IAEA/DPRK: SUPPORT FOR SIX-PARTY PROCESS AND

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000091 SENSITIVE SIPDIS EAP FOR BOSWORTH AND KIM, ISN FOR GROMOLL AND MAHAFFEY, IO FOR GOLDSTEIN, EAP FOR KELLY AND JOHNSON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AORC IAEA KN KNNP SUBJECT: IAEA/DPRK: SUPPORT FOR SIX-PARTY PROCESS AND IAEA'S INVOLVEMENT CONTINUES -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) North Korea has been on the agenda of every IAEA Board of Governors meeting since inspectors were kicked out of the country in December 2002. For the March 2009 Board meeting no written report was issued by the Secretariat on this item, and the Director General's introductory remarks were notably short; he stated only that the Agency continues to monitor and verify the shutdown status of Yongbyon nuclear facilities and that fuel discharged from the reactor remains under IAEA surveillance. Fewer Board members spoke on this item than in previous Boards, due probably to the lack of detail provided by the DG and the lack of progress within the Six-Party framework in securing a verification mechanism or completing "Phase II" actions as agreed among the six parties. As in previous Board meetings, members delivered statements strongly supporting the Six-Party process and looked forward to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and North Korea's return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. Most members also reiterated the importance of the IAEA's participation in verification work in North Korea. End Summary. -------------- DG Confirms Shutdown of Facilities -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Director General has reported on the status of the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, as requested by the Board of Governors, since inspectors were kicked out of Yongbyon in December 2002 (GOV/2003/14). Inspectors returned to North Korea in July 2007, as requested by the Six Parties under the February 13, 2007, Initial Actions Agreement, to monitor and verify the shutdown of facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon. The IAEA's mandate remains unchanged, although they have unofficial observer status in the U.S.-led disablement work, now comprised of the defueling of the 5-MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon. ¶3. (SBU) In his introductory remarks, the DG confirmed the shutdown status of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, and noted that fuel discharged from the Yongbyon reactor remains under Agency containment and surveillance, but did not comment further on the DPRK. The DG has generally provided additional comments during his introductory remarks, including expressing his desire for North Korea to return to IAEA Safeguards at an early date. He has noted in the past that the IAEA has no role in disablement other than to document and observe the activities. He also did not repeat his call for clarification as to whether or not the IAEA should consider the DPRK an NPT member. (Note: The DPRK's NPT status has implications for how the IAEA implements its treaty/safeguards obligations in the DPRK, even if the DPRK is considered to have withdrawn from the Treaty.) ¶4. (SBU) Nine statements were delivered by Board members: China, Japan, Canada, the U.S., Russia, Australia, the Philippines, New Zealand, and the EU (representing nine Board members, including associated state Albania). (U.S. Statement in para 12). In addition, South Korea spoke under Rule 50. -------------- Six Party Members Express Support -------------- ¶5. (SBU) China spoke first, noting the important progress made by the Six-Party talks towards the eventual denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. China expressed its interest in achieving the targets set in the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005 by the Six-Party members. China committed to working with other parties to complete Phase II actions without delay. Russia noted it stands by the Six-Party commitments and the 2005 Joint Statement. Russia called on all parties to abide by agreements and expressed its hope that disablement will be completed soon. Russia also expressed the "need" to make active use of the IAEA in DPRK. ¶6. (SBU) Japan focused on the importance of establishing a robust framework of verification, recalling that such a framework was not achieved during the December 2008 Head of Delegation meeting of the Six-Party talks. Japan reaffirmed its commitment to "continue to work together with other partners at the Six-Party Talks towards the full implementation of the Joint Statement as a whole." Japan also noted that the IAEA should play an important role in North Korea, in order to make utmost use of its knowledge and experience. ¶7. (SBU) South Korea, not currently on the Board, spoke under Rule 50. ROK noted the importance of the multilateral approach to effectively dealing with this issue, and recognized that progress has been made. South Korea expressed concern about North Korea's provocative statements aimed at the South and at the North's preparations for a missile launch. South Korea asked DPRK to not take actions that would undermine the Six-Party Talks. -------------- Others Express Support and Urge And Increase Role for the IAEA -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Canada, the EU, Australia, the Philippines, and New Zealand expressed support to the Six-Party Talks and the IAEA's role in monitoring the shutdown of facilities. The EU members expressed the hope that a legal framework based on a safeguards agreement with the Agency will be implemented soon and highlighted that the IAEA has a central role to play in verification. The EU urged DPRK to provide a "complete and correct" declaration of nuclear facilities and materials to the IAEA and promptly allow for its verification. All members stressed the central role of the Agency in the verification process. ¶9. (SBU) Australia noted its concern at the slow pace of disablement activities. New Zealand expressed its concern on the lack of progress in the Six-Party Talks, saying that the current situation has taken a step back from the positive signs of a year ago. ¶10. (SBU) Japan, South Korea, Canada, and the EU joined us in recalling UNSCR 1718 and South Korea and the EU also noted UNSCR 1695. The EU in particular used the opportunity to call on DPRK to refrain from any further related (missile and nuclear) activities as noted in the Security Council resolution. The EU expressed its deep concern regarding the ballistic missile and nuclear activities of the DPRK, as well as the proliferation activities of the DPRK in both these areas, -------------- Overshadowed, and Just as Well -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Comment: The Board's treatment of the DPRK issue at this meeting was brief and business-like, acknowledging that action on this matter and the IAEA's role in it must flow from the Six-Party process. The safeguards verification items on Iran and Syria, reported septels, commanded more of the Board's attention and were contentious. Those two countries figured prominently in discussions throughout the four-day Board meeting, both inside the Board Room and out. Interestingly, the only reference to the DPRK file outside this formal agenda item was during the joint appearance of the two candidates to succeed Director General ElBaradei, when Japanese IAEA Governor Amano referred to resolving "diverse" safeguards issues such as Iran and DPRK as one of the Agency's highest priorities. Challenged by the Iranian ambassador on whether the two cases were somehow similar, Amano clarified that they were not, but reiterated they were both challenges of great importance. End Comment. -------------- U.S. Statement -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Madame Chairwoman, Secretary Clinton, during her recent trip to Asia and her first overseas trip as Secretary of State, stated that the "most acute challenge to stability and security in Northeast Asia" comes from North Korea and its nuclear program. At that time, the Secretary reaffirmed that President Obama and she are committed to working through the Six-Party Talks to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. Noting the U.S. belief that we have an opportunity to move forward with denuclearization, Secretary Clinton recalled that the DPRK committed in the September 2005 Joint Statement to abandoning all its nuclear weapons and returning at an early date to the Nonproliferation Treaty. The DPRK also committed to return to IAEA safeguards. On February 26, Secretary Clinton announced the role of Ambassador Stephen Bosworth as Special Representative for North Korean Policy and Ambassador Sung Kim as Special Envoy for Six-Party Talks. Ambassadors Bosworth and Kim are traveling to the region this week to consult with our Six-Party allies and partners on the problem of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats to the region. President Obama has called for a strengthening of the international institutions dedicated to finding common solutions to common problems. In this connection, we feel strongly that the IAEA should play an important role in the DPRK's denuclearization, including in the verification of the DPRK's initial declaration and in future dismantlement activities. We believe such a role for the Agency is in the best interest of all parties, including the DPRK. We look forward to further cooperation with the IAEA as we move toward our goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. Madame Chairwoman, The United States appreciates and commends the IAEA's ongoing work to implement the Agency's "ad hoc monitoring and verification arrangement" in the DPRK related to the shutdown and sealing of the five nuclear installations at Yongbyon and Taechon. U.S.-led teams maintain constant coordination with IAEA personnel working on the ground in the DPRK, which will serve as a model for the future, deeper cooperation that we seek. Our teams continue to make progress in disabling the three primary nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. Eight out of 11 agreed disablement actions at the three facilities have been completed, including the removal of more than 6,200 (or about 75%) of the approximately 8,000 fuel rods from the five-megawatt reactor. The United States urges the DPRK to complete the remaining disablement activities expeditiously in order to advance the denuclearization process and move toward full implementation of the Joint Statement. The United States continues to seek a Six-Party agreement on verification. In October 2008, U.S. officials and their DPRK counterparts conducted negotiations in Pyongyang and reached agreement on measures to begin verification of the DPRK's nuclear programs. The DPRK submitted an initial declaration of its programs to the Chinese government on June 26, 2008. The declaration package includes information about North Korea's plutonium program, which has produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons, and notes U.S. concerns regarding North Korea's proliferation and any uranium enrichment activities. Based upon the October discussions, U.S. and North Korean negotiators agreed on a number of important verification measures. All of these measures are consistent with the July 12 statement issued by China, as Chair of the Six-Party Talks. The parties sought to reach a Six-Party agreement on a verification text during the December 2008 Heads of Delegation meeting, but the DPRK refused to formalize any verification protocol in a Six-Party text. The United States remains committed to achieving a Six-Party agreement on verification, and we plan to work closely with our partners in the Six-Party process to wrap up Phase II activities, including disablement, in order to move quickly into Phase III, during which the DPRK is to verifiably abandon its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. The DPRK's verifiable denuclearization and fulfillment of all its other commitments relating to the Joint Statement will make possible the realization of the full range of benefits envisioned in the Joint Statement. As Secretary Clinton stated last month in Seoul, "If North Korea is genuinely prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate their nuclear weapons program, the Obama Administration will be willing to normalize bilateral relations, replace the peninsula's longstanding armistice agreement with a permanent peace treaty, and assist in meeting the energy and other economic and humanitarian needs of the Korean people." The United States reiterates that UN Security Council Resolution 1718 remains in effect. All Member States should continue to abide by the requirements of this Chapter VII resolution. The DPRK should avoid any provocative actions that might aggravate tensions in the region and undermine progress in the Six-Party process. Madame Chairwoman, The role of the IAEA, and full DPRK cooperation with the IAEA, will be important as we move forward. We expect to continue our close collaboration as we work toward the DPRK's verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. SCHULTE