U/S TAUSCHER DECEMBER 4 MEETING WITH CTBTO EXECUTIVE

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000561 SENSITIVE, SIPDIS DEPT FOR ISN/MNSA, VCI/NA, IO/GS, L/ACV DOE FOR NN-40 JCS FOR J5/DDIN SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP, ATSH/NCB/NT, DTRA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM AORC KTBT SUBJECT: U/S TAUSCHER DECEMBER 4 MEETING WITH CTBTO EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TOTH SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. ¶1. (SBU) Under Secretary Tauscher met December 4 with Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Executive Secretary Tibor Toth in Vienna. The main discussion topic was the prospect of ratification of the Treaty in the U.S. Senate. Tauscher told ExecSec Toth that the President's speech in Prague last spring is still the best summary of the administration's plans. As for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),there are three factors involved in the ratification by the U.S. senate. -- The Administration first needs to provide the necessary information for Senators to make an informed decision and for the U.S. public to understand what was at stake. Tauscher argued that the planned Nuclear Posture Review, an anticipated National Intelligence Estimate, and the National Academy of Science study on the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the CTBTO will be the key documents. They should all appear in the February to May 2010 timeframe. -- The second factor is raising awareness of the Treaty in the U.S. domestic audience. -- The third factor will be the political conditions in the U.S. at the time the Treaty goes to the Senate. ¶2. (SBU) Tauscher said the administration will not take the Treaty to the Senate until we have the required 67 votes. 2010, Tauscher cautioned, will be a short legislative year because of midterm elections. The Treaty could be voted on before the end of July. If 2010 is not feasible, the Administration will aim for ratification in 2011, which will be a longer legislative year. ¶3. (U) Toth replied that he understood the U.S. reasoning and the need to be absolutely sure of Senate confirmation. He promised to work to manage expectations. He then went on to review some of the arguments that opponents of the Treaty have been using and to suggest ways in which these attacks might be countered. Some, for example, have argued that there is no clear interpretation of crucial parts of the Treaty among nuclear weapons states. He also expressed concern about claims that U.S. allies might doubt the continued deterrent strength of the U.S. nuclear arsenal if the U.S. ratifies the Treaty, as well as questions about whether the Treaty would have any effect in dealing with countries such as the DPRK or Iran. Tauscher replied that the administration is aware of these questions and has plans to answer them. ¶4. (U) U/S Tauscher cleared this cable. DAVIES