FUTURE OF THE AGENCY SPUTTERS BUT WON'T GO OUT

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000557

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

FOR T, S/SANAC, IO/GS, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS, ISN/RA
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, HOLGATE, CONNERY
NRC FOR OIP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC KNNP PREL IAEA UN
SUBJECT: FUTURE OF THE AGENCY SPUTTERS BUT WON'T GO OUT

REF: UNVIE 506


1. (SBU) Summary: The November 19 final meeting of the Future of
the Agency (FOA) broke no new ground, though it did provide yet
another platform for Iran to bemoan "some Member States' insistence
on politicizing the IAEA." The remaining time was dedicated to the
question of Board composition and enlargement. The U.S. reminded
other Members that the FOA was born of the recognition that the IAEA
required a more visionary approach to resource issues and that the
U.S. would not back away from this uncompleted task. The Brazilian
Chair of the process announced his intention to draft a final FOA
report that could be submitted by consensus from Member States to
the March Board of Governors. This unfortunate decision threatens
to draw on Mission resources at a time when energies would be better
spent focusing on the budget and Medium Term Strategy. End Summary.

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2. (SBU) The final FOTA meeting on "cross-cutting issues" lasted
only a few hours November 19 and focused mainly on Board composition
and enlargement. Enlargement of the Board is the objective of an
amendment to Article VI of the IAEA Statute, which the 1999 General
Conference adopted but which awaits ratification by two-thirds of
Member States. (The U.S. Senate has not taken up ratification.)
Ignoring that a process is already in train (or perhaps implicitly
dismissing the amendment process as stalled),many states, including
South Korea and Spain, called for a more representative body.
Canada, on the other hand, pointed out that a larger Board implied
increasing deadlock or a greater tendency to resort to voting on
resolutions. The "Spirit of Vienna," based on consensus
decision-making, would not fare well under a larger Board.


3. (SBU) As in past meetings, Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh made the
bulk of interventions. Interestingly, Spain took the lead on
contradicting Iran's claims that "some Member States" were intent on
politicizing the IAEA's technical work. Spain pointed out that the
IAEA was a technical agency operating in a political context;
countries in violation of their safeguards agreements were a threat
to global security and therefore created political problems.


4. (SBU) The U.S. used the meeting to remind Member States that the
FOA process had been born of DG ElBaradei's commitment to fund the
IAEA appropriately and sufficiently. Stemming from the "Commission
of Eminent Persons Report" and ElBaradei's own "2020 Report," the
FOA process was intended to identify the Agency's needs and seek
funding for them. The U.S. pledged to continue work toward this
goal with an expansive stance on the 2011 budget and beyond.
Germany and Canada were more pointed in their approach, stating, in
essence, that the FOA had failed to rise above politics, focus on
the future, or live up to expectations. These observations were not
directly contradicted by other participants, though some Member
States ventured that the discussions had been "educational."
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5. (SBU) There was some division over the character of and process
for producing a final FOA product. Several G-77 states requested a
consensus report by Member States to the Board (implying a good deal
of work to negotiate a text). Others, including the U.S., Canada
and the UK, asked only that Brazilian Chair Guerreiro develop his
own report of broad conclusions that could be circulated informally
and "noted" by the Board. Guerreiro resisted this singular
responsibility and announced he would attempt to develop a consensus
text for submission to the Board on behalf of all Member States.


6. (SBU) On the sidelines of the meeting, the Finnish delegate
provided Msnoff with a sneak peak at the raw fodder from previous
FOA meetings that he would submit to Guerreiro for the final report.
(The Finns had chaired the first six meetings of the FOA before
passing chairmanship to the Brazilians.) The Finnish language was
appropriately bland, focusing on broad conclusions such as, "science
and technology are central to the Agency's role." On Nuclear
Security, the Finnish language avoided any discussion of regular
budget funding, stating only that Nuclear Security was a concern "of
all Member States."


7. (SBU) Comment: Both the Finns and the Brazilians harbor hopes
that the final FOA Report may serve as a starting point for
discussions of the Budget Working Group and negotiations over the
2012-2017 Medium Term Plan. If so, we will at least have extracted
something of value from the process. If not, Mission officers will
find themselves drawn into negotiations over the text of the FOA
Report at a time when energies would be better spent negotiating the
budget. End Comment.

DAVIES