IAEA/SAFEGUARDS: YEAR-END ROUND-UP OF DISCUSSIONS

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000568 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/MNSA SANBORN, ADAMS DOE FOR NA-24 WHITNEY, LOCKWOOD, MURPHY NRC FOR NMSS MARSHALL, GRICE; OIP - SCHWARTZMAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KNNP TRGY ENRG AORC IAEA SUBJECT: IAEA/SAFEGUARDS: YEAR-END ROUND-UP OF DISCUSSIONS ON POTENTIAL SAFEGUARDS MEASURES FOR U.S./URENCO CENTRIFUGE PLANT REF: ZUBAREV-GOODMAN EMAIL 6/11/09 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: On November 25, Msnoff and STATE/ISN colleagues met with Neville Whiting, IAEA Section Head responsible for implementing safeguards in the United States, to discuss prospects for safeguards implementation at the Louisiana Energy Services (LES - a U.S. subsidiary of Urenco) gas centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) under construction in New Mexico. The IAEA intends to visit the LES site in January 2010. Plans for this pending visit follow a June 2009 meeting hosted by the IAEA, including both the U.S. and Urenco, on the application of safeguards at the LES facility. The IAEA is interested in using safeguards at LES as a test bed for novel approaches to safeguards at enrichment facilities that could be applied in the future. DDG/Safeguards Heinonen has made clear, however, that while he welcomes development of new tools, he wants the IAEA to retain full latitude as to what tools are actually used/installed in any given facility worldwide (i.e., availability of a new tool does not necessarily mean the IAEA will choose to deploy it worldwide). This report includes a summary of the various discussions to date on safeguards at LES. ¶2. (SBU) Summary contd.: The November meeting and continuing preparations in the Safeguards Department for 2010 extend the process set out when representatives of the USG and Urenco met with a large IAEA team June 15 to discuss possible safeguards measures for the LES GCEP. IAEA officials said then they were interested in applying safeguards only if the United States funded the service and if the IAEA were permitted to try out approaches that would be useful elsewhere, e.g. in Iran. The IAEA presented the outlines of a proposal to reduce inspection effort through use of remote monitoring and short-notice random inspections. The United States provided a paper on technical measures under consideration to improve GCEP safeguards. Drawing on elements of that paper, the IAEA presented the outlines of a safeguards approach that would rely on expanded use of operator data and randomized inspections to improve effectiveness and reduce inspection burdens. Representatives of the Dutch/German/UK consortium Urenco expressed cautious interest but raised a number of reservations, particularly about potential impacts on operations and competition in the U.S. enrichment market. End Summary. -------------- Path Forward on Safeguards at LES -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In a recent meeting with Neville Whiting of the IAEA Safeguards Department's Operations B regional inspector staff, U.S. representatives noted that the USG and LES have agreed on a date for an IAEA site visit--January 21, 2010. Whiting found the date agreeable, and expects to complete his report on possible safeguards measures at the LES plant in mid-December. The report will lay out innovative ideas for the future of inspections at centrifuge facilities, using LES as a test bed. His hope is to have the sides review the report prior to the LES site visit. Speaking for the USG, Steve Adams of ISN/MNSA suggested holding a closeout meeting in Washington immediately following the site visit to discuss the facility and the concepts in Whiting's paper. As a follow-on in the February/March timeframe, the U.S. and IAEA could have more formal bilateral discussions on the application of safeguards at LES, in addition to discussing other issues related to safeguards in the United States (e.g., changes to the Eligible Facility List). Whiting indicated that IAEA participants in the site visit would likely include the same participants as in the initial June meeting: Herman Nackaerts (Director, Safeguards Operations B),Neville Whiting (Section Head, Safeguards Operations B1), Jill Cooley (Director, Safeguards Concepts and Planning), Bruce Moran (Section Head, Safeguards Concepts and Approaches),Alain Lebrun (Acting Unit Head, Safeguards Technical Support). ¶4. (SBU) Whiting emphasized that this is an opportunity to be innovative and serve as a benchmark for a new transparency regime. He noted that the only way for this effort to be worthwhile would be if novel approaches were pursued at the GCEP to serve as a model for safeguards at enrichment facilities in other countries, particularly countries of concern. Whiting added that while there are several possible scenarios, his approach will be to highlight the 3 or 4 primary measures that are most essential for effective safeguards at a centrifuge plant. -------------- Early Background -------------- ¶5. (SBU) At an April 20-21, 2009 U.S.-IAEA meeting on safeguards implementation in the United States there was a preliminary discussion of the possibility that the IAEA might select a gas centrifuge enrichment plant in the United States for application of safeguards under the U.S.-IAEA safeguards agreement (also known as the Voluntary Offer Agreement or VOA). In particular, the National Enrichment Facility (NEF), under construction in Eunice, New Mexico by Louisiana Energy Services (LES - a U.S. subsidiary of Urenco),was scheduled to begin operation by the end of 2009. The IAEA suggested holding a meeting in June to discuss the matter further, and suggested that Urenco be invited. ¶6. (SBU) On May 21, Michael Whitaker and Brent McGinnis (Oak Ridge National Laboratory) and MsnOff met with IAEA officials Chris Charlier (Safeguards Operations B - the Section Head responsible for safeguards in the United States),Bruce Moran (Safeguards Concepts and Planning),and Alain Lebrun (Safeguards Technical Support) for informal discussions of possible U.S. and IAEA objectives for GCEP safeguards. The IAEA indicated that its principal objectives were (1) to improve efficiency in verifying non-diversion of declared material, (2) to improve effectiveness at detecting undeclared LEU production, and (3) to improve timeliness in detecting undeclared HEU production. Participants discussed technical measures involving automated use of operator weighing systems, non-destructive assay methods for measuring enrichment and flow in header (feed and withdrawal) pipes, tagging and tracking cylinders of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), and other technical measures. The IAEA expressed particular interest in use of weighing systems. There was general agreement that it was important to get Urenco buy-in for whatever approach was proposed, and to invite them to a more formal discussion in June. ¶7. (SBU) On June 12, MsnOff met with Charlier to preview the IAEA's proposed safeguards approach. As outlined by Charlier, the IAEA planned to propose the use of data from the operator's weighing system and of mass spectrometry data on enrichment levels of feed, product and tails. Combined with mailbox declarations (secure and unalterable daily reports of operating data to an IAEA computer on-site) and random inspections to verify samples of the reported data, this would allow more effective safeguards with lower inspection effort by reducing the time spent on mechanical tasks such as verifying cylinder weights and enrichment assays. In a separate discussion, DDG/Safeguards Heinonen confirmed to Deputy Nuclear Counselor his support for this effort, with the understanding that his primary interest was not to apply safeguards in the United States but to develop methods that could be used in other countries, particularly to detect undeclared nuclear activities. -------------- U.S. and IAEA Presentations in June 2009 -------------- ¶8. (SBU) An IAEA Secretariat team hosted USG and Urenco representatives to an in-depth discussion June 15. Herman Nackaerts, Director of Safeguards Operations B (SGOB - the Division responsible for safeguards in, among others, all nuclear weapons states) opened the meeting by noting the conditions under which the IAEA was willing to apply safeguards to a U.S. enrichment facility. First, the United States would have to pay the cost of safeguards operations. Second, the IAEA would have to learn something that it could apply to other facilities. Third, the IAEA would apply a comprehensive safeguards approach covering the entire facility. ¶9. (SBU) Mark Laughter (Oak Ridge National Laboratory) summarized the U.S. concept paper ("Summary of Advanced GCEP Safeguards Efforts in the United States"),which had been provided to the IAEA and Urenco in advance (ref e-mail). Based on the UAEA objectives cited above (para 3),the paper listed twelve types of safeguards measures under development at the DOE National Laboratories, seven of which involve unattended monitoring measures. The majority of these measures would be available in the relatively near term (five years or less). ¶10. (SBU) Jill Cooley, Director of Safeguards Concepts and Planning, then presented the outlines of the IAEA's proposed safeguards approach: -- Use of operator process load cell data at feed and withdrawal stations to measure mass flow through the process area. -- Use of online enrichment monitors at the unit headers rather than cascade headers (a unit consists of several cascades). -- Use of data from accountability scales (these provide more precise mass measurements). -- Integration of accountancy scales with surveillance to identify cylinders automatically at key points. -- Use of operator data from online mass spectrometers. -- Maintaining continuity of knowledge by having the operator apply IAEA seals to cylinders. -- Use of mailbox declarations for reporting data. -- Remote monitoring through periodic transmission to the IAEA of some accountancy-related data. The safeguards approach would involve one annual PIV; all the other inspections would be done on a randomized basis. The IAEA could also call a short-notice inspection if data reported through remote monitoring indicated unusual operating conditions. SGTS Acting Unit Head Alain Lebrun said that applying formal authentication measures to all data streams would be prohibitively expensive, and he anticipated that only the accountancy scales would need to be authenticated. He warned that unattended systems only save money when done right. -------------- Urenco Concerns -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Peter Friend, Urenco Director of safeguards and security from Capenhurst, UK, expressed a number of concerns with what he called a "long shopping list." First, he noted that there were four companies providing enrichment services internationally and only one of them (Urenco) was subject to IAEA safeguards. He referred to the two other planned U.S. enrichment facilities - the USEC American Centrifuge Plant at Portsmouth, Ohio and the Areva centrifuge plant (using Urenco technology) planned for Eagle Rock, Idaho, and said it seemed a little unfair that only the Urenco plant was being considered for safeguards. Second, Friend noted that the construction schedule at the LES plant was tight, with first cascade operations scheduled for November 2009. Urenco did not want anything to interfere with commissioning this plant, and noted that new safeguards measures were easier to contemplate at an operating plant, such as Almelo in the Netherlands. ¶12. (SBU) Responding to specific measures proposed, Friend warned that enrichment measures sensitive enough to detect diversion of a significant quantity per year might be able to reveal classified centrifuge performance data. He thought unattended use of accountability scales was probably doable. Online enrichment monitors are expensive and not very accurate and Urenco might be able to allow direct gas measurement instead, but he wasn't sure Urenco would be willing to share mass spectrometry data. Friend was unsure of the value of containment and surveillance measures and noted that this might require some improvement in cylinder identification. Regarding mailbox declarations, he wanted the declared data to remain on-site and not be transmitted to Vienna. There was some discussion of possible compromise approaches allowing summary data to be transmitted to Vienna. With those caveats, Urenco was generally supportive of IAEA safeguards and would cooperate with the authorities. Friend did not put any markers down to the effect that what was being proposed was unacceptable, noted that Urenco had a longstanding relationship with the IAEA, and expressed the view that all centrifuge enrichment facilities around the world should be under international safeguards. Later, Friend raised two additional concerns: First, what would happen if operator data system failed? Second, he did not want the IAEA to learn of operational problems before the operator. ¶13. (SBU) Nackaerts summed up by saying he was encouraged. He identified three types of issue that needed further discussion: technical issues, concerns about intrusiveness, and information sensitivity. He suggested that one advantage of trying new measures at LES was that it offered greater prospects for reducing inspection effort. At Urenco's European plants, where Euratom safeguards are also applied, new measures might reduce inspection effort by 40% from the current level of roughly 120 person-days of inspection (PDI) per year. At LES, the inspection effort could be reduced to 30 PDI per year, a 75% reduction. He said the IAEA would prepare a written proposal, taking into account the discussion, and aim to share it with the United States and with Urenco by the end of July. Friend suggested that the IAEA use the design of an existing Urenco facility at Almelo in the Netherlands as the basis for such a proposal. The proposal would be in the form of a baseline and additional options, and would include a cost estimate. This would enable the United States and the IAEA to make their respective decisions (on funding and selection) on whether to apply safeguards at the LES plant. Nackaerts also made a request for design information to aid in developing a safeguards approach and cost estimates. Friend suggested using design information from recent additions to the Almelo plant for that purpose. ¶14. (SBU) June 2009 Meeting Participants: IAEA -------------- Herman Nackaerts, Director, Safeguards Operations B Neville Whiting, Section Head, Safeguards Operations B1 Jill Cooley, Director, Safeguards Concepts and Planning Bruce Moran, Section Head, Safeguards Concepts and Approaches Alain Lebrun, Acting Unit Head, Safeguards Technical Support United States -------------- Dunbar Lockwood, Department of Energy Steve Adams, Department of State Jon Sanborn, Department of State Karolina Walkin, Department of State Jane Marshall, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mark Goodman, UNVIE John Murphy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Brian Boyer, Los Alamos National Laboratory Mark Laughter, Oak Ridge National Laboratory Urenco -------------- Peter Friend, Capenhurst Jack Rollins, LES Theodoor Botter, LES ¶15. (U) Subsequent USG-IAEA consultations in November involved Steve Adams (ISN/MNSA),Mathew Sharp (ISN/MNSA) and Elena Thomas (UNVIE) for the USG, and Neville Whiting (SGOB1) from the Agency. DAVIES