IAEA/SYRIA: DIVIDED BOARD REMAINS SEIZED OF THE

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000539 SENSITIVE SIPDIS ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL, IO/T FOR DETEMPLE, NEA FOR ABELL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: DIVIDED BOARD REMAINS SEIZED OF THE SYRIA ISSUE REF: A. UNVIE 00529 ¶B. UNVIE 00521 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The IAEA Board of Governors November 27 formally addressed Syria for the fifth time in as many boards. Despite a critical report by the Director General noting no progress on the Dair Alzour investigation and mounting questions on uranium traces at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor that foreshadow possible confirmation of safeguards failures in the March 2010 report to the Board, the Board debate exposed continued divisions on the Syria nuclear issue. Reflecting the same trends from previous Boards, like-minded countries (EU, JUSCANZ plus Argentina, ROK, and Ukraine) called for Syria to cooperate as requested by the Agency and in adherence with its safeguards obligations, while the NAM and Arab states insisted that IAEA requests for cooperation were beyond Syria's legal obligations and welcomed Syrian cooperation to date. Russia and Switzerland called for Syria and other member states, to include Israel, to cooperate with the Agency's investigation. South Africa was the most balanced among the NAM members addressing the Board, but it also called out Israel. There were no new converts among Board members calling Syria to account, though new Board member Ukraine, in its first intervention on the subject, came out clearly in the like-minded camp, as did fellow newcomer South Korea. Syria took issue with the Agency's continued questions regarding Dair Alzour, claiming the facility is not nuclear-related and therefore not subject to IAEA safeguards -- in essence disregarding all the information and concerns explained by the Agency over the course of various reports by the Director General. ¶2. (SBU) Few countries focused on the probable safeguards failure by Syria in not declaring the import of uranyl nitrate. Syria downplayed this by saying that uranyl nitrate is available commercially and has "nothing to do with safeguards." End Summary. -------------- Syria Issue Divides Board Along Familiar Lines -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Seventeen statements were delivered on the Syria agenda item: Sweden on behalf of the seven EU Board members, Egypt on behalf of the NAM, Ukraine, Canada, Cuba, Argentina, Switzerland, Venezuela, USA, Japan, Russia, Australia, New Zealand, Egypt, South Korea, Turkey, and South Africa). Board members Azerbaijan and Ukraine associated themselves with the EU statement. There are 13 NAM members on the Board, although they do not have a unified policy like the EU. Under Rule 50 Iran, Libya, Israel, and Syria spoke. Overall, this is the group of speakers we have previously heard from, except for Board newcomers Ukraine, Venezuela, and South Korea (though ROK has previously addressed the issue under Rule 50.) Brazil, China, and Uruguay remained silent. -------------- Questions on Correctness and Completeness of Syria's Declaration -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Relatively few countries focused on the safeguards reporting failure by Syria in not declaring the import of uranyl nitrate. Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Ukraine, (and Israel under Rule 50) joined the U.S. in questioning the correctness and completeness of Syria's safeguards declarations with respect to the import of undeclared uranyl nitrate for the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR). Some of these countries also quoted the Secretariat's remarks from the November 18 technical briefing, in which the IAEA stated that Syria should have declared the importation. South Korea expressed concern about the uranyl nitrate, and the EU looked forward to the results of the IAEA's November 17 visit to the MNSR for follow-up samples. (Comment: The EU statement did not address this as a possible safeguards issue, as EU members await further information from the Secretariat. The French Mission informed us in confidence that consideration of the French bilateral relationship with Syria led the French Ambassador to refrain from deploying a question regarding the uranyl nitrate her staff had prepared for her use during the technical briefing for member states on November, 18. End Comment.) ¶5. (SBU) NAM members did not address the import of uranyl nitrate, although Syria downplayed it by saying that uranyl nitrate is available commercially and has "nothing to do with safeguards." (Note: This Syrians made this claim despite the IAEA's explicit statement during the Technical Briefing that the uranium should have been reported by Syria for safeguards purposes. End note.) -------------- Like-Minded and Others Repeat DG's Call for Syrian Cooperation -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The EU, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States called on Syria to cooperate with the Agency's investigation of Dair Alzour, including providing access to information, locations, and equipment/debris. Joining the like-minded countries, Argentina delivered a strong statement supporting the DG's assessment that it is necessary to arrive at a full understanding on the uranium particles at Dair Alzour, the imagery, and the procurement activities that the Agency assesses could be related to the construction of a nuclear reactor. Argentina joined Canada, Australia, and the U.S. in calling on Syria to give the Agency access to additional sites that might be functionally related to Dair Alzour. ¶7. (SBU) The same countries, along with Ukraine, South Korea, and Turkey, called on Syria to establish modalities, as recommended by the DG, to protect sensitive information in Syria and thus facilitate Agency access to military sites. The Ukraine, in its national statement, took issue with Syria's refusal to give the Agency access to information and locations, especially given the IAEA's mandate on nuclear issues. Ukraine said it needed to have IAEA confirmation that there were no undeclared activities in Syria. ¶8. (SBU) Turkey called on Syria to cooperate with the Agency, noting that no progress had been achieved on the Dair Alzour investigation since September, but expressed more optimism than did like-minded countries that Syria would provide the necessary cooperation. Turkey also welcomed Syria's cooperation at the MNSR. ¶9. (SBU) The EU, Japan, Australia, and the United States called on Syria to sign and implement the Additional Protocol. ¶10. (SBU) Japan and Canada remained concern about the possible connection between the Dair Alzour site and North Korea. ¶11. (SBU) Like-minded countries also called on the DG to continue reporting on Syria and to keep this issue on the Board's agenda. No consensus was reached on Canada's call to release the DG's report to the public, as Cuba and Egypt (and Syria under Rule 50) opposed public release on the same grounds as in previous Board sessions. -------------- Russia and Switzerland -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Russia called for Syria to cooperate with the Agency as requested by the DG, but also gave equal weight to calling on member states to provide information to the Agency that led them to believe it was a nuclear reactor. Switzerland expressed "only moderate" optimism that this issue would reach an eventual solution, noting that this case goes "well beyond nuclear aspects," a probable reference to the dissatisfaction with how this issue was brought to the Agency. Switzerland encouraged all parties to assist the Agency investigation, but cited this as "first and foremost about Syria who should respond to questions by the Agency." Switzerland also called out Israel by name as another party that needed to respond to the Agency's questions. --- NAM --- ¶13. (SBU) The NAM statement, read by Egypt, referred back to NAM Summit conclusions on the Syria issue, placing the onus on Israel. The NAM reiterated that while considering this issue, it is essential not to lose sight of how it was brought to the attention of the Agency. The NAM found it regrettable that the Board had not expressed its position on Israel's attack on Syria and on the late provision of information to the Agency. The NAM welcomed Syria's continued cooperation within the limits of its safeguards agreement, essentially rejecting IAEA statements that unanswered, outstanding requests are within Syria's safeguards obligations. The NAM statement, as well as national NAM statements, focused on the Israeli attack and called on "others" to make information available to the Agency. ¶14. (SBU) Cuba blamed the lack of progress cited by the DG in his report on the bombing of the site and the late provision of information to the Agency. Venezuela said that any analysis on this issue was "beset with uncertainties" since the facility was destroyed by Israel. Venezuela explicitly said the additional requests of the Agency go beyond the legal obligations of Syria's safeguards agreement. Egypt noted that the DG's request for Member States to make information available to the Agency "have been ignored," and in light of this the Board should question the inclusion of this item on future Board agendas. (Comment: The NAM continues to highlight the need for Member States to provide additional information to the Agency, which is not a safeguards obligation, while rejecting all calls by the IAEA for Syria to live up to obligations. End Comment.) ¶15. (SBU) South Africa associated itself with the NAM statement, but said that the Agency should ensure all safeguards are applied (within the safeguards agreement) and that Syria should establish modalities that would facilitate progress in verification. South Africa strongly encouraged Israel to provide the specific information requested by the Agency with regards to the munitions used in the bombing. ¶16. (SBU) Under Rule 50, Iran delivered its usual diatribe, condemning the "Zionist" regime of Israel and calling on the UN Security Council to immediately condemn Israel's attack on Syria. Iran again invoked a resolution from the 1990 General Conference (GC/RES/533 that considers the attack of nuclear installations a violation of international law. Iran criticized the Board for reporting confidential technical details of its investigation on Syria, similar to Iran's complaint of the IAEA's reports on the Iran item. Libya also delivered a statement under Rule 50, adding that an end must be put to the double standards which are discriminatory and "can only bring about radicalization and an upsurge in extremism." -------------- Rule 50: Israel -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Israel pronounced that the DG's reports show a pattern of noncooperation by Syria, refusing access to sites including where the debris is located. Israel called Syria's activities a "gross breach" of its safeguards obligations. Israel also requested that it be referred to by its proper name. -------------- Syria -------------- ¶18. (SBU) The Head of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission, Ibrahim Othman, delivered Syria's statement last under Rule ¶50. Othman thanked Egypt, the NAM, and other friendly states for their statements and expressed regret to hear the statements of others "leveling accusations against Syria despite Syria's cooperation and positive engagement with the Agency." Othman expressed surprise that the Agency continued to ask questions about the Dair Alzour facility after Syria had explained to the Agency that the previous and current buildings at Dair Alzour are not nuclear-related. Othman said that Syria had provided the Agency "all sorts of cooperation under the relevant obligations." ¶19. (SBU) As in previous statements, Syria focused on Israel's attack on Syria's sovereign territory (a flagrant violation of international law) and highlighted Syria's self-restraint in not responding to the attack to maintain peace and stability in the region. Othman said that it was a double-standard to demand Syria provide non-existent information about the facility while not holding Israel accountable for attacking a sovereign country. He called on Israel, as a member of the IAEA, to submit a list of all Israeli bombs that contain depleted uranium and subject all nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. ¶20. (SBU) Othman characterized all cooperation with the Agency on the Dair Alzour facility as voluntary cooperation beyond its safeguards obligations as the facility is non-nuclear. In this regard, he cited a memorandum of understanding between Syria and the Agency that provided for a one-time visit to Dair Alzour. Othman touted Syria's cooperation by responding to inspectors' questions during and after the visit. He rejected the Agency's request to view debris removed from the bombed site, saying it was "not natural" for the Agency to request this and to expect the debris to be available. Othman dismissed the "few natural uranium particles" found at Dair Alzour, adding that they could not be "scientifically" explained as resulting from nuclear activity nor can they be described as undeclared nuclear material as there are "only a few particles." ¶21. (SBU) Othman was displeased to see the Agency incorporate into the Syria report the "minute quantities" of uranium particles found during the Agency's inspections. He downplayed the import of uranyl nitrate because the material is commercially available and has nothing to do with safeguards. Othman asked the Agency not to include questions regarding the MNSR in future reports. ¶22. (SBU) Othman said that Syria is always ready to cooperate with the Agency to bring these issues to closure provided it is not done at the expense of its national security and sovereignty. Othman called on the Agency to conduct itself with neutrality and not to rely on "non-credible open sources" and "desires of certain states whose political intents are known to all." -------------- U.S. Statement As Delivered -------------- ¶23. (SBU) Thank you, Mr. Chairman, We thank the Director General for his latest report and commend the Secretariat for its professional input of the technical investigation in Syria. Syria's ongoing refusal to cooperate with the IAEA remains of serious concern to the United States, and, indeed, should concern all supporters of the Agency's safeguards system and the international nonproliferation regime. This Board must not allow any country to hinder inspectors and attempt to dictate its safeguards obligations and the terms by which the Agency may meet the verification responsibilities with which it has been charged. We hope future reports will reflect a decision by Syria to change course and provide the Agency a full accounting of its past and present nuclear program, and allow the Agency the access to locations and information it has requested. Until Syria makes such a decision, the IAEA will not be in a position to give the international community meaningful assurances that Syria is not engaged in undeclared nuclear activities. Indeed, with every new report on Syria submitted by the Director General, the Board is presented with mounting evidence that Syria's clandestine nuclear activities were not limited to the Dair Alzour facility. For well over a year, the IAEA has been investigating Syria's clandestine nuclear activities related to the destroyed reactor at Dair Alzour. Regrettably, Syria has not used this time to resolve the serious outstanding questions about the reactor and other suspect sites of interest to the IAEA. Instead, it has attempted to dictate the terms of the IAEA's investigative authority and to actively hinder the Agency's efforts to verify the scope and peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear activities. Contrary to its safeguards obligations, Syria continues to deny inspectors access to locations and information the Agency has deemed essential to fulfill its verification mandate. Syria has not provided credible explanations for the presence of undeclared chemically-processed uranium at the site of the destroyed reactor. Syria continues to refuse to provide information and supporting documentation about the destroyed facility at Dair Alzour. Syria has not adequately addressed the Agency's questions about nuclear-related procurement efforts. Syria continues to deny the Agency information related to nuclear cooperation with the DPRK. Worse yet, while denying such access, Syria appeared to have sanitized the sites upon receiving the IAEA's request to visit them, according to the IAEA's review of commercial imagery from those sites. As members of the IAEA Board of Governors, we should not tolerate Syria's pervasive undermining of the Agency's verification efforts. This willfully puts into question the credibility of IAEA safeguards. We note with concern Syria's assertions that "due to the military and non-nuclear nature of the Dair Alzour site and the other three locations, it had no obligation to provide more information under its Safeguards Agreement." This amounts to unilaterally seeking to change the terms of its safeguards obligations. As stated clearly in the Director General's report, "The presence at the Dair Alzour site of particles of anthropogenic natural uranium of a type not included in Syria's declared inventory gives rise to questions about the correctness and completeness of Syria's declaration, which the Agency is obliged to pursue." Furthermore, the Director General has rejected Syria's unfounded assertions that it has no obligation to provide information and access due to the military-nature of a site. We also note with serious concern that significant questions have now arisen about the correctness and completeness of Syria's declaration at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR),a safeguarded facility. As noted in the Director General's report to the September Board, anthropogenic uranium of a type not included on Syria's declared inventory was detected in the hot cells at the MNSR. After being confronted with evidence contradicting Syria's previous explanation for the origins of the uranium, Syria presented the Agency with two additional possible sources for the undeclared uranium traces: domestically produced yellowcake and "small quantities of imported, but previously undeclared, commercial uranyl nitrate." This raises a serious question about Syria's compliance with its safeguards agreement. Article 34(b) of Syria's Safeguards Agreement requires that, when any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage where it is suitable for fuel fabrication or for isotopic enrichment is imported, Syria shall inform the Agency of its quantity and composition, unless the material is imported for specifically non-nuclear purposes. The uranyl nitrate presence at the MNSR suggests it was indeed intended for nuclear-related purposes -- why else would it be there? We also note the Secretariat's statement at the Technical Briefing on the Director General's Syria report that the uranyl nitrate should have been declared to the IAEA for safeguards purposes. We would, Mr. Chairman, ask that this statement be reflected in the Board Chair's summary of this item. We are pleased the Agency was permitted to conduct a follow on visit to the MNSR on November 17 and look forward to a report before the March Board meeting on whether Syria has resolved the Agency's outstanding questions on the origin of the undeclared anthropogenic uranium detected at the facility and on the safeguards implications of the previously undeclared activities. When considering the importance of the multiple outstanding questions, and the mounting evidence that Syria's clandestine nuclear activities were not limited to Dair Alzour, the Board should not lose sight of the following: the configuration and location of the destroyed reactor suggests that it was not intended for peaceful purposes. Given the gravity of this issue and the fact that Syria continues to seriously impede the IAEA's verification efforts, the United States urges all Board members to join us in demanding that Syria fully cooperate with the IAEA investigation without delay by granting the IAEA access to any information, debris and sites needed to complete its investigation. Syria's attempts to deceive the IAEA and the international community before and during the investigation underscore the limitations on the Agency's ability to fulfill its mission in a country with a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement but without an Additional Protocol. The importance of verifying the absence of undeclared nuclear activity led the international community to develop the Additional Protocol in order to give the inspectors the tools they need to provide the necessary assurance that a country's declaration is not only correct, but is also complete, and that its nuclear program is therefore exclusively for peaceful purposes. We call on Syria, and on all states that have not yet done so, to sign and implement the Additional Protocol without delay. The existence of undeclared nuclear sites seemingly intended for non-peaceful purposes, and the possibility of safeguards violations including undeclared nuclear material, are matters of grave concern to the entire international community. Therefore, in the spirit of transparency, the Board should make available to the public the Director General's report on "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic." Mr. Chairman, We look forward to the Secretariat's report before the March meeting of the Board of Governors on the progress of the Agency's investigation. And we once again strongly urge Syria to provide without further delay whatever access and information the Agency deems necessary to resolve all outstanding questions. Thank you. DAVIES