SUBJECT: APRIL 28 HLTF: NATO ALLIES KEEN TO STAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 000173 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE NATO RS OSCE SUBJECT: SUBJECT: APRIL 28 HLTF: NATO ALLIES KEEN TO STAY ON MESSAGE ON CFE REF: A. REF: A) STATE 41666 (28 APR 09 HLTF GUIDANCE) ¶B. B) STATE 43053 (RUSSIAN PAPER ON CFE) ¶C. C) STATE 41124 (U.S. NON-PAPER ON THE STATUS OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CFE PARALLEL ACTIONS PACKAGE) Classified By: Classified by: Ambassador Kurt Volker for reasons 1.4 (b ) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. At the April 28 High Level Task Force (HLTF) meeting and on the margins Allies welcomed the U.S. read out of Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller's April 24 luncheon discussion of CFE in Rome with Russian Security and Disarmament Director Antonov, including indications that Russia is prepared to intensify efforts to find a CFE solution building on the parallel actions package. Allies were particularly interested that Russia had provided a paper to the U.S. (The translation of that paper ) ref B - was subsequently provided to Allies on April 30.) In addition, a number of other issues figured prominently in the HLTF and associated bilateral meetings: -- Allies were appreciative of the U.S. non-paper on the status of U.S.-Russia bilateral discussions of the parallel actions package (ref C). Several said they considered it a useful overview of the issues at play. Although comments on the paper were minimal, Turkey was insistent that any enlarged (from the bilateral) format discussion with Russia on the package should include Allies on a non-exclusive basis (meaning not just quad 1) and must address the entire parallel actions package, not just selected issues, like the flank. Turkey,s comments on the need to retain the flank regime for Russia were unambiguous. -- On the way ahead, Allies discussed the need to use key upcoming opportunities to deliver a consistent and constructive message on CFE. Turkey stressed that Allies should use the May (TBC) NATO-Russia Council Ministerial as an opportunity to raise CFE. -- Allies intend to use the May 26-28 Oberammergau HLTF "Away Day" to review in detail Russia,s position on the package elements and agree on a calibrated Alliance message for the June 10 German-hosted seminar on CFE and the future of conventional arms control in Europe. -- German Seminar: Allies view the latest version of the German concept paper for the seminar much improved, but remain uncomfortable with the potential scope and intent of the seminar, and particularly of a planned discussion on "options for the future." German rep Biontino struggled to explain how Germany intended to manage a discussion on stocktaking and to limit a discussion on "options for the future" among such a broad group of participants, but he indicated Berlin would distribute an annotated agenda in an effort to manage expectations and structure the discussion. END SUMMARY. - - - - - - - - - - - - CONTACTS and BILATERALS - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) HLTF Chairman Erdmann reviewed the post-Summit state of play stressing renewed efforts to reinvigorate the NATO-Russia Council, including in arms control. He noted an Interfax news release that was highly critical of the Summit declaration paragraph on CFE which Russia claimed indicated Allies were not ready to engage in dialogue to resolve the impasse. Erdmann remarked that this contrasted sharply with the tone of an April 17 discussion with the RF delegation during which Russia discounted the news release and claimed readiness to intensify efforts. The highlight of the contacts and bilaterals discussion was the U.S. read out and the Russian non-paper (of which the Dutch, at least, were already aware): -- U.S. Rep Rich Davis reported briefly on A/S Gottemoeller's April 24 START meeting with MFA Director Antonov in Rome during which Antonov raised CFE over lunch and provided an informal paper in Russian, indicating that Russia is prepared to work off of the parallel actions package. Davis informed USNATO 00000173 002 OF 005 Allies of the overall positive tone of the exchange and noted that the U.S. was still having the Russian paper translated and expected to share it with Allies as soon as possible. (Note. The English version has since been distributed to HLTF reps via NATO International Staff, ref B. End Note) Davis emphasized that while, at first reading, the ideas were familiar, reflecting well known Russian priorities and no new concepts or ideas, at the same time it was useful that the Russians had put their positions down on paper and that the paper focused on the parallel actions package. Allies welcomed news of the constructive tone of the meeting and appeared particularly relieved that the parallel actions package -- which many have described as "the only game in town" (and which was very difficult to agree within the Alliance) -- remained the focus of discussion. -- Netherlands: Dutch rep Kleinjan (who had consulted with the U.S. del just prior to the meeting to ensure the U.S. intended to raise the paper) reported on a meeting in Moscow with Russian expert Federyakov in which he claimed Russia would share the paper provided to the U.S. with all the members of the JCG during the first week of May. (Note. Kleinjan was under the impression the paper laid out specifics of a Russian two-staged provisional application proposal but opted not to go into any substance in his remarks. End Note.) -- Slovenian rep Vidovic reported on an April 8 Foreign Ministerial working level meeting in Moscow during which CFE was not raised, but Russia,s European Security Treaty proposal was discussed. He indicated FM Lavrov raised familiar Russian points stressing that the NRC (which amounted to 28:1) was not an adequate venue for discussions on European security and noting his intent to attend the ASRC in Vienna and the Informal Ministerial in Corfu. Vidovic also reported that on Aug 30-Sep 1, the Slovenian MFA is organizing the fourth event in a Bled Strategic Forum series which will focus on the economic crisis, but will also include a panel devoted to European Security. -------------- -------------- THE WAY AHEAD ) AWAY DAY - STOCKTAKING, BERLIN, AND BEYOND -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) NRC and CFE: In discussions on the way ahead, Turkey suggested that Allies should consider the full calendar of available opportunities to deliver a solid message on CFE to Russia. Turkey stressed that Allies should use the NATO-Russia Council Ministerial meeting to send a constructive CFE message; otherwise Allies would risk Russia misinterpreting the absence of discussion of CFE. On the margins, Turkish rep Gun informed the U.S. that his Minister would make a statement noting the positive dynamic is an opportunity for progress, but also flagging that Russia,s insistence on abolishing the flank regime would "kill Turkish ratification chances." Gun urged that Secretary Clinton should mention CFE in her remarks, as that would have "great impact" and be useful to the overall process. ¶4. (C) U.S. Non-Paper Well Received with One Exception: Allies universally welcomed the U.S. paper on the status of bilateral discussions of each element of the parallel actions package. Only one concern surfaced which stemmed from the idea of using "variable geometry" for engaging Russia on an issue-by-issue basis. -- The Turks in particular do not like the idea of U.S.-Russia- plus- Allies meeting to discuss specific issues. They and others are concerned this might suggest that some issues, like the flank, are of interest only to certain Allies. Turkish rep Gun was adamant, and others agreed, that any enlarged format discussion must address the entire parallel actions package and should include a small to medium (8-10) group of Allies (on a non-exclusive basis). The idea of a larger group ) which would preclude a Quad plus Russia format ) appeared to resonate with many. -- No Ally spoke in favor of selective, issue-specific small groups. The UK argued such an arrangement could give Russia a veto on who participates; both Romania and Italy argued it could give Russia an opportunity to drive wedges. (On the USNATO 00000173 003 OF 005 margins, Romanian rep Stoica noted that Romania was interested in "applying" to be part of any set, small group.) Belgian rep van Meirvenne underscored openness to an expanded format as long as it was not to the detriment of the bilateral process; Turkey concurred with this. ¶5. (C) The HLTF Away Day in May: Apart from modalities, Allies focused on what they wanted to achieve at the away day in Oberammergau. Prior to learning of Russia,s paper on revitalizing the CFE parallel actions discussion, key Allies like Turkey envisioned a unitary priority for that meeting: to prepare a unified NATO position for the German CFE seminar. However, Allies agreed that the U.S. non-paper, the Russian paper responding to the parallel actions package, the German seminar concept paper (to which Russia had also responded in writing) and the Czech paper from last fall would all provide ample material for a thorough stocktaking discussion. German rep Biontino repeated calls for more "comprehensive" stocktaking to assess more broadly the importance of conventional arms control, but the IS did not bite at the notion of developing an additional paper on a way ahead. Two key goals surfaced: to reach agreement on and calibrate the NATO message to Russia for the June 10 seminar, and to review in detail the Russian position on elements of the parallel actions package. ¶6. (C) German-hosted CFE Seminar on June 10: On the margins (see para 7) and in the HLTF itself, German rep Biontino struggled to describe the goals and modalities for the Berlin event. He said Berlin envisioned two parts in terms of the agenda: "stocktaking and options for the future." Although Allies consider the latest revision of Germany,s concept for the June seminar much improved, it was clear that some (France, Turkey, Canada, Czech Republic) are uncomfortable with the potential scope and perceived Russian intent of a discussion on "options for the future." These uncertainties were reinforced by a Russian written response to Germany (distributed to all) that appears to call for a broadened discussion beyond CFE and for concrete, practical outcomes for future steps. -- French rep Raharinaivo (supported by UK rep Ford) was strongest on this point. He reiterated French support for the seminar and a positive dynamic, but underscored that Allies should not be bashful about establishing red lines and making it clear that there will be "no deliverables." Germany gave assurances that there would be no negotiated outcomes and noted plans to incorporate input from Russia in a third revision of its concept paper and to also develop an annotated agenda with the aim of structuring the discussion. - - - - - - - - - - - - MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) On the margins of the HLTF, the U.S. met with quad reps from Germany, France and the UK, and conducted bilateral meetings with Turkey, Romania, Norway and Italy (and informally with Canada.) For the most part, Allies previewed and discussed the same points made in the HLTF plenary, but the bilateral meetings also provided an opportunity for more in depth discussion of the German seminar concept as well as some of the elements of the U.S. non-paper: -- Quad: Much of the quad discussion focused on the latest version of the German paper and the Russian response, as well as how Germany intends to address continued Allied concerns about the scope and intent of the seminar. Several Allies took note that the Germans planned to invite all potential CFE participants to the meeting. (This was a major issue for the Turks ) see below.) The U.S. and others pushed Biontino to explain how "stocktaking and options for the future" would work: stocktaking would inevitably highlight the Russian suspension and the status of the parallel actions package, which might produce maximalist statements of position on both sides. This could not be useful. "Options for the future" sounded too open-ended, if NATO,s common goal is to preserve the CFE Treaty regime; the U.S. and UK warned that Allies would not welcome such a discussion. Regarding the latter point, Biontino said that he did not foresee a discussion of substance under the rubric of "options for the future." The USNATO 00000173 004 OF 005 focus could be on process. He envisioned a discussion of whether Allies would engage Russia in a group larger than just the U.S. and Russia. The U.S. and UK acknowledged that "process" was safer than "substance," but pointed out it was hard to imagine a limited discussion on format and process in a group that Germany had said would include all potential CFE participants -- the Balkans, the Nordics, the Austrians, in addition to the current CFE members. Biontino admitted that Berlin was still trying to sort through the plan, but would distribute an annotated agenda with the next version of the concept paper by the time of the "away day" in an effort to manage expectations and structure/limit the scope of discussions. -- Turkey: In separate discussions with Turkey, Gun remarked that Germany intended to invite Cyprus to participate in the seminar and that if Cyprus does participate, Turkey would not likely attend. Gun made clear in the HLTF plenary that Turkey,s attendance was still subject to review. -- Turkey, Romania, Italy and Canada: All welcomed the U.S. non-paper and were encouraged by the positive tone of the most recent U.S.-Russia meeting. Each expressed concerns about the timing and intent of the German-hosted seminar as noted in the plenary, but bilateral discussions generally focused on some of the key issues in the U.S. parallel actions package non-paper: -- Flank: During bilateral discussions, Turkish rep Gun was very firm in underscoring that Turkey could not take the Adapted Treaty to its parliament if there was a question about the status of the flank. He repeated concerns about the suggestion that Russia might only resume implementation of some (but not all) elements of CFE in certain conditions ) but not the flank limits. The Norwegians were also very firm about the flank not being negotiable for them. Norwegian rep Loken expressed concern that Germany was interested in finding compromises and pushed for a U.S. assessment of how a flank deal might be possible. EUR/RPM Jennifer Laurendeau recalled that during the U.S.-Russian bilateral discussion in December, Russia had focused on political commitments as a substitute for the flank limits. Loken said Norway liked having both ) the political commitments (which exist for Russian equipment levels in the north) and/and the legal limits ) as a "double safety switch." Italian rep Farruggia, in an uncharacteristically realistic assessment, stressed that if Russia,s flank position (including the Baluyevskiy proposal) was not just tactical posturing ) which Italy hoped that it was ) then there would be a serious problem. He and Gun were both clear about timing and sequencing: provisions of the Adapted Treaty could not be changed before entry into force. -- Moldova: On the margins Allies asked if the U.S. had heard any definitive interpretation of the 2 1 statement from the Moldovans, but none pressed this in the plenary. The U.S. team responded that we had requested the formal Moldovan view on the matter, but obviously the political situation in Moldova had complicated prospects for receiving an answer. UK rep Ford noted in the quad that for the UK the 2 1 statement "doesn,t change the price of fish" in terms of host nation consent. Romanian rep Stoica (DG for Strategic Affairs and former HLTF rep Micula,s replacement) underscored that regardless of whether the Moldovans considered the Russian peacekeeping presence illegal, Romania did not want Russian forces on its border, and therefore Russia,s implementation of its withdrawal commitment remains critical for Romania. In this regard, Stoica reaffirmed that Romania supports the Parallel Actions Package in principle but not necessarily in the specifics. (Note: Romania would like the package to include a date certain for Russia,s withdrawal of forces and munitions. End note.) -- Georgia: Several Allies welcomed receiving the text of the U.S. proposals on Georgia that we had advanced in the parallel actions context; there was little extended discussion, just preliminary remarks. The Italian rep suggested this issue was mainly a matter of bilateral agreement between Russia and Georgia. Canada opined separately that Russia had painted itself into a corner by recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia, thereby complicating USNATO 00000173 005 OF 005 matters. Both Canada and Romania remarked that Russia would not likely withdraw TLE from either region. In plenary, Czech rep Zvonkova suggested Allies devote time at the "Away Day" on the issue of unresolved commitments to Georgia and Moldova in developing a key message for the Berlin seminar: these commitments should not be abandoned, but Allies must find creative ways to deal with these issues in view of current developments in the region. ¶8. (SBU) NEXT MEETINGS. The HLTF "Away Day" will take place 26-28 May at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany and will be followed by the June 10 German-hosted seminar on "The Future of Conventional Arms Control" in Berlin. Allies agreed for the HLTF to then meet on July 9 to draw conclusions from the preceding events and consider next steps in light of any developments. VOLKER