PAKISTANI PRESIDENT ZARDARI MEETS THE NAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000274 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS MCAP PK AF SUBJECT: PAKISTANI PRESIDENT ZARDARI MEETS THE NAC USNATO 00000274 001.2 OF 003 ClassifiedUSNATO 00000274 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge John Heffern. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: On June 17 Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari assured the NAC that his government had taken ""political ownership"" of the war against extremists in Pakistan. Stressing the need to respect Pakistani sovereignty, he said that his forces needed to be the ones to fight the war. He asked for significant financial and development assistance for Pakistan. He admitted Islamabad needed further democratic reforms, while also acknowledging that such reforms would be insufficient to defeat the extremists. He said that relations with Kabul had improved, but added that an ""issue of trust"" remained. He said Iran needed to be engaged, citing the possibility of cooperation in the regional fight against narcotics trafficking. At the same time, he avoided being drawn out on his views of the Iranian nuclear program. NATO Permanent Representatives expressed support for Zardari's government and asked how NATO could provide assistance. Zardari failed to respond to these questions, leading some Allies to conclude that he was cautious about any visible NATO role. After the meeting, a member of the NATO International Staff said that while Zardari had certainly been ""theatrical,"" he had also appeared ill-prepared for his NATO meeting. Allies echoed a similar view. END SUMMARY Zardari Claims Political Ownership of the War -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) In a June 17 meeting with NATO's North Atlantic Council, Pakistani President Zardari used an emotional intervention to argue that his government, with the support of the population, had taken ""political ownership"" of the war against extremists in northwest Pakistan. He called terrorism the ""war of our age,"" but added that the international community had wasted eight years by attempting to combat violent extremism without engaging Pakistan's public. While saying he was glad NATO was involved in Afghanistan, he stressed the need for NATO to respect Pakistani sovereignty. He said that Pakistani forces would have to fight the extremists, arguing that NATO forces were not properly trained to do so. He said that he was a willing participant in the war, but that he needed additional resources. He asked, for example, for ""my own drones to fly under the Pakistani flag."" Requests Financial and Development Assistance -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) Zardari asked for financial and development assistance from NATO countries, adding with a rhetorical flourish that ""you don't have to love me as much as AIG, but love me closer to that."" He said that Pakistan was worse than underdeveloped: it was at war. He called on the international community to match the U.S. pledge of USD 2 billion per year, noting that Pakistan would probably require significant assistance for at least the next five to ten years. He also asked for access to western markets. Zardari made his case for this assistance through the colorful use of metaphors. Zardari compared Pakistan to a sick patient, arguing that--in the same way a doctor prepares the body to fight disease--the international community should strengthen the GOP so that it can fight the disease of extremism. He added ""don't give me the fish, teach me how to fish."" Democracy is Necessary, but Not Sufficient -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Zardari repeatedly stressed the importance of democratic changes in Pakistan and asked for a commitment from Allies that they would not let a ""dictator"" take over the country again. At the same time, he argued that democracy alone would be insufficient for winning the war against the extremists. USNATO 00000274 002.2 OF 003 Relations with Neighbors: Afghanistan, Iran, and China -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) In response to Allied questions, Zardari said that Islamabad's relationship with Kabul had improved. He noted, for example, that he had invited President Karzai to his inauguration. At the same time, he acknowledged that there was a ""trust factor"" with Afghanistan that needed to be managed. ¶6. (C/NF) When asked by PermReps about his thoughts on the Iranian nuclear program, Zardari said that he did not know Iranian plans for its nuclear program. He added that Allies were probably better informed than he was on this issue. At the same time, he said that ""Iran needs to be engaged,"" suggesting that a good initial area for cooperation with Tehran could be shared regional counter-narcotics efforts. ¶7. (C/NF) Zardari also noted that he traveled monthly to China, adding that Beijing had given Pakistan ""capacity"" to purchase equipment to fight its insurgency (NFI). PermReps Try to Engage... -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) In their tour d'table, NATO PermReps expressed support for the GOP in its war against the extremists and expressed condolences for lives lost in Pakistan due to extremism. Turkish PermRep Ildem said Ankara was proud to have recently taken on the role of NATO Contact Point Embassy in Islamabad, adding that it supported enhanced NATO-Pakistan political engagement. Several Allies--including Ambassador Daalder, Canadian PermRep McRae, and Norwegian PermRep Traavik--asked what specific assistance NATO could provide, such as assets to help alleviate the current humanitarian crisis of Internally Displaced Persons who have left their homes due to the ongoing military operations. Spanish PermRep Miranda joined McRae in asking what could be done to improve the image of NATO in Pakistan and how NATO might help Zardari continue to build the political consensus he needs to combat extremism. UK PermRep Eldon asked what training NATO might be able to provide Pakistan and how Zardari's government planned to follow military operations in the northwest with reconstruction and development efforts. But Zardari Fails to Respond in Kind -------------- ¶9. (C/NF) Zardari failed to answer most of these direct questions, reverting instead to continuous invocations of his late wife. At one point he said that it would take up to USD 2 to 3 billion to help displaced people return to their homes, adding ""I have my hat off to ask the international community for financial support."" Zardari dwelled on ""30 years of neglect,"" blaming the international community for turning away from Pakistan. He repeatedly argued that his family had paid a heavy priced in the struggle for democratic change in Pakistan, particularly the assassination of his wife. Nevertheless, he said that his family would continue the struggle. In this regard, he noted that he had appointed his son to the chairmanship of the Pakistan Peoples' Party, even though previous chairmen had been assassinated. Allies and the IS Reflect on the Visit -------------- ¶10. (C/NF) When asked for his thoughts on the Zardari visit, the NATO International Staff action officer for Pakistan smiled and said that Zardari was certainly ""theatrical."" He said that he regretted that Zardari seemed ill-prepared for his NATO meeting, focusing a disproportionate amount of his limited time on issues that were better suited for the UN or the EU. Allies had a similar view. USNATO 00000274 003.2 OF 003 Comment -------------- ¶11. (C/NF) While in some respects the meeting was the message--sending a visible signal of deepening NATO-Pakistan relations--it was also something of a lost opportunity. While certainly entertaining, Zardari came across as ill-prepared. His interventions were impassioned, but lacked substance. He failed to answer PermReps' questions or to make specific requests of the Alliance, leading some Allies to conclude that he was cautious about any visible NATO role. Perhaps most disappointing, he was unable to engage PermReps in a strategic-level discussion of the situation in South Asia. As the NATO-Pakistan relationship matures--or, for that matter, as Europe more broadly begins engaging Pakistan as a result of the new regional approach to Afghanistan--Zardari would be more effective were he to tailor his remarks and presentation style to better engage European audiences. HEFFERN