VIENNA PERMREPS URGE U.S. ACTION ON CTBT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000086 SIPDIS STATE FOR T, IO, AND ISN DOE FOR NA-20 NRC FOR MDOANE AND JSCHWARTZMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2014 TAGS: AORC TRGY MNUC KNNP XF SUBJECT: VIENNA PERMREPS URGE U.S. ACTION ON CTBT, DISARMAMENT, AND ENGAGEMENT WITH NAM/G-77 Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a series of recent lunches, eighteen Vienna PermReps provided Ambassador their advice to the new Administration on advancing the multilateral agenda here, especially in the IAEA. Common themes and thought-provoking perspectives, especially from NAM/G-77 counterparts, included: -- The U.S. should ratify the CTBT and rally other significant countries to sign and ratify. U.S. leadership on CTBT, toward a verifiable FMCT, and on other issues can "catalyze" others to action. -- Serious engagement (in non-Vienna fora) on disarmament per Article VI of the NPT would improve the atmosphere in Vienna, and may even be held by some states as a prerequisite to movement on parts of the IAEA nonproliferation agenda. -- Resolution of the three disparate nonproliferation cases Iran, Syria and the DPRK, but especially resolving Iran's defiance of Board and UNSC decisions, is vital to the IAEA. -- Selection of the next Director General is the greatest factor in setting the Agency's future. The main difference between the two candidates is on the question of "how political" the IAEA should behave. -- "Politicization" of the IAEA is inevitable because interests, including commercial ones, are in play. Politicization is bitterest over issues in the Middle East, in part over the issue of NPT universality. The solution to Israeli-Arab differences will not flow from Vienna; rather, taking Middle East politics out of the agenda of this "technical" agency is a decision that must be made and enforced in capitals. -- In other Vienna agencies, U.S. focus on narcotics in Afghanistan and on combating human trafficking are especially welcome and apt to meet with broad cooperation. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Between January 27 and February 4 Ambassador Schulte hosted four lunches with selected counterparts grouped by region. The line-ups were: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa Afghanistan, India, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia Czech Republic, Ireland, Philippines, Switzerland, Turkey All these states currently sit on the IAEA Board of Governors 
except Chile, Morocco, Nigeria, and the Czech Republic (EU Presidency). ¶3. (U) In opening remarks on each occasion the Ambassador stressed the new Administration's commitment to multilateralism, U.S. support for the IAEA and UNODC, and the ongoing review of our posture toward the CTBT. In "listening mode," he solicited views on how the U.S. can work better with others in Vienna organizations. Change They Want to Believe In -------------- ¶4. (SBU) All counterparts welcomed the tone of the new Administration and acknowledged an atmosphere of great expectations (though acknowledging delivery would be more difficult). Many echoed the statement of the Moroccan ambassador: "Multilateral diplomacy cannot work without the U.S." The Swiss Ambassador said many countries would adjust national policies to U.S. actions and that the U.S. can "have a catalyzing effect." Saudi Arabia's ambassador was among the most effusive in praising the obvious "strong will to be engaged," the fast start on Middle East diplomacy as well as the appointment of Special Envoy Holbrooke. Mexico also welcomed the "change in attitude" and hoped for greater understanding by the U.S. for other countries' roles and voices in multilateral fora. Brazil hoped there would be a better understanding of the consequences of U.S. actions -- these consequences were all the more important, Chile's ambassador added, as the U.S. moves in new policy directions. Reflecting on the "change" message, Argentina's ambassador said he was watching to see whether President Obama would be a "Reformist Pope" or a "Luther." ¶5. (SBU) Counterparts' observations about the global nonproliferation regime at this time of U.S. transition included some cautionary and skeptical notes, as well, e.g.,: South Africa: Sending Sen. Mitchell so early to the Middle East sends a good signal. The Middle East requires a comprehensive approach. The IAEA is not the place to settle all these issues, but will "piggyback" on progress elsewhere once the right signals are sent. Egypt (DCM): The NPT is on "very shaky ground and could be replaced," but in meantime it is all we have. In Vienna, we suffered a "huge crisis of confidence" in recent years. Lack of confidence can result from misperception or "actions"; overcoming distrust borne of actions is harder. On nonproliferation, the U.S. has sent contradictory messages. On one hand, we want more stringent measures to stop nuclear proliferation. But there is a strong perception that in some cases we "implement the opposite." The India deal is one example, and we "find all sorts of reasons not to clear about Israel." Argentina: The India civil nuclear cooperation deal demonstrated that the U.S. was prepared to throw out NPT principles when it came to "good business." Agenda of the IAEA -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Noting UN Ambassador Rice's comments on Iran, Chilean Ambassador and former IAEA Board Chair Skoknic welcomed the change and openness to a new approach. He cited four long-term issues confronting the IAEA: fuel supply; the Future of the Agency/budget; nonproliferation cases in Iran, Syria and DPRK (though these are not the same in character); and strengthening safeguards. The Chilean noted that fuel supply assurance is linked to the nuclear renaissance and said any fuel assurance mechanism needed to balance NPT rights and nonproliferation. ¶7. (SBU) Addressing the future and structure of the IAEA, both the Czech and Swiss ambassadors saw the selection of the next Director General (DG) as the central discussion. Swiss Ambassador Schaller observed that a "North-South" divide in the Agency could not be ignored and required bridge-building. The question of "how political the Agency should behave" was what separated the two candidates to be DG, in Schaller's view. While one (Amano of Japan) would emphasize the Agency's technical excellence and service to Member States, the other (Minty of South Africa) saw himself more as an activist bridge-builder. Also on the Future of the Agency, Brazil's ambassador stressed the necessity to look to the future and not cling to notions that do not even "belong to the present." The U.S. should be pragmatic, including as regards safeguards and reliable access to nuclear fuel (RANF). ¶8. (SBU) Agency technical cooperation (TC) was, in the Argentine Ambassador's view, not focused as it should be on national capacity building (especially for those who are starting from zero toward nuclear power or other applications). The ambassador said Agency procurement is "scandalous" (he did not expand on this). The debate over doubling the budget should await the selection of the next DG, he added, but we needed clarity on what we want, how to implement, and how much it would cost. Malaysia, conversely, welcomed the signal of U.S. intent to "double the budget" but hoped TC would be a beneficiary. The Malaysian ambassador asked for U.S. help in expanding the TC program, either in its current extra-budgetary form or under the regular budget. India's ambassador said doubling the budget was a long-term task and should be discussed in the framework of Board Vice Chair Kauppi's open-ended discussion rounds on the Future of the Agency. Budget realities could not be separated from the discussion of the Agency's mission. Fuel Bank/Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF) -------------- -- ¶9. (SBU) Several counterparts picked up on Ambassador Schulte's observation that the new Administration had signaled support for an International Nuclear Fuel Bank. Turkey's ambassador advocated a discussion involving all IAEA Member States. As a country "on the verge" of a functioning nuclear power sector, Turkey would be "very careful" in addressing the issue. Ireland's ambassador characterized as "underwhelming" the DG's written reply to the EU letter announcing its fuel bank pledge. As reported in UNVIE 0047, Brazilian Ambassador Guerreiro saw the fuel bank as a "thorny issue", questioned the conceptual framework and goals of the various proposals, and asked whether all the effort on RANF is worth the trouble. ¶10. (C) Egypt's DCM exemplified NAM/G-77 suspicions by asking rhetorically why "only now" when developing countries were becoming serious about having nuclear power was there an emphasis on internationalizing the fuel cycle. In a separate luncheon, Philippine Ambassador Lacanlale hinted at the remedy to these suspicions, saying that on too many issues delegations "mouthed the same positions" because they did not know the "nuts and bolts" of issues. We needed "awareness raising" about the Agency, she said. Other delegations, she acknowledged, posed the same questions repeatedly despite getting answers; there had to be some honesty about why some countries "deeply reject" certain issues. (See also below on Middle East.) Safeguards, Security, and Safety -------------- ¶11. (SBU) During the first of these gatherings, Ecuador's ambassador emphasized the need to improve the environment and create a less confrontational, more constructive atmosphere for dialogue; Member States should not politicize this technical agency. However, Brazil observed that what may be a political issue for one member state may not be so for another, citing the Syrian case of "possible non-compliance" and the political and technical issues on Iran. Argentine Ambassador Curia argued that the IAEA was, in fact, a highly politicized agency with a "technical patina" because we deal with nuclear issues that involve big business as well as national security. Handling of Iran, Syria and DPRK would be the test of whether change in the U.S. approach would be "reformist or Lutheran," Curia said. But talk of "depoliticizing the Agency" was meaningless, he continued; every country had its national position. Ecuadorian Ambassador Moreno replied that he sought more of a focus on common interests and common goals. ¶12. (SBU) Regarding the Iran case in particular, Morocco's ambassador hoped the new U.S. Special Envoy would come to Vienna so states could share their ideas. Ambassador Zniber said we should avoid waiting for a new Iranian president after the June elections in Iran, but should send the message that our policy is not determined by who is president in Iran. Nigeria's ambassador encouraged the U.S. not to let itself be distracted from efforts to build understanding with Iran. Irish Ambassador Cogan echoed others when he said that despite political divisions among Member States the Agency could not avoid exercising its role on Iran and Syria. Iran's obligations to the Security Council were clear, and on Syria we needed assurance that safeguards obligations were not being breached. The Czech ambassador went so far as to say the "fate of the Agency will be determined" by how we resolve the Iranian case and Iran's defiance. He asked if individual NAM states could prevail on Iran to join a constructive way out. ¶13. (C) On other safeguards matters, Chilean Ambassador and recent Board Chair Skoknic said "politicization" stemmed from the issue of NPT universality in the Middle East; without addressing Israel's NPT status it would be difficult to advance. European ambassadors regretted that the Middle East Safeguards/Israel debate in the General Conference had become repetitive and characterized by "hot air." Turkey's Ambassador Ertay said the solution to the IAEA Middle East discussion lay not in Vienna; we had to start early in capitals to engage constructively. The Philippine Ambassador also appealed for early, frequent outreach by developed countries to individual NAM states on this and other controversial matters. Many NAM positions, she noted, were based in a sense that "double standards" applied. Engaging with Iran as a fellow NAM state or taking a more moderate line on Middle East safeguards matters were decisions that had to me made at ministerial level in capitals. Delegations from countries disinclined to support a hard-line position would not speak up, within NAM counsels, for moderation or cooperation without clear instructions to do so. Disarmament -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Acknowledging that action on disarmament would occur in other locales and fora, many Vienna PermReps saw the issue as influential for the working atmosphere here. Ireland's Ambassador said "new, fresh wind" was needed in the NPT Prep Com discussions, and he and several others saw prospective U.S. moves in bilateral disarmament and on the CTBT and FMCT as positive impulses. Malaysia's and Morocco's ambassadors were among several interested in the U.S. posture on going to zero. Mexico sought more discussion of vertical disarmament. The Swiss Ambassador said notions of linking nonproliferation and arms control in shaping the IAEA's future constituted a significant issue. A big debate would ensue in his country, he predicted, on any proposal that the IAEA be charged with "verifying" arms control obligations. With a focus on Vienna and the IAEA General Conference, Moroccan Ambassador Zniber said we needed to move soon to start to rebuild confidence. Israel, Zniber said, "should be treated on its own merits" in regard to nuclear issues and the NPT. Morocco had signed the NPT with five Nuclear Weapons States "and no more." ¶15. (SBU) South African Ambassador Gumbi spoke extensively on disarmament: It is good to see discussion of "zero option." NGOs/civil society will drive us forward in this area. The U.S. change on FMCT is welcome. On new issues, we will "watch closely and hold you accountable," especially in terms of taking a leadership role. On missile defense, the U.S. was "provoking" Russia. Here in Vienna, the fuel bank issue can only move forward in linkage to progress on disarmament, and cannot include any attempt to "re-write" Article IV of the NPT. CTBT -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte asked each group for patience as the Administration and Senate work out priorities, including action on the financial crisis and the economy, confirming senior officials, and holding hearings on pending treaties including the CTBT. The general response in every discussion was "just do it," ratify already, and many ambassadors asked about the timeframe of Senate action. Several pointed out that the Article 14 conference in New York in September would be an opportunity to demonstrate strong support for CTBT. Nigeria's Ambassador called the CTBT "uppermost in our mind," and he regretted it had "taken forever" to move toward full entry into force. Turkey's Ambassador said his government had supported the CTBT all along and welcomed the "important shift of attitude" in the USG. Malaysia's Ambassador regretted the U.S. posture toward the CTBT in the past and hoped that beyond ratifying, the U.S. would give an impetus to others to sign and ratify (India, whose ambassador was present, being the intended recipient of the message). India's ambassador argued that the CTBTO Technical Secretariat should have the mandate to identify events as nuclear tests based on objective evidence, while the political decision of how to respond to the fact of a test should lie with governments. Comment -------------- ¶17. (SBU) These fairly open-ended conversations in the Administration's early days, and preparatory to the Ambassador's own Washington consultations, sometimes ranged far afield of the agenda or mandates of Vienna-based international organizations. They conveyed the context in which other capitals weigh what happens in Vienna. We heard clearly and frequently messages of willingness to engage with the new Administration and to see the U.S. extending hands in untested directions. This applied to objectives of high policy such as bringing the CTBT into force, but also to more detailed matters of overseeing management of the IAEA (and UNODC) or addressing the dysfunctional dynamic of Middle East issues in the General Conference. On the issue of RANF in particular, Mission is acting on the Philippine ambassador's advice by reaching out to NAM-member states we believe are most ready to discuss the practicalities of the issue. Despite the positive tones reported here, however, subsequent engagement in the IAEA Board Room, in technical and informal meetings leading up to the March Board meeting and the spring budget process, have reaffirmed that Iran and its allies are determined to disrupt and politicize IAEA deliberations across the board. SCHULTE