IAEA/SYRIA: DIRECTOR GENERAL REPEATS CALL FOR

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000071 SENSITIVE SIPDIS ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL, IO/T FOR GOLDSTEIN, NEA FOR MONZ, CIA FOR HORIO E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: DIRECTOR GENERAL REPEATS CALL FOR SYRIAN COOPERATION IN MARCH BOARD REPORT REF: 08 UNVIE 00612 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The Director General's February 19 report on Syria's undeclared nuclear activities is more categorical than his November report in re-focusing the Agency's nearly year-long investigation on Syrian noncooperation. Most importantly, the report debunks the Syrian red-herring allegation that the man-made uranium particles came from Israeli munitions. The technical analysis of the uranium samples stipulates that there is a low probability this could be the case and further notes that the uranium is not of the type found in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material. With additional particles now detected, it will be more difficult for Syria to deflect this issue. The report places the emphasis back on Syria's failure to respond to Agency requests for information and access to debris and locations, as outlined in the November report. The DG underlines that without Syria's cooperation, the IAEA will be unable to complete its assessment. Taking a page from the Iranian playbook, Syria delivered an eleventh-hour letter on February 17 attempting to demonstrate a degree of cooperation immediately before the report's release. Helpfully, the report also sees through this stratagem, noting that Syria's "only partial answers" failed to address most of the Agency's questions. ¶2. (SBU) Overall, the report is a clear improvement over the November report but whether this will substantially change the dynamic in the Board Room will also depend on the tenor of the DG's opening remarks. Although it will be difficult for NAM and Arab group defenders of Syria to applaud "cooperation" on the basis of the report, a change in the DG's tone at the Board or a development in the next week, e.g. involving minimal cooperation by Syria, could prompt some Board members to again rally behind Syria. Notably, there is no broad condemnation of Israel's bombing in the report, though the DG may again harken back to this in his opening remarks and NAM/Arab Board members will certainly not lose any opportunity to castigate Israel for violating international law. Some Board members are also likely to focus on the Director General's call, at the end of the report, upon Israel and others to provide information and satellite imagery, which the DG may also repeat in his opening remarks as he did in November. ¶3. (SBU) Taken together, the two IAEA reports on Syria provide a compelling technical case for continued investigations into claims of undeclared nuclear activities in Syria. As the evidence mounts, and if Syria continues to stonewall, pressure will build for Board action. The negative dynamics on the Board and the DG's stance do not allow for consideration of a resolution on Syria's noncooperation at this juncture. As the Israeli Ambassador has noted, Syria does not present an imminent proliferation risk but eventually the Board will have to respond to maintain the credibility of Agency safeguards. Our immediate objective in the March Board will be to solicit more forceful national statements, which on the basis of this report should be forthcoming, with exception of the NAM troika (Cuba, Egypt, Malaysia). Mission will also support the public release of this report and seek to undo the negative precedent set in November when Cuba and Egypt blocked release of the Syria report. NAM/Arab Board members would be hard-pressed to bring this issue to a vote given that they would lose, and blocking release lends the appearance that Syria has something to hide. End Summary. -------------- Call for Syria to Cooperate -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The Director General's report on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic (GOV/2009/9),released on February 19, strengthens the case against Syria and puts the onus on the need for Syrian cooperation for the IAEA to complete its assessment. The DG departs from his usual rhetoric that focuses on the unilateral use of force and the late provision of information concerning the building at Al-Kibar (referred to in the report as Dair Alzour) and instead lists out the specific areas in which Syria should cooperate, areas that have been conveyed to Syria on numerous occasions. The list includes provision of additional information and supporting documentation about the past use and nature of the building at the Al-Kibar site, information about the procurement activities, access to other locations alleged to be related to Al-Kibar, and access to sample destroyed and salvaged equipment and debris from the Al-Kibar site. ¶5. (SBU) Taking a page from the Iranian playbook, Syria delivered an eleventh-hour letter on 17 February attempting to demonstrate a degree of cooperation immediately before the report's release. The report notes that while Syria's letter responds to "some of the questions" raised by the Agency, the responses in the Syria letter "were only partial" and did not address "most of the questions raised in the Agency's communications." Syria did not receive the desired recognition for its efforts in the report. -------------- Additional Uranium Identified in Samples -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The Agency identified new uranium particles in the samples taken during the Agency's visit to Al-Kibar in June 2007, in addition to the "significant number of natural uranium particles" first identified in the November 2008 Board report (GOV/2008/60). These new particles are also anthropogenic (or man-made). Furthermore, the Agency notes that all the uranium particles identified to-date "are of a type not included in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material." Press reports provide additional details regarding the environmental samples not identified in the DG reports; that the uranium was "uranium dioxide" according to a senior UN official, and that graphite (although not specifically "nuclear-grade" graphite) had been found in the samples. (Comment: The U.S. assesses the nuclear reactor under construction at Al-Kibar was a graphite-moderated, gas-cooled reactor-type, which uses uranium metal fuel. End comment.) The DG dispels the notion that the man-made uranium, identified at Al-Kibar by numerous Laboratories in the Agency's Network of Analytic Laboratories, was introduced by Israeli missiles that destroyed the site in September ¶2007. The DG calls this a "low probability" due to the isotopic composition, chemical composition, and morphology of the particles, which are "all inconsistent with what would be expected from the use of uranium based munitions." -------------- Unhelpful Element -------------- ¶7. (SBU) In what appears to have been added almost as an afterthought at the end of the report, the Director General injects an element of unhelpful "balance" after calling for Syrian cooperation -- a call on Israel and other States to provide information and imagery. Some Board statements will likely reflect this "balance" which detracts from the report's focus on Syrian noncooperation, and some may also harken back to conspiracy theories about the lack of commercial imagery. U.S. and likeminded statements should underline steadfast support for the investigation to mitigate this unhelpful element. -------------- Procurement -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Other than the new uranium findings, the only other area in which the Agency continued to make progress was in its review of Syrian efforts to procure materials and equipment which could support the construction and operation of a nuclear reactor. Additional details are not provided about the specific procurements, although the February 17 letter from Damascus responded to some of the Agency's questions in this regard, which the Agency is now assessing. -------------- Building the Case -------------- ¶9. (SBU) This new report does not repeat the Agency's analysis of satellite imagery and other information, as it first reported in its November report. In November, the Agency made a compelling case for continued investigations in Syria with the uranium findings and its assessment that the containment structure of the destroyed facility at Al-Kibar "appears to have been similar in dimension and layout to that required for a biological shield for nuclear reactors," and the "overall size of the building was sufficient to house the equipment needed for a nuclear reactor of the type alleged." In addition, the November report noted the water pumping infrastructure at the site had enough pumping capacity "for a reactor of the size referred to in the allegation" as well as "sufficient electrical capacity to operate the pumping system." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Despite the stark report, Syria will undoubtedly seek to rally support by reminding Member States that Syria has cooperated with the Agency as required by its Safeguards Agreement. Its agreement to allow inspectors to visit Al-Kibar, which it claims is not nuclear-related and, therefore, not on the Agency's list of declared nuclear sites, is technically considered going beyond the letter of the law with its Safeguards Agreement. While the Agency raises compelling and legitimate questions in order to conclude there are no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Syria, its hands are tied without Syria's "goodwill" or invoking special inspections. In addition, Syria refuses to sign the Additional Protocol while Israel remains out of the NPT, which could also be an instrument for the Agency to use to gain access to additional sites. Strong member statements during the March Board urging Syrian cooperation will be imperative to move the Agency's investigation forward. SCHULTE