IAEA/IRAN: EU3 REACT TO DRAFT BOARD STATEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000060 SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, IO, ISN MOSCOW PLEASE PASS TO U/S BURNS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP MNUC IAEA IR SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: EU3 REACT TO DRAFT BOARD STATEMENT REF: A) UNVIE 53 AND PREVIOUS B) RANGASWAMY-UNVIE EMAILS 2/9/09 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b an d d Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Charge shared a draft P5 1 Board statement with EU3 counterparts, who reacted cautiously. Although supportive in principle, the EU3 see no prospect of success in Vienna absent strong confirmation of PolDir agreement to pursue such a statement. Already the Russian PermRep has told German Ambassador Luedeking that he saw no point to discussing a statement in Vienna as there had been no consensus among PolDirs. The EU3 promised to share the draft text with capitals. Shortly after the meeting, the French Ambassador called with feedback from French PolDir Araud echoing the French Mission's concerns that the draft sets too low a bar, in particular, by omitting any reference to suspension, Code 3.1 and "possible military dimensions." The UK Mission also noted that our draft lacks sufficient negotiating fodder. Based on his own discussions with the Secretariat, Charge provided the EU3 a readout of the ElBaradei-Larijani meeting at the Munich Security Conference, in which the DG reportedly took a more forceful tone pressing Iran to demonstrate some gesture of progress on the IAEA investigation. Larijani did not respond to this overture, but the Secretariat will follow up with the Iranian PermRep to suggest a visit to Tehran prior to the Board. France took issue with the DG's reported suggestion to Larijani of "AP-like" or "DIV-like" access, and will formally request a legal opinion on Code 3.1 modified during the March Board meeting. End Summary. Reaction to Proposed EU3 3 Statement -------------- ¶2. (C) In a German-hosted meeting February 10, EU3 1 DCMs exchanged views on the February 4 PolDirs meeting and discussed strategy on Iran for the March 2-6 Board of Governors, including consideration of a U.S. draft P5 1 statement. Germany agreed with the U.S. assessment that there was no PolDir consensus on a Board resolution, though the UK readout was less clear on this point. Germany reported that PolDirs agreed to "consider" a P5 1 Board statement, despite Russia and China's hesitancy, but there was no consensus to pursue one. German Ambassador Luedeking had spoken to his Russian counterpart, who had a different readout of the PolDir meeting, i.e., that there was no consensus on the idea of an P5 1 statement. Russian Ambassador Zmeyevskiy had seen no reason to discuss one in Vienna, according to Luedeking. When Luedeking pressed that PolDirs had expressed a willingness to examine a statement sending a signal of P5 1 unity, the Russian Ambassador promised to check with Moscow. ¶3. (C) Charge shared the U.S. draft text of an P5 1 statement (ref b),and noted that we hoped to quickly engage Russia and China after the issuance of the Director General's report. He also reported that U/S Burns was in Moscow. The UK and France stressed that without confirmation of PolDir agreement, at least in principle, Russia and China would stonewall in Vienna and the effort would fail. Any EU3 1 agreement on a text would be "decimated," as has been the case previously. French DCM Gross suggested that one of the EU3 1 (Germany and the UK suggested it be the U.S.) could send a letter to Russia and China asking for confirmation from capitals to participate in a P5 1 meeting to discuss a text in Vienna. He also welcomed any discussions U/S Burns may have in Moscow. Germany toyed with the idea of Russia drafting a text but the others did not see any indication that Moscow would be so disposed. Charge agreed that the impetus for an P5 1 statement came from the U.S., but noted the ongoing U.S. policy review on Iran and indicated we would have to seek guidance on leading the charge in Vienna. ¶4. (C) Charge underlined the high value the U.S. places on P5 1 unity and noted that there were several audiences for this Board statement: Iran, the Board, and the IAEA Secretariat. The EU3 promised to relay the U.S. draft text to capitals. The UK commented that from a tactical standpoint, the U.S. draft did not include much fodder for negotiation with Russia and China. Germany suggested that an agreed P5 1 statement could obviate the need for an EU3 statement at the Board, to which France strongly disagreed. Germany noted that the EU3 would speak three times, with the Six, as the EU3, and with the EU. ¶5. (C) French DCM observed off-the-cuff that while it was a "balanced" text that certainly would "go down easier," the U.S draft lacked any reference to Board and UNSC obligations on suspension of enrichment. This important omission could lead to reinterpretation, he observed and noted that Paris would also favor a direct reference to "possible military dimensions" as contained in the DG's reports. Privately, the French Counselor sniffed that the draft "sounded like a Chinese statement." Immediately after the P5 1 meeting, the French Mission received feedback from PolDir Araud, who was reportedly puzzled that the U.S. would start from "such a low bar," in particular, the omission of the UNSC obligation to suspend, implementation of Code 3.1 modified and reference to "possible military dimensions." Paris was also concerned that the U.S. should not share the draft with Russia prior to reaching agreement with the EU3. ElBaradei-Larijani Readout -------------- ¶6. (C) Charge shared a readout from EXPO Director Vilmos Cseverny, who had accompanied the DG, of ElBaradei's February 6 discussions with Majles Speaker Ali Larijani at the Munich Security Conference. According to Cseverny, the DG sent a clear message to Larijani that the IAEA investigation could not be swept under the carpet, and that it would be very bad for Iran if there was no progress to report. ElBaradei suggested a menu of gestures that Iran could make including AP-like access to Arak and answers on the alleged studies. On the latter, the DG suggested a visit to Iran by the inspectors to discuss outstanding issues before the next report, a suggestion Cseverny will pursue with the Iranian PermRep in Vienna. ElBaradei also encouraged Iranian engagement on the freeze-for-a-freeze offer, warning that this would not be on the table forever. Larijani, flanked by a large Parliamentary delegation, did not respond to the overtures but on the AP pointed to the Majles member who had authored legislation blocking AP implementation. While Iran's reaction was not encouraging, Charge noted that ElBaradei's reported forcefulness was a welcome change from his recent public tone, including unhelpful comments on Iran using its nuclear program as "an insurance policy." ¶7. (C) French DCM Gross also provided a brief readout of FM Kouchner's meeting with Larijani in Munich. Larijani indicated that Iran would have no difficulty responding to the IAEA's questions when pressed by Kouchner. They also discussed Afghanistan and the Presidential elections. Regarding the El-Baradei-Larijani meeting, Gross was not surprised by the Secretariat's negative tone on Iran but noted that France expected more than some ambiguous AP-like and DIV-like access. France will ask the Secretariat/Legal Advisor's formal opinion in the Board (as they have previously in an informal Technical Briefing) on Iran's obligation to implement Code 3.1 modified, which France regards as a significant issue. Gross recalled that inspectors did not have full access to Arak when they last visited and that since June 2007 the DG had reported additional restrictions and limitations on access. He noted that without early DIV information, safeguards cannot be implemented on the facility at a later date. PYATT