THIRD STATES LEVERAGING ESDP TO PURSUE THEIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 000554 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019 TAGS: PREL MARR EUN SUBJECT: THIRD STATES LEVERAGING ESDP TO PURSUE THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS REF: A. A. USEU 08 BRUSSELS 1814 ¶B. B. USEU 08 BURSSELS 930 ¶C. C. ANKARA 461 ¶D. D. USEU BRUSSELS 401 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRS CHRISTOPHER MURRAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 1.(C//NF) Summary: Just as EU Member States look increasingly to the EU,s Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to tackle security issues, non-EU countries, including some close NATO Allies, are pursuing their national interests through ESDP. In some cases, third states, national interests converge with ours, presenting opportunities for cooperative engagement with the EU. In other cases, even our Allies pursue their agendas in ways that are at odds with U.S. and NATO interests. While Russia works to splinter the EU, and Turkey puts its own interests ahead of NATO-EU relations, Norway and Canada,s pragmatic engagement with the EU may provide a model for future U.S.-EU cooperation that allows us to pursue our national interests in the EU and to strengthen NATO from the outside. End Summary. NATO Allies Working Bilaterally with ESDP: Norway's Close Contact with ESDP -------------- -------------- 2.(SBU) Norway enjoys the most extensive and productive ties to ESDP of any third state (REF A). Norway has an agreement for the exchange of classified information, regularly commits personnel to ESDP civilian missions, has an Administrative Arrangement for cooperation with the European Defense Agency (EDA),and contributed to the EU,s Nordic Battlegroup in ¶2008. Norway is also committing a frigate to the EU,s Operation ATALANTA beginning in August 2009. 3.(C//NF) Norway uses its links to ESDP to work around the blockages on NATO-EU cooperation, while at the same time co-sponsoring initiatives to improve NATO-EU relations (REF B). A contact in the Norwegian mission recently told PolOff that Oslo decided to contribute to ATALANTA for three reasons. First, Norway has just acquired its third new frigate from the Spanish shipyard Navantia, and the EU,s counter-piracy operation presents an opportunity to deploy this new capability. Second, the Norwegian ship will join ATALANTA as the Dutch take over command of the Force Headquarters, and Norway is comfortable with both Dutch and UK command, given the close naval cooperation among the three countries. Finally, Norway recognized that NATO discussions on counter-piracy were dragging on, and that they could contribute to the fight most effectively through the EU. Norway also felt the EU would work out satisfactory arrangements for the transfer of pirates to Kenya ) something they did earlier this month, just weeks after the Norwegian pledge was finalized. Turkey: Vying for Influence over ESDP -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C//NF) Turkey,s experience is more complicated. The NATO-EU relationship is one of the few areas where Turkey has leverage over Cyprus and can try to influence EU decision-making. The Turkish delegation to the EU works tirelessly, if not always effectively, to improve its position with the EU, both as part of Turkey,s accession process and as a way to influence EU thinking on military and civilian crisis management. Turkey has a bilateral framework agreement to facilitate participation in ESDP operations. It participates in the EU,s civilian police missions in Kosovo and Bosnia, it offered personnel for the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia last summer, it offered to increase its presence in the police mission in the Palestinian Territories (an offer which has not been accepted),it contributed airlift to the EU's military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006, and it takes part in the EU,s military operation in Bosnia under Berlin Plus. While some Member States are considering withdrawing their contingents from the operation in Bosnia, the Turks have signaled that they could increase theirs . 5.(C//NF) For military-to-military engagement, according to a Turkish mission contact, Turkey has an official military representation to the EU, participates in meetings of third states with the EU Military Committee, and has offered to place a liaison officer in the EU Military Staff, although the EU has not accepted the offer. As a non-EU European NATO Ally and EU accession state, Turkey received an official readout of the March 12 informal EU Defense Ministers meeting in Prague. Turkey,s agreement for the exchange of classified information has been negotiated, but has not been approved by the EU Council ) a point of contention for the Turks (REF C). Turkey also has established channels for political-level consultations on security issues through meetings of the EU,s Political and Security Committee and Allies and/or accession states (REF D). 6.(C//NF) Turkish policy towards ESDP focuses not only on shutting out Cyprus, but also on gaining greater insight into and influence over EU operations and deliberations (REF C). The Turks insist that the EU adhere more closely to the Nice Implementation Document of 2002, which establishes the terms for EU consultations with non-EU European NATO Allies on crisis management operations. Specifically, the Turks complain that the EU does not consult with non-EU European Allies closely enough or early enough in the EU decision-making process. The Turks often hold out the prospect of participation in an EU mission, but insist that the EU adhere to the Nice Implementation Document or make other concessions to Ankara before finalizing any force pledge. For example, at a meeting in March, Turkey said it would consider increasing its contingent in EULEX Kosovo from 38 to 150, but implied that an increase was tied to Turkish personnel being assigned to particular posts. Turkey also appears willing to increase its contribution to the EU,s police mission in the Palestinian Territories, provided the EU consults Ankara early and often (REF D). 7.(C//NF) Turkey also uses its influence over NATO-EU relations to try to elicit greater bilateral cooperation from the EU, even when bilateral EU-Turkey cooperation would include Cyprus. Turkey limits the scope of NAC-PSC meetings, allowing discussions only on Bosnia, purportedly to keep Cyprus out of the discussion. Turkey also has its complaints about how Greece and Cyprus stymie its ESDP ties. The Turkish permanent delegation to the EU complains that when the EU,s Political and Security Committee (PSC) ) which includes Cyprus, of course ) meets with non-EU European Allies, the meetings are not comprehensive enough. Turkey says those meetings only involve discussion of military operations, when they should include both military and civilian crisis management. Turkey tries to use its leverage over NATO-EU relations in other ways, too. At a recent meeting at which the U.S. was present, Turkey suggested that it could contribute to the EU,s police mission in Afghanistan, if NATO and the EU arrived at a security agreement ) an agreement Turkey reportedly blocks. In addition, EU officials say Turkey prevents NATO from releasing even NATO UNCLASSIFIED materials to the European Defense Agency, even as Ankara bemoans its lack of access to EDA. 8.(C//NF) EU diplomats say that the blockage on Turkey-EU relations is not simply a Cyprus issue. It also reflects the lack of progress towards Turkish EU membership. Czech FM Schwartzenberg told the Secretary in March that there is opposition at all public and political levels to Turkish EU accession. EU officials and other third country diplomats also note that Turkey,s strong-arm approach to ESDP issues alienates the EU, does not effectively advance the Turkish case, and has potential ramifications for future meetings at which the U.S. is present. Our contacts disclosed that at the PSC meeting following the recent PSC Plus 7, the Cypriot and Greek Ambassadors, with sympathy from other delegations, harshly criticized the Czech Presidency for having allowed Turkey to complain repeatedly without reacting on behalf of the EU. Our contacts also tell us that the Cypriots and Greeks continued on to say that the discussions in the PSC Plus 7 format should be limited to operational issues, rather than larger political issues ) an unlikely development which, if implemented, would restrict U.S. insight into and influence over EU policy. (Note: The PSC Plus 7 format includes the 27 EU Member States, all non-EU NATO Allies, and the EU accession states of Croatia and Macedonia. End Note.) Canada: Limited, Pragmatic Engagement -------------- -------------- 9.(C//NF) Canada maintains official links to ESDP and participates in some missions, although its engagement with ESDP is more limited than Norway,s or Turkey,s. While Canada does not maintain a military delegation to the EU, Canada and the EU signed a framework agreement in 2005 that allows for Canadian participation in ESDP missions. A more comprehensive agreement on the exchange of classified information is under negotiation. Canada previously contributed to the EU,s Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and EUPOL Kinshasa, currently contributes to EULEX Kosovo, and works with EUPOL Afghanistan. Canada attended counter-piracy force generation conferences last fall, although it is not contributing to the EU's Operation ATALANTA following its own naval support to World Food Program deliveries to Somalia last year. 10.(C//NF) Canada,s practical approach to ESDP, which does not close the door on bilateral cooperation but only results in concrete cooperation when it suits Canadian interests, allows Canada to work around the NATO-EU blockage. In addition, Ottawa may be a partner in opening up channels to EU structures. Canada,s EU mission supports the PSC Plus 7 forum. The Canadian mission has reportedly asked Ottawa for guidance on working with the U.S. to request that the EU provide debriefs of official meetings to all non-EU NATO Allies and EU accession states, rather than just the accession states and European NATO Allies. Such a move would open up a link between the EU and all NATO Allies without allowing NATO-EU theology to stand in the way, although we expect Turkey would object. Russia: Slowly Drawing Closer to ESDP -------------- 11.(C//NF) On March 6, PolOff met with Col. Valery Afanasiev, Counsellor and Military Advisor at the Russian Mission to the EU, who said Russia is trying to work more closely with ESDP. Afanasiev implied that Russian engagement with ESDP and the ongoing EU-Russia "strategic agreement8 negotiations are related. For instance, he predicted that a section of that agreement will cover crisis management cooperation. Separately, a contact in the EU Council Secretariat, whose portfolio covers ESDP relations with third states, said the negotiations with Russia on the crisis management section were moving slowly, given Russian insistence on not relinquishing command of resources placed in an EU operation. Despite the slow negotiations, contact continues between the EU and the Russian military. In fact, Lithuanian contacts in February told PolOff they were surprised when they first learned that Russia had closer formal military-to-military relations with the EU than the U.S. does. 12.(C) Russia has been coordinating its counter-piracy operations with the EU. Moscow has sent military delegations to Brussels ) most recently in February ) to meet with the EU Council Secretariat to ensure complementary counter-piracy approaches. Afanasiev also said Russia would attend a Coalition-led coordination conference March 25 in Bahrain. 13.(C) The most tangible area of EU-Russia defense cooperation was in Chad, where Russia contributed helicopters to the EU,s military operation that ended March 15 when the UN took over. As part of that deployment, Afanasiev said Russia and the EU signed two agreements: a basic agreement laying out general terms of cooperation, and a second implementation agreement outlining the specifics of when and how the Russian helicopters would operate. The thorniest issue was command and control, with the Russians hesitant to put their forces under EU command. Afanasiev said the eventual agreement, finalized in November 2008, put the Russian commander under the EU force commander, but with the authority to check with Moscow if tasked to do anything outside the framework of his specific mandate. Our EU Council contact said the negotiations had been difficult and progress had been intermittent, but that the Russians suddenly brought the negotiations to a conclusion. Member States did not debate the issue of Russian contributions to the mission extensively, with our contact recalling only one such discussion in the Permanent Representatives Committee. During that session, our contact recalled, Central European member States expressed concern at the EU asking Russia for a contribution, but the French Ambassador responded that on this issue, the EU did not have negotiating leverage. 14.(C//NF) Our sense is that Russia,s security cooperation with the EU may divide EU Member States. Moscow and Russia-friendly Member States can use cooperation with ESDP to distract attention from issues like Georgia, where Russia is not meeting its commitments. Such a strategy keeps EU Member States like Germany and Lithuania at odds over whether Russia is a partner or an adversary. It is notable that Russia quickly reached agreement on plans to send Russian helicopters to Chad after the Georgia crisis, and as Moscow was resisting the EU and U.S. calls to adhere to its ceasefire commitments. MURRAY .