SECRETARY CLINTON: YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000269 NOFORN SIPDIS FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR IVO DAALDER E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019 TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS RS GG SUBJECT: SECRETARY CLINTON: YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Madam Secretary: ¶1. (C) This is the first high-level NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meeting since the August 2008 Georgia crisis, when NATO suspended meetings of the Council. During the Foreign Ministerial last March, you succeeded in convincing your NATO colleagues to resume NRC deliberations - a decision subsequently reaffirmed at the April Summit. The Corfu meeting comes at a critical time in our attempt to rebuild relations with Russia - just one week before the Moscow Summit. A major objective of this meeting is to ensure that the improvements in bilateral relations are reflected in the NATO-Russia relationship as well. Moscow has yet to match its more positive attitude towards the United States in its attitude towards NATO. This gap is worrying to many Allies, and we should seek to close it. Indeed, if we ignore it, Allies may come to fear that we are willing to sacrifice their interests in order to advance our bilateral relations with Moscow. ¶2. (C) Of course, the choice is not ours alone to make. While most Allies view NATOs relationship with Russia as a political priority, Moscow regards its relations with NATO as less important than its relations with Washington. At this point, Russia sees re-engagement with NATO as necessary to normalize its relationship with the United States and other key western countries. It is not yet clear whether it is interested in a real, constructive relationship with the Alliance as a whole. One immediate objective of your meeting, therefore, will be to ascertain the degree to which Moscow is interested in forging a strong, cooperative relationship with NATO. Alliance Management -------------- ¶3. (C) No issue divides the Alliance more than Russia. Most East European Allies fear being swept up by Russian military and economic assertiveness and doubt NATOs commitment to act in the event of a bilateral conflict with Russia. Canada and the UK sympathize and often side with this group. All of them are deeply concerned about NATOs inability to confront Russia in a unified manner. On the other hand, most West European countries, led by Germany, believe Russia is a critical partner and believe NATO must avoid actions that Moscow might see as provocative. Our decision earlier this year to seek to bridge the differences between these two groups of Allies is succeeding. We were able to build a fragile consensus that engagement with Russia would be based on seeking cooperation with Moscow in areas of mutual benefit, while committing to frank discussion with Russians about issues on which we disagree. This consensus, however, does not resolve the underlying differences that divide the Alliance - some Allies will focus on the need for cooperation; others on the need for frank disagreement. In Corfu, Allies will expect you to take the lead in elaborating the Allied vision for reengagement with Russia and the NRC, and to do so in a balanced manner. ¶4. (C) Allies applaud the improvement in U.S.-Russian relations and support the U.S. taking the lead in bilateral talks with Russia in order to inform and advance discussions in NATO and the OSCE. However, they expect to be consulted before such talks take place, as well as being briefed on the results. In that regard, we appreciate Washingtons agreement to send an inter-agency team to NATO on June 29, as well as Rose Gottemoellers decision to brief the NAC immediately after the Summit. These briefings will help counter a growing suspicion that Washington is content with its improved bilateral relations and is willing to let NATO-Russia relations languish. We must dispel this notion by sending a strong signal of our commitment and readiness to engage Russia in the NRC. Russia - To Cooperate or Not to Cooperate... -------------- ¶5. (C) Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov will be looking for two deliverables from this meeting. First, he wants to sweep away all of the diplomatic consequences from the Georgia crisis in order to lock in the current reality in Georgia; in many ways, NATO is the final step in this process and symbolically important to Moscow, given NATOs desire not to discuss the crisis with Moscow last August. Second, FM Lavrov will seek agreement for a clear signal to restart mil-to-mil cooperation. Beyond this, it is unclear whether Moscow has any interest in deepening cooperation with NATO or engaging in a constructive dialogue. All indications are that Lavrov will blast NATO Allies for their support for Georgia, as well as for refusing to accept Russias call for an emergency NRC meeting during the crisis. We should carefully pre-coordinate a concise - yet strong - response on Georgia with Allies (perhaps delivered by the German or French Foreign Minister) so that our real differences over Georgia do not completely monopolize the NRC meeting and eclipse a more fruitful discussion on the areas of possible collaboration. This Ministerial will set the future course of the NRC - any hope of future cooperation with Russia will require a constructive dialogue and positive decision at the meeting itself. Practical Cooperation -------------- ¶6. (C) This meeting provides the opportunity to steer NRC cooperation toward U.S. priorities of mutual benefit. In the past, NRC resources have been squandered in moribund working groups that have produced little result. We should seek to advance cooperation in areas of past success -- specifically Afghanistan, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics -- and explore new areas of mutual benefit, including counter-piracy and missile defense. Even though arms control and nonproliferation seem a natural fit for the NRC, there has been little progress to date. Our administrations recommitment to these areas may change that. More generally, you should appeal to your NRC colleagues to inject new energy and vitality into each of these priority areas, underscoring that the United States, Allies, and Russia should look to the NRC as a practical vehicle for pragmatic cooperation on issues of mutual concern. Deliverables -------------- ¶7. (C) Although the meeting itself will be seen as a visible political signal of NATOs re-engagement with Russia, we hope to achieve several other deliverables in Corfu. While Russian insistence on unacceptable "political" language might prevent a final agreement before Corfu, NRC nations have been hard at work negotiating a document on the practical aspects of taking the NRC forward, including through the adaptation of NRC structures to address new areas of mutual concern. We also hope to get political agreement to restart military-to-military cooperation, something Moscow has said would require a "political mandate" from Foreign Ministers. As a concrete result of such a decision, we anticipate that Moscow will announce that it is accepting NATOs invitation to contribute a ship to Operation Active Endeavor, the Alliances modest Article 5 counterterrorism operation in the Mediterranean. In addition, we hope that you will be in a position to announce U.S. ideas on how to move forward with the NRCs Cooperative Airspace Initiative, a program of cooperation in the fields of airspace surveillance and air traffic coordination designed to strengthen capabilities required to deal with situations in which aircraft are suspected of being controlled by terrorists. HEFFERN