WORKING WITH THE EU,S COUNTER-PIRACY HEADQUARTERS

S E C R E T USEU BRUSSELS 000206 NOFORN SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA NDEAN, EUR/RPM PCHISHOLM, PM JFREDERICK, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR DGORDNER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PHSA EWWT EAID PTER XI XO XW ZR, EUN SUBJECT: WORKING WITH THE EU,S COUNTER-PIRACY HEADQUARTERS REF: A. SECSTATE 4610 ¶B. SECSTATE 5934 Classified By: Pol M-C Christopher Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C//NF) Summary: USEU representatives visited the EU's counter-piracy Operational Headquarters (OHQ) on January 16, where interlocutors described the EU's operations and information sharing arrangements with the U.S. and NATO. To make maximum use of a limited force, the OHQ collects information about merchant ships transiting the Gulf of Aden, conducts a risk-based assessment of each vessel, provides advice to the merchant, and sends guidance to EU naval forces on which commercial ships are at greatest risk. This economy-of-force approach also ensures strong links to industry. OHQ interlocutors described strong coordination between U.S., NATO, and EU forces and headquarters, expressing concerns only about technical obstacles to U.S.-EU information sharing. They also described planning for potential EU involvement in longer-term capacity building in the region. We can leverage the structures and processes that the EU's OHQ has designed to increase the EU's involvement in counter-piracy, and to improve NATO-EU cooperation. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The EU's naval counter-piracy operation, Atalanta, launched in December 2008, has a one-year mandate to escort World Food Program shipments to Somalia, to provide protection to vulnerable merchant shipping, and to conduct surveillance of the area. The UK is leading the operation from its headquarters in Northwood, outside London. On January 16, USEU representatives visited the UK-led Operational Headquarters (OHQ) for Atalanta. The operation,s chief of staff, assistant chief of staff, deputy assistant chief of staff for intelligence, chief of plans and policy, and political adviser described the OHQ,s approach to protecting merchant vessels. Our interlocutors described the conduct of operations, the OHQ,s links to industry, liaison and information sharing with the U.S. and NATO, and planners, early thinking about how else the EU could provide counter-piracy support. Creative Approach to Protecting Commercial Shipping ¶3. (C) Our interlocutors stressed that with only four to six frigates ) one of which is almost always dedicated to World Food Program escort duties ) and two maritime patrol aircraft, EU naval forces cannot protect the hundreds of merchant ships that move through the Gulf of Aden each day. Instead, the OHQ has devised a Group Transit Concept, whereby the OHQ collects information from merchant ships via its website, then advises those ships on when they should transit a pre-designated corridor. This allows EU forces to monitor those vessels at greatest risk and to ensure that a number of merchant ships are clustered when they reach particular areas at particular times of the day. The group of merchant ships can provide mutual reassurance, while EU naval forces know where those ships are positioned so they can respond rapidly to pirate attacks. Reaching Out to Industry ¶4. (C) This approach relies heavily on cooperation from and coordination with industry, something the OHQ ensures through its Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa website (www.mschoa.eu). According to our interlocutors, in its first six weeks of operation, the website collected 4,700 registrations from 1,200 companies and ship operators. When a merchant registers, it provides the EU with a description of its vessel, its cargo and its destination. The OHQ uses that information to perform a risk-based assessment, after which it sends advice to the merchant ship. The OHQ also alerts the forward Force Headquarters ) currently aboard the Greek frigate Psara ) to the vulnerability of various vessels. In this way, EU naval forces not only know which merchant vessels are most at risk, they also encourage those vessels to participate in the Group Transits described in paragraph 3. (The EU does not provide industry with its risk-based assessment, but uses it internally to evaluate those ships it says are in the greatest danger.) While the OHQ admits that it is too early to judge the effectiveness of this system, the initial results are encouraging. ¶5. (S//NF) With growing cooperation from the shipping industry, the Northwood OHQ has already laid the foundation for the counter-piracy coordination center (CPCC) under discussion in the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (REF A). USEU contacts at the OHQ and the UK Permanent Representation in Brussels stress that London could probably agree politically to have the OHQ serve as an interim CPCC, but security and bandwidth are concerns. Specifically, with the Northwood base being home to EU, NATO, and UK national headquarters, and with the base undergoing significant construction, the UK is concerned about providing access to all the countries in the Contact Group, especially Russia and China. The lack of bandwidth may have a simpler solution, with interlocutors at the OHQ suggesting that the Contact Group could provide the funding to furnish sufficient bandwidth. Strong Cooperation With U.S. and NATO ¶6. (C) Our interlocutors described cooperation with the United States as &extremely good,8 praising the meetings in Bahrain earlier that week between the EU,s operation commander, Rear Admiral Philip Jones, and NAVCENT commander, U.S. Vice Admiral William Gortney. Our contacts also described the integration of the EU,s liaison officer in Bahrain into important meetings and briefings. The EU is participating in shared awareness and deconfliction meetings and may host the next such meeting at the Northwood headquarters. ¶7. (C//NF) Our interlocutors, however, also mentioned the limits on information sharing, specifically the lack of a REL EU designation that would allow for the sharing of U.S. information with all EU Member States. (Note: The Council Secretariat expressed a similar concern when PolOff delivered REF B letter on information sharing on January 22.) USEU understands that NAVCENT and the EU are working through this issue, and that the EU has dispatched a liaison officer to the Combined Maritime Forces J2. ¶8. (C//NF) The OHQ has also established communication with the collocated NATO headquarters and with JFC Naples, and informal NATO-EU information sharing is taking place, but our interlocutors suggested that this should remain below the political radar. When asked directly, they said the OHQ had no concerns about operating alongside Standing NATO Maritime Group 1, should it be tasked with counter-piracy, as long as NATO operations were fully coordinated with the EU. What Next? ¶9. (C) The OHQ acknowledged that, for now, the EU has adopted an &end date8 rather than an &end state8 for Operation Atalanta, which is scheduled to end in December ¶2009. However, the OHQ,s plans and policy shop is contemplating options for counter-piracy engagement ashore ) options which could theoretically encourage the Member States to extend the EU,s engagement in the region, albeit with a different focus. The OHQ is preparing a paper for the EU Military Staff, entitled &Over and Above,8 that outlines options for engagement on shore. There is currently no political will to pursue kinetic military operations against pirates ashore and no discussion at the political level of extending the Atalanta mission, but planners suggest that the EU may agree to pursue regional capacity building. Key questions include how to work with all the players in the region, what the role of the African Union should be, and what kind of support the EU could bring to bear. ¶10. (C) Comment: We can capitalize on the OHQ's work being done by encouraging the EU to use the OHQ as the foundation for the CPCC under the Contact Group. This would deepen the EU's involvement and provide the Contact Group with an already-established capability, but would require that we resolve the UK,s concerns about security and bandwidth. Should we ask this of the EU, we should also emphasize our commitment to a robust, informal U.S.-EU information exchange, per REF B. We can also encourage the EU to consider a longer-term capacity building role, which would get the EU engaged in addressing the root causes of piracy and may keep them involved after the mandate for Atalanta expires in December 2009. In addition, as NATO contemplates similar capacity building with the African Union, this would be a good test case for NATO-EU cooperation. End Comment. MURRAY .