Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USEUBRUSSELS1738
2009-12-30 18:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

MONUC HEAD AND GREAT LAKES ENVOYS DISCUSS NEED FOR

Tags:  PREL MARR MOPS CG 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #1738/01 3641813
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301813Z DEC 09 ZDK
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 001738 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2024
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS CG
SUBJECT: MONUC HEAD AND GREAT LAKES ENVOYS DISCUSS NEED FOR
HIGH-LEVEL APPROACHES TO KABILA

REF: KINSHASA 1109

Classified By: USEU/POL M-C Chris Davis for reasons 1.4 b/d
C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 001738 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2024 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS CG SUBJECT: MONUC HEAD AND GREAT LAKES ENVOYS DISCUSS NEED FOR HIGH-LEVEL APPROACHES TO KABILA REF: KINSHASA 1109 Classified By: USEU/POL M-C Chris Davis for reasons 1.4 b/d 1.(C/NF) Summary: In a meeting December 18 in Brussels, host EU Special Representative Roeland Van de Geer, UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Alan Doss, and Deputy to the U.S. Special Advisor for Africa's Great Lakes Region James Yellin discussed the future of the UN peacekeeping operation in DR Congo. Doss observed there was always some risk of abuses against the civilian population when working with the Congolese army. Doss said that Kabila, concerned about his own survival, is reluctant to countenance criticism of the Congolese army, so as to keep the army on his side. Doss also said that high-level political approaches, such as by Secretary Clinton or French President Sarkozy, were the only way to influence Congolese President Joseph Kabila. Doss counseled a measured approach regarding the eventual arrest of CNDP's Bosco Ntaganda. Doss suggested that the UN Mission in DRC (MONUC) could provide logistical assistance to the Ugandan army in its operations against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA); however, the Ugandans need to initiate discussions in the UN Security Council to request this authority for the mission. Yellin was joined by USEU/POL, notetaker. End Summary ¶2. (C/NF) Going into the meeting hosted by Roeland Van de Geer, the European Union's Special Representative for the Great Lakes, SRSG Alan Doss received a read-out over the phone of the meeting Congolese FM Thambwe had just held with ambassadors in Kinshasa (reftel). Doss said that, given the barrage of negative press regarding human rights violations by the FARDC (the Congoles army) and the likely content of the draft UNC Resolution, he was not totally surprised at Thambwe's reported blunt stance that day that there be a clear drawdown strategy for MONUC, and that there be no conditions placed on the conduct of the FARDC for continued MONUC support. Doss said he suspected China is backing the GDRC demand that the UNSCR limit MONUC to a 6 (or 5)-month extension with no other substantive language and no conditions. Doss noted, however, that such an outcome would not be in keeping with the March 23 agreement, adding that the U.S. position, made clear to him earlier that week at the UN, along with t
hat of France and the UK, was that the Resolution not back away from the current MONUC mandate, which has language on respect for international humanitarian law and human rights. (Note: The Security Council adopted the new MONUC mandate as UNSCR 1906 four days after this meeting.) ¶3. (C/NF) Doss said it was important, nonetheless, to think about a transition; after ten years of operation, it was time. Doss added that MONUC needed continued GDRC cooperation on security sector reform (SSR). He said he told a closed meeting of the UNSC that there is always some risk of human rights violations when involved with the FARDC. He alleged, however, that human rights organizations have misled the public in contending erroneously, for example, that the FARDC has killed more innocent civilians than has the FDLR. MONUC's Christian Manahl, who accompanied Doss, said UNSC members were pulling back from the GDRC, nonetheless, disappointed by its lack of progress on SSR notably, leaving MONUC in the gap. He said he hoped the Council would come up with a "clear idea" for MONUC's future. ¶4. (C/NF) Roeland Van de Geer, said President Kabila risks losing his credibility entirely and seems unwilling to regain it, making cooperation with the GDRC a hard sell in the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the European Union. Van de Geer said there is a risk of losing touch with Kabila, whose government is corrupt and isolated, with the FARDC not fully under its control. Van de Geer (who was joined by Jean-Michel Dumont, the EUSR's deputy in Goma) added that it had been some months since he spoke with Kabila, and he therefore advocated higher-level political contact. For his part, Doss said his access to Kabila is up and down, according to how upset Kabila is regarding conditions placed on the conduct of the FARDC. "He's circling the wagons more," Doss added, and people are more cautious about what they say around and about the Congolese president. "His agenda is survival," said Doss, which is why Kabila has never criticized the FARDC in public, while criticizing other governmental institutions. While Kabila might support the FARDC, Doss questioned the degree to which Kabila supports SSR. ¶5. (C/NF) To Yellin's questions regarding Bosco's apparently changing role and the timing of his possible arrest on an International Criminal Court warrant, Doss answered that Bosco is now nervous and circling his wagons, and may be tempted to ally with other factions. Doss surmised that Bosco feels he has lost in negotiations what he gained in battle. As for the professional soldiers within the FARDC, they resent that command and control posts are being given to Mai Mai and other former rebels, such as Bosco. Manahl said Bosco was exploiting broad frustration in the FARDC. The big change with respect to a year ago, Doss continued, is that Rwanda does not want to be seen to be supporting Bosco. Doss said arresting Bosco alone is one thing, but there are others around him; if the effort fails, the consequences could be disastrous. Doss counseled a measured, non-precipitous approach. Van de Geer echoed that Rwandan officials indicated in his meeting with them on December 15 that they were against the arrest of Bosco. Doss added that the Rwandans do not want to see another round of escalating conflict. While Kabila and Kagame still talk on occasion, Doss said he thought the GDRC and GOR are taking their distance one from the other. ¶6. (C/NF) To Van de Geer's question as to what MONUC needed to have in order to strengthen its position, Doss again raised high-level political contact, noting, however, that President Sarkozy tried in vain to prevail upon Kabila to go to Copenhagen; nor did Kabila go to Addis two years ago when invited by SecState Rice. (Department comment: Kabila did not attend the UN General Assembly in 2008 or 2009, and it remains unclear whether he will attend the upcoming African Union summit.) Whoever called Kabila, it was agreed that the message to him needed to be coordinated. There was some discussion regarding other leaders in the region and their potential influence on Kabila, South African President Zuma in particular. Doss said Zuma had advised not to rush to draw down MONUC. ¶7. (C/NF) To a question by Yellin about post-Kimia II military operations, Doss said protection would be the core mission and that joint planning and adequate measures to protect civilians would be conditions for MONUC support for any future FARDC operations. Nevertheless, any joint operations are problematic and should be restricted to certain areas, which will not obviate all risk, Doss observed. ¶8. (C/NF) Yellin asked about gender-based violence and moving against human rights violators. Doss responded that his deputy Leila Zarrougui had the lead and progress was being made. Doss added that arrests could be destabilizing. One should proceed "progressively" and begin by identifying and arresting the "15 or so real bad guys." ¶9. (C/NF) Van de Geer read out loud the four main points he made recently in a report to the Council of the European Union (note: likely to the Political and Security Committee): 1) The EU should show more commitment to the Goma and Nairobi processes. 2) The EU should help do more against the LRA. 3) The EU should intensify its efforts against sexual violence. 4) The EU should increase high-level political involvement. On the latter point, he said he would advise the new permanent President of the Council of the European Union, Herman Van Rompuy, and the new EU High Representative for Foreign Policy, Catherine Ashton, about the recommendation that there be more high-level political involvement in the DR Congo. ¶10. (C/NF) Van de Geer said he would draw more attention to the LRA. Doss said he thought MONUC could have a role: With UNSC authority, for example, it could facilitate Ugandan supply lines and help stock staging posts in CAR; however, he added, Uganda itself needs to do the spade work at the UNSC. Manahl said that UNAMID claims LRA elements are in Southern Darfur. Doss thought these were rumors, like the one that placed LRA leader Joseph Kony in Khartoum; Doss dismissed the latter prospect as well, saying that Sudanese President Bashir would not tolerate Kony's presence, given the scrutiny Bashir has received following his own ICC arrest warrant. Doss noted that Under Secretary General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe has the lead at the UN on LRA. ¶11. (C) Doss said he would return to Kinshasa in January. He also planned to meet in Nairobi in January with former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo and former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa, who recently concluded their mandates as UN and AU envoys to the Great Lakes region. ¶12. (U) Yellin has cleared on this cable. MURRAY .

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