ROGOZIN RAMBLES SOVIET-STYLE IN RESTART OF THE

S E C R E T USNATO 000165 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017 TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS GG RS SUBJECT: ROGOZIN RAMBLES SOVIET-STYLE IN RESTART OF THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL REF: A. USNATO 157 ¶B. STATE 43053 Classified By: Ambassador Kurt Volker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: On April 29, the first formal NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Ambassadorial meeting was held since the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Russian Ambassador Rogozin used the meeting to dissect and criticize the communiqu from NATO's recent 60th Anniversary Summit. Paying particular attention to the language on Georgia, he took the opportunity to urge the cancellation of the upcoming NATO/Partnership for Peace exercises which will be held in Georgia. Allies were frustrated by Rogozin's unconstructive comments, pushing back appropriately. They made clear that the exercises in Georgia would go forward as planned. After an initial discussion on several non-papers on the subject of NRC reform (including one co-sponsored by the U.S.),Ambassadors tasked the NRC Preparatory Committee to have an instructed discussion on the issue. After being told that Secretary Clinton was not available for the date initially proposed for the NRC Foreign Ministerial, Rogozin urged Allies to quickly determine a date when the meeting could be held. He said Russia would like to focus on Afghanistan, European security issues, and the state of relations between NATO and Russia at the Ministerial. Repudiating his own recent press comments, Rogozin said the Russian decision not to participate in a May 7 Chiefs of Defense meeting was not intended as a political demarche regarding the exercises in Georgia. Instead, he said that Moscow believed military-to-military cooperation could only be considered after a political mandate had been delivered at the upcoming NRC Foreign Ministerial process. He called attention to Russia's proposals for revitalizing work on a CFE solution based on the U.S.-drafted Parallel Actions Package and sought further work on non-proliferation issues. He also asked for a meeting with Allied armament directors. END SUMMARY ROGOZIN'S RANT ON THE NATO SUMMIT COMMUNIQU... -------------- --- ¶2. (S/NF) On April 29, NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Ambassadors met for the first time in formal session since the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war and the resulting suspension by Allied Foreign Ministers of "business as usual" in the NRC. Following a brief summary of the results of the April 3-4 NATO Summit by NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer, Russian Ambassador Rogozin launched into an extended Russian critique of the Summit Communiqu. Specific criticism included: -- Paragraph 3: Indivisibility of Security: Rogozin complained that the reference to the indivisibility of security referred only to Allied security and, therefore, ignored Russian security needs. (Note: This is standard Alliance language which has been used for years in Summit and Ministerial communiqus.) -- Paragraph 7: Kosovo: Rogozin argued that the decision by many NATO Allies to recognize the independence of Kosovo contradicted the Paragraph 7 statement of support for the principle of territorial integrity. -- Paragraph 8: Medvedev European Security Treaty Proposals: Rogozin complained that paragraph 8 seemed to imply that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was not the appropriate venue for discussion of proposal by Russian President Medvedev for a European Security Treaty. Rogozin argued that the OSCE was an appropriate venue because it had not been dealing with hard security issues for at least the last year, adding that he did not want the Medvedev proposal "hidden away" at the OSCE. He argued for a discussion of the Medvedev proposal within the NRC, including at ministerial level. -- Paragraph 19: NATO-UN: Rogozin criticized the NATO-UN agreement cited in the paragraph, arguing that it had been signed without the knowledge or consent of Russia. He also argued that while the UN had tried to argue that this was merely an agreement between the secretariats of the two organizations, the NATO Communiqu indicated it was an agreement between the respective organizations. -- Paragraph 49: Cyber-security: Rogozin asked what the reference to cyber attacks was meant to imply. Did it mean, he asked, that attacks on the computers of Alliance members would be considered an Article 5 (i.e. collective defense) issue, even if launched by private individuals? -- Paragraph 57: CFE: Rogozin then turned to the CFE paragraph of the summit declaration, and commented on it in a positive tone, arguing that we need to show more flexibility. He said the Russia-U.S. Parallel actions package could be the basis for a way forward but we need to improve it. Rogozin then walked through, in broad brush, most of the elements of the paper that Russian MFA Disarmament Director Antonov passed to A/S Gottemoeller on April 24 in Rome (REF B). (NOTE: Partly because of difficulties with translation of some of the technical language in Rogozin's CFE remarks, his comments resulted in some confusion. Allies concluded that the upshot was that Russia said it was ready to work on the basis of the parallel actions package. END NOTE.) Rogozin called on Vienna to increase its work and indicated that Russia would present its CFE proposals in Vienna at may 12-13 (presumably the JCG and FSC meetings). Finally, he said NRC Ambassadors should discuss CFE at their next meeting, and offered to have Russia's JCP rep provide a CFE presentation. In response, Germany expressed deep concern over Russia's suspension of the CFE treaty and requested more details on the Russian proposals. Ambassador Volker stressed the importance of implementation of the existing treaty but welcomed Russia's willingness to work on the basis of the parallel action plan. Several allies supported U.S. and German interventions. -- Article 60: The High North: Rogozin argued that NATO had no constructive role to play in the High North, adding that the activities of the Arctic Council were sufficient. He also disputed the Communique's claim that the region has been received increased international attention, adding as a poor joke that the only attention he could see was that which might be generated by polar bears. And Venom for Georgia... -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Rogozin's comments about the Georgia-related language in the Communiqu were particularly pointed. He asked how NATO-Georgian relations could have deepened (Summit Communiqu paragraph 31) when Georgian actions had not promoted stability in the Caucasus region. He used the opportunity to urge Allies to cancel or defer the NATO/Partnership for Peace exercises Cooperative Longbow 2009 and Cooperative Lancer 2009 which are scheduled to be held in Georgia later this year, adding that cancellation or deferment was necessary to protect "the image and reputation of NATO." He claimed that holding the exercises during the electoral campaign in South Ossetia would put undue pressure on the South Ossetian electorate. He also complained about comments attributed to U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Secretary Joseph Benkert that the exercises were intended to support Georgian territorial integrity, arguing that Benkert's comments were proof that the exercises had a political dimension. Leaves Allies Frustrated -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) Allies--even the usually more forward-leaning ones with regard to engagement with Russia--were clearly frustrated by the unhelpful tone and substance of Rogozin's intervention. German PermRep Brandenburg said he was reminded of his days as a political officer in the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Norwegian PermRep Traavik remarked that "if we are going into the future, we are going backwards into the future." Italian PermRep Stefanini added that "we don't want to miss the bus. It may come twice, but not three times." Canadian PermRep McRae simply expressed bafflement at the "unreconstructed" Russian intervention, asking rhetorically "where are we going?" ¶5. (S/NF) Allies pushed back in all the right places, in a well-orchestrated (although not pre-coordinated) manner. They argued that Rogozin was reading selectively from the NATO Communique. They noted, for example, that Rogozin had not even mentioned the carefully balanced language in the Russia-related section of the document (paragraphs 33-35), adding that Rogozin should spend more time reading the actual text and less time trying to "read between the lines." ¶6. (S/NF) On Georgia, Allies quickly brushed aside the Russian attempts to cancel the NATO/PfP exercises, with Italy arguing that Rogozin's "concerns" were "much ado about nothing." Noting the limited time frame and small number of forces in these exercises, Canada mused that Russian forces in Georgia had no invitation from the host government, no limits on their numbers, and an undefined time frame for their continued presence. Ambassador Volker explained that the exercises--which were designed to promote interoperability--will threaten no one and that no heavy equipment will be involved. He pointed out that Russia was invited to participate and that the 600 PfP soldiers will be dwarfed by the over 7,000 Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Ambassador Volker also explained the context of ASD Benkert's statement about the exercise, quoting from a transcript provided by Embassy Astana. Lithuanian PermRep Linkevicius expressed regret at the lack of Russian implementation of the commitments it agreed to in the cease-fire with Georgia negotiated by the EU, adding that Lithuania saw a clear linkage between these commitments and the ability to be more forward leaning with regard to re-engagement with Russia. ¶7. (S/NF) French PermRep Andreani said that that Rogozin did not have a good understanding of the Allied position with regard to the OSCE role for the Medvedev proposals. She said that she thought the OSCE was the proper forum for to handle the Medvedev proposals, but that that did not rule out discussions within the NRC. Ambassador Volker agreed, noting that the OSCE was more inclusive than was the NRC. He also strongly refuted Rogozin's argument that the OSCE was inappropriate for hard security issues, pointing out that the OSCE has had a "security basket" for years. Germany urged Rogozin not to underestimate the OSCE. ¶8. (S/NF) Norway, Iceland, and Italy (an observer to the Arctic Council) acknowledged the leading role of the Arctic Council on High North issues, but took pains to defend a NATO role, as well. Iceland said security issues cannot be addressed in the Arctic Council. Canadian PermRep McRae asked when Moscow would begin pre-notification of bomber flights in the area that come near Alliance territory. Norwegian PermRep Traavik took issue with Rogozin's statement that there was not increased international attention to the region, stating that such attention was "an objective fact" which could be easily seen in the discussions taking place in scientific circles, as well as in media and think tank events. Ambassador Volker said that the High North was an area ripe for cooperation. ¶9. (S/NF) On other issues raised by Rogozin, Hungary and the UK said Russia's arguments about Kosovo ignored Kosovo's special circumstances. On the issue of the indivisibility of security, Ambassador Volker pointed out that security is a common good. He said that security for NATO or her partners increases security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area and is not at the expense of any other country. Volker also pointed out that the arrangement with the UN was important to the Alliance because NATO has been acting as the executor for several operations with a UN mandate, such as in Afghanistan. THE PAPER CHASE ON NRC REFORM -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) Ambassadors expressed initial impressions of the three non-papers on NRC reform/revitalization (1) CZ/US/GER, 2) Russian, and the 3) SP/IT/TU/FR papers) and clearly seem to prefer the greater depth and substance in the CZ/US/GER paper(ref A). Ambassador Rogozin said he personally supported streamlining NRC committee structures from our paper, and then suggested the creation of a new working group to negotiate the details. One hour prior to the meeting, the Russia Mission circulated its non-paper (emailed to EUR/RPM). Luxembourg, Slovenia, Norway, and the U.S. expressed concern with the proposal to create a coalition of willing members to act as an NRC steering committee. Deputy Political Advisor Baez warned against a focus on the proliferation of meetings and said substance should drive the number of meetings. From the Russian paper, Rogozin highlighted that NRC members should not enhance their security at the expense of other NRC members. In addition, Russia wants to create a working group focused on Afghanistan and advocated holding NRC Ambassadorial meetings in different locations, such as in, "Russia, Norfolk, Italy and near conflict zones." Ambassadors tasked the NRC Prep Com to discuss and potentially merge ideas from the three non-papers for approval by NRC Foreign Ministers. Spain and Portugal suggested that the Prep Com focus on improving the substance of the NRC rather than the procedure. NRC MINISTERIAL -------------- ¶11. (S/NF) Rogozin said Foreign Minister Lavrov was available for the NRC Foreign Ministerial on May 19 (NOTE: USNATO has expressed its displeasure to the NATO International Staff for proposing a date to Russia for the NRC Ministerial before there was an inter-alliance agreement on it. End note.) Ambassador Volker noted that the Secretary was not available on May 19, but that he was working with Washington on an alternate date. Rogozin urged Allies to find a date for the ministerial as soon as possible in the acceptable time frame (NOTE: By acceptable time frame, the Russian Mission to NATO told us that Moscow is hyper-sensitive as to the sequencing of NRC re-engagement and that the Foreign Ministerial must precede the June 11-12 NATO Defense Ministerial. End note.) On the agenda for the Ministerial, Russia wants to include: the state of NRC relations, Medvedev's European security proposal, and Afghanistan. The Secretary General made clear that as Chairman of the NRC he would work with capitals to expeditiously determine a date for the Foreign Ministerial. NON-ATTENDANCE AT THE CHODS CONFERENCE -------------- ¶12. (S/NF) Many Allies expressed regret at the Russian decision not to attend the May 7 NRC Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) meeting. Repudiating comments that he had made in the press, Rogozin responded that the Russian cancellation of the CHODs was not a political demarche relating to the exercise in Georgia. Instead, he said that Russia believed that political guidance from NRC Foreign Ministers was needed before consideration could be given to restarting military-to-military cooperation. (NOTE: Rogozin echoed the line that Russian Military Representative Mazlov used to cancel the May 7 meeting of NRC CHODs, claiming Moscow wanted political guidance from NRC Foreign Ministers before any military re-engagement or high-level meetings on the military side. End note) MILITARY PROCUREMENT, NON-PROLIFERATION, AND CAI -------------- --- ¶13. (S/NF) Rogozin proposed a meeting with Allied armament directors, arguing that the NRC should look at cooperation in the procurement of military hardware ¶14. (S/NF) Rogozin also called for a meeting of NRC Disarmament Directors to reinvigorate the moribund NRC non-proliferation working group. NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer agreed that there was a clear consensus within the group to re-invigorate its work, but disagreed with Rogozin's approach. He said that this process must start at the expert level, going on to note that Russia had canceled all of the experts' meetings of this group this year (NOTE: Allies strongly oppose the Russia top-down approach which ignores the need for preparatory groundwork done at the working level. End note.) Norway said it saw non-proliferation issues as a part of the "Holy Trinity" of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. ¶15. (S/NF) Poland also took the opportunity to urge further development of the NRC Cooperative Airspace Initiative. COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (S/NF) Although all Allies did a good job of pushing back on Rogozin, some Allies "aired the Alliance's dirty laundry" in front of Rogozin, revealing to him the continuing divisions within NATO over the wisdom of the "no business as usual" policy adopted in August. Germany, for example, expressed regret that there had been no NRC meetings for an extended period of time, while Greece "rejoiced" at this meeting. Hungary said that the message it wanted to send was that it was "glad to have you back." As we move forward with re-engagement with Russia, we will need to make sure that these Allies stay on message: an eyes-open approach of seeking cooperation in areas of common interest, while also pushing back in areas where we disagree. It is important that Russia see first had that it cannot continue to divide an increasingly unified Alliance. VOLKER