IAEA: DG RACE UPDATE

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000055 SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019 TAGS: AORC PREL PARM TRGY IAEA KNNP JA SF SUBJECT: IAEA: DG RACE UPDATE REF: THE HAGUE 59 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b an d d ¶1. (S) Japanese IAEA Governor Amano told Ambassador Schulte February 4 he was "more optimistic" as to his ability to clinch the two-thirds vote required for election as Director General. With the Board Chair having nearly completed her consultations, 13 countries claimed to be undecided but among those, Amano postulates, 4-5 (such as Romania) have actually decided. Amano expected more Board members to make a decision once a date is set for a vote and noted that abstentions, in any case, work in his favor, i.e. since he has the plurality of the vote. The GOJ's lobbying campaign had made progress and Japan expected support of the eight EU states on the Board. The big "undecideds" remained Brazil, India, and China, according to Amano, with Russia leaning in his direction. Amano noted that the Japanese Permrep in New York had also spoken to Ambassador Rice. ¶2. (S) EU member states with the exception of the UK (but including Spain) have confirmed support for Amano, tipping the balance further in his favor. By Mission's informal count, Amano has 15 firm votes and 4-5 leaning in his favor, while 10 states are undecided and 6 are for Minty. We see no/no indication of Minty dropping out at this juncture (thus ceding the election to Amano),even if he were interested in the OPCW Director position as speculated in reftel. Brazil and India are probably in Minty's camp, given strong ties to South Africa via trilateral IBSA coordination. Brazil's support may also be tied to the NSG debate on criteria for transferring enrichment and reprocessing technology. Mexico and Switzerland are still officially among the undecided. The Swiss Counselor said to us Bern was torn 50/50 between Minty and Amano, though he told a New Zealand counterpart two days earlier that Bern supported Minty. New Zealand also reported that non-Board member Norway is lobbying on behalf of Minty. The Malaysian Ambassador announced to colleagues at a lunch hosted by Ambassador Schulte that his country has an official position (though he did not share it) but would consider nominating former Deputy Director General for Technical Cooperation Bin Muslim in the event of deadlock (Comment: Should the election be deadlocked, we anticipate the emergence of several "ponies" rather than a single, galvanizing "dark horse." End comment.) ¶3. (C) The Board Chair has yet to confirm a date for an Extraordinary Board session and vote on the next DG, but the Secretariat's office of Policy-Making Organs (PMO) is proceeding on the expectation it will be held on March 26 due to a lack of consensus and opposition to an early March date. (Comment: There is no requirement for consensus on a date, but the Board Chair seems to be hiding behind the lack of one. End Comment.) In a separate meeting on February 4, like-minded Ambassadors (EU3, U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan) expressed frustration with the Board Chair, having heard several different dates. Japanese Ambassador (and DG candidate) Amano saw it as imperative to fix the date, with early March seeming reasonable and in conformity with past precedent. He noted that the date should not be a matter of negotiation, which would inevitably give rise to speculation about hidden agendas. The like-minded supported an early March date. Australian Ambassador Shannon remarked that the Chair had a "shaky" grasp of her procedural role, which was not to "engineer" an outcome. The UK Ambassador agreed that Board Chair Feroukhi was exceeding her role in trying to manage the process toward a near-consensus outcome. Feroukhi had argued that too many countries were not ready for a vote in early March, according to Australian Ambassador Shannon, who clarified that should not be her concern. New Zealand and Canada also questioned the Board Chair's grasp of the arcane Rules of Procedure. New Zealand Ambassador Macmillan commented that Feroukhi seemed to interpret the rules as guidelines and that her intentions seemed most influenced by whomever she spoke to last. Feroukhi's refusal to have the Secretariat present in her bilateral consultations was, in retrospect, also a disadvantage. 4.(C) Comment: Amano seems increasingly confident in his interactions with us. However, as the vote drags out, the risk of a contentious, politicized outcome will increase. PYATT