IAEA/IRAQ: DISPOSITION OF IRAQI DOCUMENTS AND

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000058 NOFORN SIPDIS ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL; NA-241 FOR O'CONNOR AND GOOREVICH E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2034 TAGS: AORC IAEA PARM PREL KNNP IZ SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAQ: DISPOSITION OF IRAQI DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS HELD BY THE IRAQ NUCLEAR VERIFICATION OFFICE (INVO) REF: UNVIE 00080 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES GEOFFREY PYATT FOR 1.4 REASONS B AND D SECRET / NOFORN ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Reflecting U.S. concerns regarding the sensitivity and security of old INVO documents, records and hardware still stored at the IAEA, the U.S. (DOE) recently funded U.S. expert Bill Domke (DOE/LLNL) to conduct a preliminary review of the records and provide a recommendation on the sensitivity of the documents. Domke has provided his assessment to IAEA Safeguards officials, and also shared his assessment with Mission. Domke notes that the documents still in storage contain technical details on past Iraqi fuel-cycle research, facility construction and operations, and research records from Iraq's efforts to design and fabricate a nuclear explosive device prior to the first Gulf war. The most sensitive among the large cache of documents are proven centrifuge design information, Iraqi centrifuge components, and (of less utility to proliferators given the nature of the information at hand) incomplete research for designing and fabricating a nuclear explosive device. ¶2. (S/NF) It is difficult to determine whether there may be additional copies of the collection of records, including sensitive centrifuge documents, (may have been duplicated within the Agency) -- although the Safeguards Department has done a fair job of centralizing the materials of which it is aware -- and will require a more thorough review to sort the information by sensitivity before making decisions on final disposition. Mission's goal is to prompt an IAEA decision on final disposition that results in responsible disposal and/or long-term storage of all sensitive materials. DDG for Safeguards Olli Heinonen told Msnoff that he is on board with a consultant reviewing the archived documents to determine future disposition of the records. Heinonen directed Ops B Director, Herman Nackaerts, to work with the Mission on this, using soon-to-be-retired IAEA Senior Inspector Robert Kelley (AMCIT). Mission is working with Nackaerts to generate the necessary letter request to fund Kelley as a consultant. Finally, Kelley suggested to mission his effort to survey sensitive information stored at IAEA should include a review ;of information from when the IAEA verified South Africa's initial safeguards declarations. End Summary. -------------- Current Status of INVO Documents -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) A large volume of Iraqi nuclear program documentation is in storage at the IAEA. The records were acquired by the IAEA under the auspices of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 from February 1991 through March 2003 and contain technical details on Iraqi fuel-cycle research, facility construction and operations, and research records from their efforts to design and fabricate a nuclear explosive device. At the time of acquisition by INVO, the content of these materials was substantively different from materials normally acquired by the IAEA in its performance of safeguards operations. (Comment: With the elimination of Iraq's pre-1991 nuclear program completed and INVO dissolved, these materials have more meaning as record of Iraqi accomplishments and the work of INVO and might have only limited value to current safeguards operations. End Comment.) ¶4. (S/NF) Most of the documents are stored in a secured room to which only three IAEA officials have access (see para 20 below for more details.) With Operations B having taken back responsibility for Iraq, Director Herman Nackaerts has suggested that Canadian citizen/Algerian born Mohammed Lamari should have access to the archives in addition to himself. ¶5. (S/NF) DOE/LLNL expert and former INVO inspector Bill Domke conducted a U.S./DOE-funded preliminary review of the documents and records in the INVO storage room. His findings are listed in the following paragraphs, with the most sensitive items noted first. -------------- Proven Centrifuge Technology -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) By 1991, the Iraqis had acquired proven centrifuge technology, developed it, and tested it. Domke judged that the INVO documentation contains data that would enable a proliferator with access to the information to expedite its enrichment program. -------------- Iraqi Centrifuge Components -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) The INVO archive room contains a few Iraqi centrifuge components, including two assembled rotors, sample end caps, and a centrifuge motor. One rotor assembly has been partially destructively examined to show technical details. The other sample centrifuge components are used as display items during presentations. (Comment: This rotor assembly needs to be protected given it is proven centrifuge technology. The other sample centrifuge components are less sensitive, but should not be widely available for detailed examination. End Comment.) -------------- Nuclear Explosive Device R&D -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) According to Domke, the information from Iraq's nuclear explosive device research and development does not, taken as a whole, provide information needed to construct a nuclear explosive device. But, it does include some key components, some of which were tested and qualified for a finished design. (Comment: Because some Iraqi weapons design program goals were met, these materials should also be carefully protected and access given on a "need to know" basis, even if they would not qualify as "weapons data" in a nuclear weapon state.) ¶9. (S/NF) Domke advised the IAEA that there is a lesser category of sensitive information that should also be carefully protected. Even though few milestones were met by the Iraqi nuclear program, their "all-avenues" approach led to research into many, (albeit mostly fruitless) projects. Knowledge of the successes and failures of Iraqi research projects - especially the reports describing weapons development activities - would be valuable to an entity starting out a project and wishing to select only the promising lines of activity. Thus, knowledge of Iraqi successes and failures is of value and, therefore, needs to be protected. (Comment: The Iraqi Full, Final and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) statement has not been publicly released for this reason). ¶10. (S/NF) Jacques Baute (former head of INVO, current Director, Division of Safeguards Information Management), like the other INVO analysts still at the IAEA, maintains files from his past work from when INVO was active. Since Baute was responsible for investigations of Iraq's weapon development program, he preserves translations of key documents, his analyses of those documents, and interview data. (Comment: Any authoritative review of the IAEA's Iraq-related holdings should include a review of Baute's files.) -------------- INVO Documents Outside of Archive Room -------------- ¶11. (S/NF) INVO translations of sensitive documents from the nuclear weapon design effort and analysis documents exist electronically on the Safeguards SGIM/Trade and Technology Analysis group (TTA). While most analysts' copies have moved the INVO Archive Room, there are hard, and possibly electronic copies, sprinkled through the files of analysts that had worked the Iraq problem in the past, some still working at IAEA. Some of these translations are for documents from the nuclear weapon or uranium enrichment development efforts for which the originals should be considered sensitive. (Comment: These sensitive documents should be culled from analysts' files.) ¶12. (S/NF) In addition to the hard copy files noted above, are electronic files on the TTA LAN. (Comment: The INVO LAN is now the TTA LAN, which is air-gapped from the SGIM and other IAEA LANs. The server is a secure room on the eleventh floor and access to the LAN is password controlled. Some or all of these files may have been shared with Safeguards Operations B. The degree to which the TTA project files and databases have been inter-mingled with INVO data files is unknown, but should be determined via the prospective U.S.-funded consultancy. End Comment.) -- The database program, OMVSUM, contains records of inspections throughout Iraq up to and including the last day of inspection activity in March 2003. -- Specialized databases were created to support inspections and analysis. Of note is the database on interviews with Iraqis, which is more tightly controlled and was only available to select INVO staff. The documents may contain sensitive information, because direct queries were made about bomb design and other issues during the interviews. -------------- Other INVO Documents and Records -------------- ¶13. (S/NF) Procurement records comprise a large volume of the INVO archive, especially telexes sent by the procurement operation of Iraq's centrifuge program. The telexes have all been scanned and put in a database and, therefore, need not be retained in the current, unsorted, hardcopy form. ¶14. (S/NF) Purely administrative and programmatic documentation describing personnel assignments, civil construction plans, payment records, and other non-sensitive also are among the INVO archives. (Comment: These documents might be of use in a complete historical treatment of the program, but have no value for IAEA and are not otherwise sensitive.) ¶15. (S/NF) There is a large quantity of open-source literature in the form of product brochures and journal articles. These are of lowest continuing value/sensitivity for safeguards purposes. ¶16. (S/NF) Documents from the IAEA Office at the UN in New York were sent from UNMOVIC when it was dissolved and are stored with the INVO archives. Given the work of the New York office, it is possible that sensitive documents are included among this collection of documents. (Comment: The proposed U.S.-funded consultancy should review these materials.) -------------- Current Security Arrangements -------------- ¶17. (S/NF) The INVO Archive room is behind a locked door, an alarm station, and an outer locked door. It is in a remote part of the building and is unmarked. Three IAEA officers have keys to the room: (1) Lawrence Meledeth (SGIM, Indian national) who served in INVO since 1994; (2) Gregg Whitaker (US national, SGIM),served with INVO since approximately 1996, and (3) Tom Killeen (US national, SGCP),who started in INVO in 2002. ¶18. (S/NF) To enter the room, one unlocks the outer door, calls a guard to inform that the alarm station is being opened, enters a password to disarm the alarm, and then unlocks the inner door. ¶19. (S/NF) Inside the room, there are two separately-locked file cabinets and the only key to each is possessed by Tom Killeen. -- There is a cabinet of Iraqi nuclear program documents in a locked file cabinet. This contains material of the most sensitive aspects of the weapon program. The cabinet contains the original Iraqi versions of project files and progress reports acquired by INVO from 1991 on to 1998. It remains locked and secure. -- The cabinet otherwise designated to contain sensitive centrifuge documents is full of drawings that were sorted by project and not sensitivity. (Comment: Domke observed that there used to be a collection of centrifuge drawings and documents that URENCO staff set aside as URENCO-sensitive, but these documents are no longer in the file cabinet and the disposition of these files is not known. The URENCO files included relatively sensitive Iraqi technical reports and the very few URENCO-origin drawings found in the Haider House cache delivered to the IAEA in 1995. There is a lot of duplication of sensitive centrifuge drawings amongst the documentation in the archives.) -------------- -------------- Recommendations for Disposition of INVO Documents And Action Request -------------- -------------- ¶20. (S/NF) Mission recommends funding soon-to-be-retired Bob Kelley as a consultant to thoroughly review and sort the documents with a view towards recommendations on removing from IAEA premises and/or destroying the most sensitive documents and/or components. DDG for Safeguards Olli Heinonen told Msnoff that he would welcome a U.S.-funded consultant to review the archived documents to help the IAEA determine future disposition of the records. According to Jacques Bautes, Heinonen subsequently directed Ops B Director Herman Nackaerts to send UNVIE a request letter for such a consultant, specifically requesting Bob Kelley (AMCIT). Pending other guidance, Mission is following-up with Nackaerts to facilitate such a letter. Mission will also raise with Nackaerts Kelley's suggestion to MsnOff that any such consultancy also cover old South Africa-related documents. (Comment: Kelley served as a consultant/inspector for the IAEA in South Africa in the early 1990s and said he believes the IAEA has retained sensitive documents from that exercise that should also be reviewed for ultimate safe/secure disposition. PYATT