MARCH 12 HLTF: NATO ALLIES PRESS U.S. TO LEAD ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000115 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2019 TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL SUBJECT: MARCH 12 HLTF: NATO ALLIES PRESS U.S. TO LEAD ON CFE NEXT STEPS REF: STATE 23176 Classified By: POLAD W. Scott Reid for reasons 1.4 (B)&(D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. At the March 12 NATO High Level Task Force (HLTF) meeting, three main themes emerged from Allies' comments on next steps regarding CFE: 1) Allied support for U.S. leadership in engaging Russia on CFE; 2) support for the Parallel Actions Package as the basis for engagement; and 3) determination to preserve Alliance unity on CFE and reflect that in NATO public statements and in talks with Russia. The quote of the day came from Turkish rep Gun: "Any hint of abandoning the NATO position in the Parallel Actions Package, and I won't be able to go back to Turkey." ¶2. (C) Turkey offered a three-part proposal for next steps: 1) development of a NATO International Staff-U.S. non-paper addressing the status of each element of the Parallel Actions Package; 2) a stock-taking discussion based on the non-paper, following the NATO Summit; and 3) a meeting in an expanded U.S.-Russia format including key interested Allies to discuss all elements of the "Parallel Actions Package." Many Allies welcomed Turkey's call for detailed stocktaking - with some calling for a more forward-looking consideration of options - as well as HLTF chairman Erdmann's unexpected suggestion for Allies to engage in CFE brainstormin at an off-site meeting prior to the German-hosted seminar in June. Many expressed concern about the German non-paper on the Steinmeier-proposed CFE seminar, fearing that the meeting, as conceived, could result in Allies airing differences in front of the Russians and could complicate negotiations on the Parallel Actions Package. Turkey and Romania raised particular concer n about Germany's plan to discuss the "scope and parameters" of a future negotiation to update the Adapted CFE. Almost all, with the notable exception of Germany, emphasized the need for a unified Allied position at the seminar. The German rep dismissed much of the input from Allies as "misunderstandings" of the specific language in the German paper, but indicated Germany would attempt to clarify some of the key concerns in the next version. He also made clear that the paper was strictly a German concept (not an Alliance-agreed document) that aimed to sustain the current process while exploring complementary ideas in a positive dialogue. Germany intends to seek input from Russia in the near term and will brief Allies on the Russian reaction at the next HLTF. ¶3. (C) On CFE language for the NATO Summit and the HLTF input to the SPC paper on arms control, Allies quickly reached agreement on outstanding issues in the current texts. Allies from both sides of the NATO divide on Russia management insisted that the December NAC text on CFE should be used, unchanged, in the Summit Declaration, with only minor edits if needed to avoid repeating language elsewhere in the document. END SUMMARY. - - - - - - - - - - - - CONTACTS and BILATERALS - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) HLTF Chairman Erdmann introduced this agenda item with a broad overview of Alliance Summit preparations. He noted that Foreign Ministers had agreed to resume formal contacts with Russia to include a NATO Russia Council Ministerial that will take place following the Summit but prior to late June. U.S. Rep Rich Davis (per reftel) remarked on the brief exchange on CFE between Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov at their March 6 meeting in Geneva, noting that The Secretary indicated her interest in continuing to work the issue. As expected, other reports were at a minimum: -- Romania: Romanian rep Micula reported on their Foreign Minister's visit to Moscow on February 27, which included CFE on the agenda. Nothing new emerged from a brief discussion in which Romania reiterated the need for Russia to resume CFE implementation and respond constructively to the Parallel Actions Package, and FM Lavrov replied that the package was a step in the right direction but insufficient. -- France: French rep Raharinaivo noted that the French MoD Director for Strategic Affairs met with MFA Director Antonov in Moscow on February 9. The meeting touched on CFE, but the dialogue was "fruitless" as Antonov criticized the Alliance in general and would not engage constructively on process or future steps. In meetings outside the HLTF plenary, Raharinaivo's characterization of the meeting was more evocative: it was demonstrated that the parties could speak in loud voices, he noted. -- Germany: German rep Biontino reported that a February 19 meeting between German Director General for Arms Control and Disarmament Gottwald and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov and MFA Director Antonov only served to reinforce that Russia remains in a "wait and see" mode on CFE. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - THE WAY AHEAD - STOCKTAKING AND THE GERMAN SEMINAR - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Turkey's Three-Part Proposal with a Brainstorming Twist: In response to the HLTF Chairman's call for views on how to best engage in stocktaking, Turkey strongly advocated that the primary venue for engaging Russia on CFE should be the U.S.-Russia channel and suggested a deliberate three-part proposal to capitalize on expected positive developments vis-a-vis Russia following the Summit, and to counter Russia's claims that the U.S. is monopolizing CFE discussions. Turkey suggested a series of next steps to carry out before June: 1) the NATO I.S., together with the U.S., should prepare a non-paper describing the state of play on each of the issues contained in the parallel actions package; 2) Allies should hold a stocktaking discussion after the NATO Summit to review that paper; and 3) Allies should then engage Russia in an expanded U.S.-Russia format (including key interested Allies) to discuss all the elements of the Parallel Actions Package. In a surprise to most Allies, HLTF Chair Erdmann suggested an additional "ingredient" to include in the "NATO Summit to Berlin seminar continuum" by proposing another HLTF off-site event during which Allies could conduct stocktaking on the Parallel Actions Package and beyond, via a brainstorming session prior to the June 10 seminar. Allied reaction to engaging in a deliberate process was favorable. The Turkish idea of engaging the Russians in an expanded U.S.-Russia format prior to the German seminar was seconded by the Dutch rep, but not further discussed. -- Most Allies focused on the stocktaking idea. Some focused exclusively on the Turkish idea of reviewing the status of the elements of the Parallel Actions Package; others were interested in a more open-ended, forward leaning discussion, and some specifically suggested the need to consider "options" which were not further detailed. U.S. rep Davis (with the caveat of the challenges presented by both the timing and process of the ongoing transition) welcomed the suggestion for a more thorough discussion at a later time and noted noncommittally that a paper might be useful to frame such a discussion. He also underscored the utility of a stocktaking exercise in preparing for the German seminar in June. The UK, Netherlands, Norway, Italy, Hungary, Greece and Romania agreed with engaging in a deliberate process. Romanian rep Micula stressed that discussion should focus on the Parallel Actions Package with the goal of "assisting our U.S. friends in their tireless efforts to overcome the CFE impasse." -- Canadian rep Arpin - supported by the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Luxembourg - suggested it would be more useful to go beyond a pure stocktaking exercise by exploring future options though she did not elaborate any further. -- German rep Biontino was open to a written assessment and discussion of where we stand on the Parallel Actions Package and how to continue the process, but also called for a broader stocktaking context that would address the importance of arms control to European security and the enormous loss Europe would suffer if arms control went by the wayside. -- The Chairman concluded there was consensus for a stocktaking debate (and possibly a "stocktaking plus" debate that would include addressing broader contextual issues and a way forward) as well as agreement to hold a stand alone brainstorming off-site HLTF. The proposition for an off-site not only meshed with Turkey's proposal but also fit neatly with Germany's June seminar. It appeared that most Allies expect to use the off-site as a preparatory event to set limits on - and establish Allied positions for - the discussion at the June meeting. What remained less clear was whether or not the IS/U.S. non-paper should only address stocktaking or include a discussion on the way forward. -- An element of Turkey's proposal lost in the discussion was the idea of engaging the Russians prior to the German seminar in an expanded format. Dutch rep Kleinjan noted continued support for the idea of an expanded format, while Romanian rep Micula suggested Allies should first engage in the stocktaking and brainstorming discussions before determining next steps such as the expanded format. (Comment: It seems likely that most Allies are waiting for U.S. reaction on the question of a U.S.-Russia meeting with participation of key allies. End comment) ¶6. (C) German Seminar in Berlin: German rep Biontino commented at length on the German concept for Foreign Minister Steinmeier's proposed seminar on the Future of Arms Control in Europe which will take place in Berlin on June 10. Biontino said the intended purpose of the meeting is to sustain the impetus of the current process (Parallel Actions Plan) by reaffirming the importance of arms control and encouraging Russia to engage through constructive dialogue based on the topics in the German paper. Biontino assured Allies that Germany believes any future conventional arms control developments should be on the basis of CFE and Adapted CFE, a point the Germans would make more explicit in their paper. But Biontino appeared to reject the Allies' universal message that a unified NATO position at the seminar was essential. He made clear that the paper was not a consensus document. It was intended to identify complementary subject matter which would amount to "converging elements" for a positive discussion in Berlin. The idea of the seminar was not to compete with the current U.S.-led approach, but rather to highlight areas to address in terms of future conventional arms control arrangements such as a regional approach to security issues, which Biontino noted would include the flank. -- In a lengthy tour de table almost all Allies present in the meeting (TU, NOR, NETH, FR, UK, RO, Slovenia, Latvia, BEL, CAN, HU, LUX, DN, US) with the notable exception of Germany, underscored that it would be essential for NATO Allies to have a unified position on all issues to be discussed at the seminar. The French were particularly effective in simultaneously endorsing the seminar, and sketching the perils of an event where Allies disagreed on core issues in front of the Russians. -- All Allies who spoke politely welcomed the Steinmeier-proposed CFE seminar, but expressed varying degrees of concern about the German paper: common goals and objectives would need to be defined and the event would need to be structured in a way that clearly supported the Alliance agreed approach in support of the Parallel Actions Package. There should be no indication of an alternate process. -- Several Allies inveighed against Germany's plan to define the "scope and parameters" of a future negotiation to update the Adapted CFE Treaty at their June seminar. Turkey told the U.S. on the margins that if Germany focused on the possibility of a post-Adapted CFE negotiation, the Russians would have no incentive to work constructively to bring the Adapted Treaty into force. Canadian rep Arpin noted it was premature and Romanian rep Micula expressed concern that Russia would misinterpret the paper as an opening to an alternate offer which would only encourage a continued "wait and see" approach and discourage any serious negotiations. U.S. rep Davis cautioned that defining the "scope and parameters" of future changes to the Adapted Treaty amounted to identifying areas for renegotiation, would require senior governmental decisions, and could seriously complicate prospects for ratification. -- The Turks opposed the "scope and parameters" language as well as the notion of discussing CFE on a "non-discriminatory basis," making clear that Turkey was not prepared to discuss revising the flank limits. Turkish rep Gun also expressed concern about the timing of the seminar when the priority effort, he opined, should go to U.S. efforts and expanded discussions on the basis of the existing package. -- Slovenia and Latvia were uneasy about Germany's proposal to explore new measures on a regional basis and called for consideration of the impact of any regional measures on the overall Alliance approach to security. ¶7. (C) In response to expressed Allied concerns, German rep Biontino noted that the paper would be revised to take account of comments made by Allies, but that it would NOT be "an HLTF document" or an agreed Alliance text. It is strictly a German concept, and not an Alliance position. Germany also intends to seek input from Russia soon as the paper should "reflect positions of all partners." Germany will then brief the HLTF on Russia's reaction to the revised paper and the overall concept. -- Biontino said the paper was not intended to suggest an alternate process or changes to the flank regime, but stressed that regional approaches to arms control were compatible with the indivisibility of security and could serve to strengthen Alliance security. He concurred that unity is important, but did not echo the call of others to develop a unified NATO position for the seminar, arguing that NATO Allies had a common view on all the issues on the table, so there was no need for worry. He did acknowledge the value of avoiding another polemical discussion between Russia and others. Regarding the fear that a "scope and parameters" discussion of future changes to the Adapted Treaty could complicate ratification, Biontino pointed out that reviewing the Treaty was already an element of the Parallel Actions Package, and therefore, if the proposal was serious then discussion should be possible. He did concede that he would consider alternate wording for the German paper. ¶8. (C) Comment: Most Allies are not comfortable with the German approach. On the margins several said that it was essential for the U.S. to resume its leadership in engaging the Russians on CFE, and shaping an agreed NATO approach. The Turks were emphatic: "we can work with an enlarged format if that will be helpful, but we want the U.S. to lead on this issue." End Comment. - - - - - - - - - - - CFE AT THE NATO SUMMIT - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) Communique: With regard to the CFE text for the Summit Declaration, Canada, supported by Allies from both sides of the NATO divide on Russia management (U.S., RO, GER, NL, TU, CZ, UK, and Slovenia),insisted that the December NAC text on CFE should be used in the Summit Declaration, perhaps with a minor edit if needed to avoid repeating language elsewhere in the document. Allies (with the exception of Italy) did not agree with an I.S. effort to edit the document in a way that dropped a call to Russia to end its suspension, and a reference to commitments on Georgia and Moldova. They insisted language on Russia's actions in Georgia be retained until the Russia section of the Declaration is settled. ¶10. (C) SPC Arms Control Paper: Allies reached quick agreement on the HLTF input to the SPC paper on "Raising NATO's Profile in the Field of Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation." The U.S. team advanced suggested text for paragraph 2 of the document which appeared to catalyze agreement on the text as a whole (after weeks of painful HLTF Deputies meetings). This was widely welcomed as there was not much appetite to get into a line by line discussion of the text. - - - - - - - - - - - - MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (C) On the margins of the HLTF, the U.S. met with quad reps from Germany, France and the UK, as well as conducted bilateral meetings with France, Turkey, and Romania. For the most part, Allies previewed and discussed the same points that they made in the main HLTF meeting with a few exceptions. -- Quad: Most of the quad discussion reflected points made in the HLTF; however, the U.S., UK and France used the opportunity to go into more depth on concerns regarding the German concept paper on the Berlin seminar. France provided written commentary (in French) to Germany and highlighted for the group that the primary thrust of the paper was that Alliance solidarity would be the key to our success and should remain our priority and guiding principle in the coming months. The U.S. stressed that the outlined concept seemed quite ambitious and may have the effect of putting the current process on hold if the Russians determine it would be more advantageous to explore the broader ideas referenced in the paper, especially any implication that the flank regime could be dropped altogether. German rep Biontino remarked that he found it challenging intellectually to comprehend both the Russian and Turkish positions on the flank in terms of security policy: for the Russians, their discriminatory issue with the flank is purely political; for the Turks, their concern about stability in the Caucasus could be addressed through steps other than the flank regime. Discussion revealed that the Germans continue to view the regional security challenges and possible solutions through an arms control lens and seem intent on leading others to their conclusion that more arms control will achieve increased stability. They continue to distinguish between CFE issues, such as the flanks and Georgia, which they regard as "regional," and CFE as a whole, which they regard as "strategic." -- At the end of the quad meeting, France raised two issues stemming from discussions in Vienna: the Russian proposal to reopen Vienna Document 1999 (VD99) and Canada's intention to propose a definition for Force Majeure. On VD99, the U.S. recalled the Alliance position that NATO should not support Russian efforts to replicate in the Vienna Document their preferred elements of CFE. The UK noted the risk of negotiating the document "to a lower result," while Germany made a plug for considering proposals in a regional context especially with regard to thresholds. On the Canadian idea of defining Force Majeure, none seemed open to pursuing it, and the French were adamantly against. -- France: Prior to the quad, France had requested a bilateral meeting with U.S. del to exchange ideas on the way ahead on CFE in particular with regard to Georgia. The French rep was quick to point out that their questions were not a sign of impatience with the U.S. Administration's transition, but rather an indication of the value they place on U.S. leadership. France expressed particular concern that Russian actions in Gudauta (in terms of reinforcing forces and equipment there) could eventually "collide" with the political solution in the Parallel Actions Package. The French wanted to explore how the U.S.'s latest Georgia proposal for the package could affect, or be affected by the Geneva process. The U.S. del reviewed the specifics of the Georgia proposal noting that conceptually it was feasible that steps in the CFE context could assist with a positive outcome in the Geneva process or that a sub-regional mechanism stemming from the Geneva process could influence the CFE process. The key, in any case, is to end the current situation, where a continued Russian military build up takes place without any limitation, level of international oversight, or transparency on the ground. -- Turkey and Romania: In separate bilateral meetings, Turkish rep Gun and Romanian rep Micula each raised strong concerns about the thrust of the German paper outlining Berlin's thinking on the June CFE conference. In particular, they objected to the idea of any attempt at this time to define the "scope and parameters" of a future negotiation to update the Adapted CFE Treaty. Each recalled this moniker as the language of the 1996 mandate to renegotiate CFE and each felt strongly that such an endeavor at this point would distract from any serious effort to get a deal on the Parallel Actions Package and get the Adapted Treaty into force. Gun remarked that he feared the German seminar proposal would "kill the established process." Both Gun and Micula were clear in insisting that the only process they support for engaging the Russians on CFE is the one led by the U.S. that is based on the Parallel Actions Package, which has been agreed by all Allies. (Comment: The subtext here is that they do not trust the Germans. End Comment.) -- The Turks previewed with the U.S. bilaterally the proposal they would make in the HLTF, expressing willingness to join with the U.S. and a small group of Allies in meeting with the Russians to discuss all the elements of the package. This is the first time the Turks have expressed officially a willingness to directly engage the Russians in a CFE Parallel Actions Plan discussion that would include the flank (although Turkey does not wish to confine its role to discussing just the flank, thereby indicating that this is only a parochial Turkish concern). Turkey wanted to find ways to enrich the parallel actions process by agreeing to participate in discussions; Gun also suggested a review of the package to explore the possibility of any additional "sweeteners" with regard to defining substantial combat forces, making ratification a priority, or anywhere on Georgia or Moldova. Regarding the flank, Gun was clear that Turkey had "stretched" just to agree to a post-ratification discussion while Russia had given no ground. (Noting that Russia stated its instructions were coming from Putin, Gun clarified that his were not coming from "my mother-in-law.") The U.S. del agreed that Russia has not negotiated constructively, but also stressed that small gains would not likely tip the balance. Moreover, offering some perspective on the delicate balance of the package, the U.S. del stressed that defining substantial combat forces is not something the U.S. was prepared to do in the absence of a deal on the package as a whole, and reminded Gun that other elements of the package already went beyond what some Allies are comfortable accepting (Romania, the Baltics). It would not be easy to find new "sweeteners." ¶12. (SBU) NEXT MEETINGS. Allies agreed to meet twice following the April 3-4 Summit and before the June 10 German-hosted seminar. These meetings will serve as opportunities to take stock of the current situation, consider options, and form a common approach for the June 10 seminar. The next HLTF is now set for April 28, 2009 and the off-site brainstorming session will take place 27-28 May, 2009 at Oberammergau, which will address the key concern of finding a venue that would allow for a sensitive, classified discussion. VOLKER