FUTURE OF THE AGENCY SPUTTERS BUT WON'T GO OUT

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000557 SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR T, S/SANAC, IO/GS, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS, ISN/RA NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, HOLGATE, CONNERY NRC FOR OIP E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AORC KNNP PREL IAEA UN SUBJECT: FUTURE OF THE AGENCY SPUTTERS BUT WON'T GO OUT REF: UNVIE 506 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The November 19 final meeting of the Future of the Agency (FOA) broke no new ground, though it did provide yet another platform for Iran to bemoan "some Member States' insistence on politicizing the IAEA." The remaining time was dedicated to the question of Board composition and enlargement. The U.S. reminded other Members that the FOA was born of the recognition that the IAEA required a more visionary approach to resource issues and that the U.S. would not back away from this uncompleted task. The Brazilian Chair of the process announced his intention to draft a final FOA report that could be submitted by consensus from Member States to the March Board of Governors. This unfortunate decision threatens to draw on Mission resources at a time when energies would be better spent focusing on the budget and Medium Term Strategy. End Summary. - ¶2. (SBU) The final FOTA meeting on "cross-cutting issues" lasted only a few hours November 19 and focused mainly on Board composition and enlargement. Enlargement of the Board is the objective of an amendment to Article VI of the IAEA Statute, which the 1999 General Conference adopted but which awaits ratification by two-thirds of Member States. (The U.S. Senate has not taken up ratification.) Ignoring that a process is already in train (or perhaps implicitly dismissing the amendment process as stalled),many states, including South Korea and Spain, called for a more representative body. Canada, on the other hand, pointed out that a larger Board implied increasing deadlock or a greater tendency to resort to voting on resolutions. The "Spirit of Vienna," based on consensus decision-making, would not fare well under a larger Board. ¶3. (SBU) As in past meetings, Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh made the bulk of interventions. Interestingly, Spain took the lead on contradicting Iran's claims that "some Member States" were intent on politicizing the IAEA's technical work. Spain pointed out that the IAEA was a technical agency operating in a political context; countries in violation of their safeguards agreements were a threat to global security and therefore created political problems. ¶4. (SBU) The U.S. used the meeting to remind Member States that the FOA process had been born of DG ElBaradei's commitment to fund the IAEA appropriately and sufficiently. Stemming from the "Commission of Eminent Persons Report" and ElBaradei's own "2020 Report," the FOA process was intended to identify the Agency's needs and seek funding for them. The U.S. pledged to continue work toward this goal with an expansive stance on the 2011 budget and beyond. Germany and Canada were more pointed in their approach, stating, in essence, that the FOA had failed to rise above politics, focus on the future, or live up to expectations. These observations were not directly contradicted by other participants, though some Member States ventured that the discussions had been "educational." - ¶5. (SBU) There was some division over the character of and process for producing a final FOA product. Several G-77 states requested a consensus report by Member States to the Board (implying a good deal of work to negotiate a text). Others, including the U.S., Canada and the UK, asked only that Brazilian Chair Guerreiro develop his own report of broad conclusions that could be circulated informally and "noted" by the Board. Guerreiro resisted this singular responsibility and announced he would attempt to develop a consensus text for submission to the Board on behalf of all Member States. ¶6. (SBU) On the sidelines of the meeting, the Finnish delegate provided Msnoff with a sneak peak at the raw fodder from previous FOA meetings that he would submit to Guerreiro for the final report. (The Finns had chaired the first six meetings of the FOA before passing chairmanship to the Brazilians.) The Finnish language was appropriately bland, focusing on broad conclusions such as, "science and technology are central to the Agency's role." On Nuclear Security, the Finnish language avoided any discussion of regular budget funding, stating only that Nuclear Security was a concern "of all Member States." ¶7. (SBU) Comment: Both the Finns and the Brazilians harbor hopes that the final FOA Report may serve as a starting point for discussions of the Budget Working Group and negotiations over the 2012-2017 Medium Term Plan. If so, we will at least have extracted something of value from the process. If not, Mission officers will find themselves drawn into negotiations over the text of the FOA Report at a time when energies would be better spent negotiating the budget. End Comment. DAVIES