Grushko in Washington, per ref B. ¶3. (C) A/S Gottemoeller provided a more detailed readout of the Moscow meeting and her thinking on next steps on CFE during separate meetings prior to the HLTF with the Turkish delegation (Ahmet Gun) and the HLTF Quad (US, UK, Ger, FR). Gun expressed high appreciation for Gottemoeller's special effort to meet with him and invited her to come to Ankara at any time to discuss CFE or other matters within her purview. He expressed gratitude for her stated readiness to use her robust schedule of START meetings to carry forward an intensified effort to solve CFE, and responded with what he characterized as a frank presentation "because we are family here" of Turkey's position on CFE. It was Ankara's assessment that Russia needed to make a choice about CFE. NATO had taken a major step with the parallel actions package, which Turkey absolutely supports. Now Russia needed to reciprocate. Turkey did not consider Russia's aide memoire a step forward. It merely recapitulated familiar Russian positions (Gottemoell er interjected that it was useful that Russia had written down its views). What was needed was a sign by Russia that it is serious about CFE, serious about working with NATO. If Russia did not want to work with us to keep CFE -- which, Gun stressed, is in Russia's interest even more than NATO's -- we would lose the Treaty, and it would take "twenty-five years" to negotiate a replacement, which would not be a document that approached the caliber of CFE. Russia needed to help find a way ahead on Georgia and on Moldova. Russia needed to resume implementation of CFE, not offer, "as if it were a concession," the idea of partial resumption of implementation of the Treaty. But most of all, Russia needed to drop the USNATO 00000309 002 OF 003 idea that the flank limits must be eliminated "as a precondition" for a CFE deal. Gun recalled that Turkey and NATO had already addressed Russia's concerns about the flank twice; Turkey had played a key role in the flank deal that is contained in the Adapted Treaty. Turkey has already said that onc e the Adapted Treaty is in force, Turkey (and NATO) will be ready to review the operation of the Treaty, including in the flank, and consider adjustments. He stressed that as far as Turkey is concerned, such a negotiation could begin "the day after the Adapted Treaty enters into force." But, he underscored, the Turkish Parliament will not ratify the Adapted Treaty without the flank regime. Politically, it cannot be done. Gottemoeller expressed thanks for Turkey's strong support for U.S. efforts on CFE and promised to stay in close touch. She expressed sympathy for the Turkish view that Russia needed to engage seriously and constructively. ¶4. (C) A/S Gottemoeller's briefing to Quad Allies focused on the CFE-related discussions at the Moscow summit; all expressed thanks and offered their support for next steps. The UK (Ford) noted that CFE negotiations would be competing with START, and asked how this might impact momentum. Germany (Reindl) asked what the U.S. was prepared to say regarding expanded consultations with Allies, and France (Raharinaivo) asked for Gottemoeller's assessment on what Russia expects from NATO. Gottemoeller conceded that START will remain a U.S.-Russia priority through December, but noted that a robust negotiation schedule should allow for more frequent contact, including on CFE; the momentum from START could provide the stimulus needed to get CFE moving. Russia has reaffirmed a commitment to working from the parallel actions package, even as it waits for Allied reaction to its aide memoire. In the mean time, the U.S. is open to the idea of expanding consultations to include Allies. ¶5. (C) Following A/S Gottemoeller's departure, the Quad discussion focused on the way ahead regarding an expanded format. All supported the idea of future small group discussions if the U.S. thought that would be useful, but size, composition, and level of participation would be particularly important. Ford noted the need for clarity on whether the small group discussion is desirable for negotiation or for discussion as this would affect decisions on composition. ¶6. (C) In the HLTF plenary, Acting Chair Mike Miggins reported that a member of the Russian delegation at NATO had asked to meet with him to discuss next steps on CFE. The Russian said he was acting on instructions from Moscow, and posed a number of questions. Moscow wanted an indication of NATO interest in Russia's aide memoire and was trying to decide whether to engage on CFE beginning with the hard issues, or the easier ones. Did Miggins think a numerical solution on ceilings and the flank issue was possible? (Miggins told the U.S. privately that the Russian did not specify whether this was a reference to the Baluyevskiy flank proposal, or something else.) -------------- HLTF REVIEWS BERLIN AND CORFU -------------- ¶7. (C) In the main HLTF meeting, Allies exchanged views on the German-hosted conventional forces seminar in Berlin June 10, and the CFE exchange with Antonov that preceded it on June 9. No Ally dissented from the view that the German seminar had been useful. The French underscored that the German event had helpfully put CFE center stage and the importance that all of Europe, not only NATO, attaches to the Treaty. Several Allies indicated that the Berlin meeting had been successful because it allowed NATO once again to demonstrate that that Alliance is unified on CFE, and no differences among Allies had been exposed. (Comment: On the margins, many expressed a sigh of relief that the event had come off without disaster, either a major confrontation between Russia and NATO, or a departure from agreed Alliance positions by Germany, which many had feared. End comment.) ¶8. (C) Discussion of Corfu took longer, and its results were less conclusive. All expressed thanks to the Greeks for hosting the NRC and OSCE Ministerial meetings. Greece USNATO 00000309 003 OF 003 described in some detail Athens' hopes for a constructive, informal dialogue on security issues at OSCE in the fall (the "Corfu process"),which could lead to agreement on a Ministerial Decision for Athens that sets guidelines for a future discussion. Greece suggested that there might be value in developing such guidelines during its Chairmanship rather than allowing the discussion to slide to 2010. (Comment: Kazakhstan will take the Chairmanship of the OSCE in January 2010. End comment.) Turkey (Gun) agreed that a process had begun, but cautioned Allies on the need to ensure that the parallel actions package remains separate and distinct from any discussions on European security in the OSCE. Others who spoke expressed doubt that Russia had accepted the OSCE as the primary forum for discussions on European Security. The Netherlands sai d that Russia had agreed to discussions in the OSCE, but had kept open the possibility of using another format. The Netherlands assesses that absent sufficient progress, Russia would want to move the discussion to another forum. None disputed the International Staff's introductory comment that the most that could be said of FM Lavrov's remarks at Corfu was that they were less negative than his speech at the OSCE ASRC one week earlier. -------------- WAY AHEAD -------------- ¶9. (C) Discussion of next steps focused on the U.S. announcement that it would again engage Russia bilaterally on CFE at the end of August. Allies generally supported the idea of a small group discussion with Russia some time this fall, provided that it would complement bilateral negotiations. While no Ally should be excluded, all Allies who spoke agreed that a small, self-selected group would be more effective in engaging Russia in an actual negotiation than a group that involved most or all Allies plus Russia. The latter would be effective in demonstrating NATO unity, but the format would not be likely to elicit Russian concessions. Several Allies indicated that they would like to participate in such a small group: the UK, Norway, Romania, Spain, Turkey, and Czech Republic. Others said they would like to "contribute" to such a group: Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Portugal, Slovenia, and Greece (France and Germany did not speak on this point but have made their interest in participation clear previ ously). Among these, some -- Canada, Portugal, and Slovenia -- said that if the group was going to be about 10 or fewer participants, they would be prepared to step aside. (Comment: On the margins, Canada told the U.S. team that their offer to not participate was intended to be helpful, but that if the group included some Allies that did not have a large stake in the outcome (read: Spain),Canada would have to insist on participation as well. End Comment) The U.S. said it would be in touch with Allies over the summer to discuss the concept further. ¶10. (C) Turkey (Gun) recalled that Allies have been content with the U.S.-Russia bilateral format and that it was Russia that had suggested expanding the format to included Allies. Turkey considers the expanded format a concession, and it should be pursued as such. He also said that the meeting of a small group of Allies with Russia should be preceded by a meeting of the HLTF and perhaps could take place in late September. ¶11. (SBU) With plans for the bilateral track and a possible small group exchange established, the chair asked whether there were plans to follow up on the informal large group format of the Berlin meeting. The German rep (Reindl) said that Germany had no plans for a follow on seminar. The Canadian rep suggested that if another large event were to be proposed, Russia should be asked to host it. No other Ally spoke. ¶12. (SBU) Next Meeting. Allies agreed to remain in touch over the summer months, and then review next steps at the September 17 HLTF meeting following the U.S-Russia bilateral meeting on CFE in late August. DAALDER