IAEA: DG AMANO CITES SAFEGUARDS AND BUDGET

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000555 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, P, IO, ISN, IO/GS, ISN/MNSA, ISN/RA, ISN/NESS NSC FOR SCHEINMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019 TAGS: AORC IAEA KNNP TRGY PREL UN JA IR SUBJECT: IAEA: DG AMANO CITES SAFEGUARDS AND BUDGET PRIORITIES WITH U/S TAUSCHER REF: A) UNVIE 545 B) UNVIE 538 C) UNVIE 535 Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) U/S for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher, accompanied by Special Assistant Jim Timbie, pledged full U.S. support to newly instated IAEA Director General Amano in an introductory call December 4. Amano confirmed his planned trip to Washington January 11-12 and welcomed close collaboration with the U.S. Taking note of the tough issues on the IAEA agenda, U/S Tauscher sought Amano's views on the status of verification efforts in Iran, Syria, and Iraq, and next steps on the International Nuclear Fuel Bank (INFB). Amano was focused on developments in Iran and had sent a letter (with limited expectation of a response) asking for clarification of Iran's announcement of 10 planned new enrichment facilities. He explained his technical role in implementing IAEA safeguards guided by Board and UNSC resolutions, as opposed to making political judgments. On Syria, Amano committed to seeking full Syrian cooperation with the IAEA investigation but would not be drawn out on prospects for a special inspection request. He was also acutely aware of the sensitivity of IAEA technical cooperation with Syria. Amano had not focused on the issue of finding Iraq in safeguards compliance and needed to give this further thought, while an aide reminded of ElBaradei's earlier letter on the need for AP implementation. Asked about the proposed IAEA nuclear fuel bank, the new DG was circumspect as to the impact of the recent divided vote on the Russian LEU reserve on other assurance of supply proposals. He was reviewing the Secretariat's paper responding to concerns on this issue and committed to engage Member States further. In discussing the budget, Amano cited upgrading the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) as an issue of special importance and noted that urgent decisions would be taken on SAL management. ¶2. (U) Participants: -- IAEA: DG Amano, Special Assistant for Management Satoshi Suzuki, Special Advisor Graham Andrew, EXPO Tariq Rauf, Tim Andrews, Office of Nuclear Security. -- U.S.: U/S Tauscher, Special Assistant Timbie, Ambassador Davies, DCM, Poloff Pappas (notetaker). End Summary. Iran -------------- ¶3. (C) U/S Tauscher pledged full U.S. support and looked to DG Amano's leadership in what were tough times with a big agenda, much of which revolved around the IAEA. She stressed that close U.S.-IAEA collaboration would be the key to success, a point on which DG Amano wholly agreed. Turning first to Iran, Amano cited the news out of Tehran following the adoption of the two IAEA Board resolutions (i.e., Iran and Russian fuel bank) the week prior. As he had with IO A/S Brimmer, Amano credited his Special Assistant for Management Satoshi Suzuki for keeping him fully informed of developments and coordinating the IAEA team, including Special Advisor Andrew. Amano advised U/S Tauscher that the IAEA had promptly sent a letter to Iran asking for clarification of its announcement of plans for 10 new enrichment facilities. While Amano did not expect much in terms of a response from Tehran, he noted that it was important for the credibility of the Agency not to keep quiet when faced with such a serious event. (Comment: Despite his title, Suzuki is emerging as Amano's point man, including on Iran. The fact that Amano is also relying on Andrew, one of our most trusted IAEA interlocutors critical of Iran, is auspicious. End Comment.) ¶4. (C) Amano reiterated his approach on Iran and other verification issues, as to the basic responsibility of the Secretariat to fully implement Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) and provide Member States with impartial and factual information and analysis as a basis for their political judgments. It was not his role as DG, he believed, to opine on political decisions to proceed with resolutions or sanctions. Rather, the Secretariat/DG must be guided by Board resolutions and mandatory UNSCRS. Amano said he would operate on this basis and report the reactions of the parties concerned. ¶5. (C) U/S Tauscher noted that we were not getting either technical or political answers from Iran as it was not clear who was speaking for the government in this time of domestic upheaval. She underlined the vitally important role of IAEA technical expertise, which had more weight than political statements, in building the case on Iran's nuclear program and providing a technical understanding of the unsustainable and destabilizing violations that trended in the wrong direction for the NPT and the post-Cold War world. Having just come from the Middle East en route to Moscow, U/S Tauscher had focused on the two-track approach in her consultations. She advised that the persuasion track had become fatigued and was losing credibility, and while the pressure track was not what we had wanted, she regretted that the historic opening offered by the Obama Administration had met with overheated rhetoric from Tehran about leaving the NPT. U/S Tauscher noted that the Board of Governors had come to a tough decision, and she expressed appreciation to the Director General for reporting the Board resolution to the UN Security Council (ref b). It was important that we stay together on this, she added. Citing his many friends in the Obama Administration, Amano said he was always comfortable working with the U.S. and thought it important to have a sense of our latest thinking. U/S Tauscher noted that Ambassador Davies has the pulse of the Administration on Iran and Amano acknowledged our very effective U.S. Mission. Syria -------------- ¶6. (C) Special Assistant Timbie noted concern in the region, even in Cairo, about Syria. We should not allow "just say no" to be a successful strategy to prevent the IAEA investigation, he opined. DG Amano affirmed that the IAEA would continue to seek Syria's full cooperation, stressing "full," and that the level of cooperation to date was very much lacking. Amano did not see any hope of a breakthrough at this time. He noted that the IAEA continued to analyze MNSR samples. Special Advisor Andrew added that time was working against the investigation of Al-Kibar, from a technical perspective, given the deterioration of possible physical evidence. Even if the IAEA were given access to debris, he surmised, the more time that has elapsed made it all the more difficult to trace back their origin. Andrew lamented that the political logjam with Damascus prevented the IAEA from moving forward and that the DG reports were getting thinner and thinner as the IAEA cannot do much more. ¶7. (C) Picking up on this problem of nuclear forensics over time, U/S Tauscher noted that technical issues underlined the political imperative for Syrian cooperation. Syria's dissembling dodges were indicative of something to hide, i.e., what one does when one is cheating, she noted, and suggested a calibrated political message that "we've seen this movie before" and Syria cannot just say "no" to the IAEA investigation. The need for technical access gave this message impetus, she noted, and underlined the need to put political pressure on Syria so the IAEA can fulfill its technical mission. Amano did not respond as Andrew intervened to note the awkward dynamic in the Board of Governors where there remains criticism of the country that bombed the Al-Kibar site. ¶8. (S) Comment: Although Amano was fully cognizant of the need for Syrian cooperation, he did not raise the prospect of a special inspection when given the opportunity. We expect that he will take his cues from the Safeguards Department as to the timing and advisability of a special inspection request, which is already under quiet discussion internally. End comment. ¶9. (C) At the conclusion of the meeting, in the context of a brief discussion on TC funding, Timbie raised the issue flagged in the last DG report on Syria as to the possibility of the yellowcake at the TC-funded Homs facility having been used for uranium conversion. Timbie noted that this could be a potential embarrassment and dangerous combination given reporting to Congress as to nonproliferation risks on TC projects. Amano assured that he was aware of the sensitivity of the issue. Iraq -------------- ¶10. (C) Turning to Iraq, Timbie hoped that the IAEA takes everything that is known about Iraq's nuclear program into account in assessing safeguards compliance, and not just the Additional Protocol (AP). Frankly, Amano admitted that he has been focused on Iran, and while the issue of Iraq's safeguards compliance had come up from time to time while he was Japan's Governor, he needed to give this further thought. EXPO Rauf unhelpfully recalled the previous DG's stipulation in a letter to the Iraqis that the AP was needed to give overall assurance of safeguards compliance in Iraq. Although he acknowledged Iraq had taken steps in this direction, Rauf noted that it takes time for the IAEA to reach such a conclusion even with the full cooperation of the state. ¶11. (C) U/S Tauscher observed that this was a non-trivial issue for Iraq as the country seeks to stand itself up financially, and put its past behind via the lifting of UN Security Council sanctions. That being the case, she sought to get a sense of IAEA timing as this was a big milestone for Iraq. (Comment: Mission will follow up with the new DG's team while Amano consolidates his thinking. Although he seems disposed to be helpful, ElBaradei's letter to the Iraqi government will make it difficult to circumvent the prevailing IAEA orthodoxy on AP implementation. End Comment.) Fuel Banks -------------- ¶12. (C) Special Assistant Timbie noted that the U.S. was pleased by the Board's decision on the Angarsk LEU reserve (ref c),attributing this outcome to close cooperation between the U.S. and Russia, and would like to see an equal effort placed on the International Nuclear Fuel Bank (INFB). He acknowledged that others were less than pleased by the Board vote on the Russian resolution and we still have own work to do to incorporate useful precedents from the Angarsk approach into the INFB, and to consult with and listen to other countries, but suggested a spring timeframe for consideration of the INFB. DG Amano was circumspect about the divided Board vote on the Russian LEU reserve, which included influential countries voting against. Citing the 24-8 vote count, he opined that consensus would have been preferable. ¶13. (C) On a more positive note, Amano observed that Board members expressed an expectation for engagement on this issue. The serious questions that had been raised in the June Board had not yet been answered and while the Secretariat had nearly completed its paper on the subject, the situation had changed in the aftermath of the vote. In view of this and since it would now be going out under his name, Amano wanted to have a look at the paper and make sure he was comfortable before distributing it. He then planned to start discussion on this issue with a view to reaching an agreed framework among Member States; the new DG pledged engagement and dialogue in contrast with the past but made no commitments on timing. Amano was not sure what impact the vote on the Russian LEU reserve would have on future consideration of the assurance of supply issue. Ambassador Davies noted that the U.S. had worked hard with Russia to ensure that the resolution text opened the door to other supply proposals, and that the UK had been helpful in this regard. He hoped that the skeptics would allow this to happen. Budget: SAL, TC -------------- ¶14. (C) Timbie reaffirmed strong U.S. support for increasing the IAEA budget, noting that we would work through the Budget Working Group to that end, including to support the upgrade of SAL. The DG cited the latter as one of the most important issues in coming months and noted his personal attachment to the issue. He recalled how he had visited the laboratories at Siebersdorf as a newly arrived Ambassador years before, expecting to see a state-of-the art facility. From that time, he had been determined to do something about SAL and had consulted with Safeguards DDG Heinonen, leading to Japan's voluntary contribution and those of others, including the U.S. However, there remain large capital requirements that may require a special approach. Amano noted good news as to the reorganization of SAL and pledged that he would look closely at SAL management issues to bring this to an urgent decision. ¶15. (C) DG Amano also expressed appreciation for U.S. budgetary and political support for TC, which prompted the discussion of the Homs facility in Syria (para 10). Timbie observed that U.S. support for IAEA-TC was contingent on strong barriers against nonproliferation. ¶16. (U) T has cleared this message. DAVIES