IAEA/IRAN: BOARD OF GOVERNORS CRITICIZE FAILURES

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000538 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2034 TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: BOARD OF GOVERNORS CRITICIZE FAILURES ON CODE 3.1 WHILE ADOPTING A RESOLUTION CENSURING IRAN Classified By: Ambassador GLYN DAVIES for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The main event in the November 26-27 Board session was the adoption of the first Board resolution on Iran since February 2006 with the support of all P5 1 partners and by an overwhelming vote of 25-3-6 abstentions, with one absence (septel). Leading up to this, the Board debate on the Director General's report on Iran included the usual constellation of regional and national statements. Thirty of the thirty-five Board Member States spoke or were spoken for by the EU and NAM, and eight states spoke under Rule 50. The EU, Germany, Canada, the U.S., Japan, Russia, Australia, South Korea, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Mongolia all voiced support for the German-sponsored resolution during their interventions, while Cuba, Malaysia, Venezuela, and non-Board member Syria specifically noted opposition. Board newcomer Ukraine also gave a forthright national statement on Iran while associating with the strong EU statement. ¶2. (SBU) Most of the Board expressed concern and regret about the late disclosure of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) near Qom, asserting that its very existence called into question the possibility of other undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran. Also per usual, the NAM statement and national statements by a handful of Iran-friendly NAM members focused on the "positives" -- verification of non-diversion of declared nuclear material, Iranian cooperation with the IAEA's visit to the FFEP, and provision of preliminary design information for the Darkhovin power plant -- in the November 16 Director General's (DG) report. Presaging the vote on the resolution on the Board's second day, the majority of Board members called on Iran to meet UNSC and Board requirements and registered serious concern about Iran's lack of cooperation on key technical issues, including possible military dimensions (PMD) and implementation of Code 3.1 Modified of the Subsidiary Arrangements, as well as the Additional Protocol. Many of the statements highlighted Iran's multiple failures on Code 3.1 Modified, reiterating the DG's report that these failures were inconsistent with Tehran's obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. An overwhelming majority of the Board expressed broad support for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) proposal as a potentially significant step toward diplomatic resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. ¶3. (C) The NAM statement reaffirmed its "principled positions" on the inalienability of Iran's nuclear rights, cautioned against undue pressure and interference with IAEA verification, and stressed the distinction between "legal" NPT obligations and voluntary confidence building measures. The Cuban, Malaysian, and Venezuelan statements trumpeted Iran's cause, in contrast with other NAM-member interventions, including by Mongolia, Peru and South Africa, which were more balanced and underlined that Iran has outstanding UNSC obligations. Iranian Permanent Representative Soltanieh, as usual, had the last word, though his statement in this instance was delivered with what seemed like forced calm and seemed to hew closer than in the past to a prepared script. The statement repeated Iran's claims of significant cooperation above and beyond its obligations and of victimization by the IAEA and the West. He also threatened consequences if the German resolution were passed and noted that Iran never responds well to pressure. Perhaps most unexpected was Iran's swipe at India, noting that a state could "stay outside the NPT" and still be "rewarded" (an apparent reference to the U.S.-India nuclear deal and NSG exception). The Indian Charge confirmed to Mission privately that he noted and took umbrage at this statement, a fact that Mission hopes to be able to leverage in the future. End Summary. -------------- ElBaradei Notes an Effective "Dead End" -------------- ¶4. (C) In his opening statement to the Board, Director General (DG) ElBaradei characterized the Iran investigation as at a "dead end," noting there had been no movement in well over a year on remaining issues of concern which needed to be clarified for the IAEA to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. He said that unless Iran engages fully with the IAEA, the Agency has effectively reached a "dead end." He also noted in a more muted manner than in previous remarks and DG reports that it would help if the IAEA was able to share more of the material with Iran that is at the center of these concerns. (Comment: Mission attributes this more muted tone in large part to the DG's dissatisfaction with the Iranian response to the TRR proposal that he has backed. End Comment.) ¶5. (SBU) ElBaradei explained that Iran's failure to notify the IAEA of the existence of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) earlier was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement and reduces the confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities in Iran that have not been declared to the IAEA. ElBaradei also discussed the proposal for providing fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, noting his disappointment that Iran has yet to agree, as the acceptance of this proposal would "greatly help to alleviate the concerns relating to Iran's nuclear program." -------------- Russia and China Cover Major Points -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Russia delivered a relatively strong and short statement on Iran, noting the need to comply with UNSC and Board resolutions, clarify all outstanding issues, and return to Code 3.1 modified. Russia also voiced support for the draft resolution submitted by Germany. China's statement did not address the resolution. (Note: In submitting the resolution, a German cover letter indicated that it had been agreed and discussed among the P5-plus-1. End note.) China noted that although the DG report indicated the non-diversion of nuclear material, unfortunately Iran had not suspended uranium enrichment and heavy water-related activities, not implemented the Additional Protocol (AP) and Code 3.1, and not cooperated with the IAEA on the remaining outstanding issues. Commenting on the FFEP, China welcomed good Iranian cooperation during the IAEA's visit, and expressed hope that this cooperation would continue. China also expressed appreciation for the DG's proposal for refueling the TRR and hope for all parties to reach an agreement. -------------- EU and Like-Minded, Strong and United on Iran -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Sweden, speaking on behalf of the EU, delivered a very strong statement describing Iran's nuclear file as a "grave situation" and noted "deep concern" about Tehran's continued refusal to cooperate with the IAEA on the possible military dimensions (PMD) issues. The EU noted Iran's construction of the FFEP near Qom was a violation of five UNSC resolutions and of Code 3.1 modified. The EU explained the FFEP construction time-line conflicts between what Iran told the IAEA and what the IAEA and third parties' information indicates. The EU also reminded the Board about an Iranian letter to the IAEA dated October 1, 2008 and circulated as INFCIRC/737, in which Iran had stated clearly "The Islamic Republic of Iran has repeatedly declared that there is no undeclared nuclear activity and material in Iran," which also conflicts with the now declared FFEP. ¶8. (SBU) The EU called on Iran to answer all the IAEA's questions about the FFEP and provide access to people, locations, and documentation, as well as substantive responses to the remaining outstanding issues related to the PMD. The EU also requested that Iran provide the IAEA with a response to its November 6 letter asking Tehran to confirm that it has not taken a decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which has not been declared to the IAEA. Noting its support for the TRR proposal, the EU urged Iran to respond positively as soon as possible. ¶9. (SBU) After introducing the resolution text, Germany explained that no progress had been made on the Iran issue and that Tehran has continued to defy the relevant UNSC and Board resolutions. Germany stated the secret construction of the FFEP near Qom decreased confidence about existence of other undeclared nuclear facilities. Noting Iran's blatant disregard for its Code 3.1 modified obligations, Germany underlined that the the FFEP is not a minor issue and increases the concerns about the true nature of Iran's nuclear program. ¶10. (SBU) Germany also highlighted that outstanding issues related to PMD were serious questions which deserved serious answers. Further explaining the reasoning behind the resolution, Germany noted it was intended to support the Secretariat's work and to convey the E3-plus-3's unity of purpose (quoting from the P5 1 March Board statement) and unwavering commitment to a resolution of this issue. Germany also commented it was "terrible" Iran had not responded to the TRR proposal, but hoped Iran would take the extended hand of the E3-plus-3. ¶11. (SBU) Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, and the Ukraine all delivered similarly strong statements that noted Iran's failure on Code 3.1 modified with regard to the disclosure of the FFEP near Qom, how the existence of the FFEP further reduced confidence that there are no other undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran, and it is essential for Tehran to promptly and substantively respond to the IAEA's questions regarding PMD projects and to meet all Board and UNSC obligations. Australia observed that the few positive steps Iran has made are welcome, but belated and that Tehran needs to reverse the course of confrontation to one of cooperation. Australia explained the TRR proposal created breathing space for a diplomatic resolution, and urged Iran to put its relationship with the international community on a more promising path. ¶12. (SBU) Canada delivered a solid statement, probably its strongest to date, noting the disclosure of the FFEP was not the first time Iran had failed to report construction and plans for an enrichment facility-Natanz. Canada said it was essential, and long overdue, for Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA, and justified its support for the resolution as a comprehensive way to illustrate the serious concerns of the international community. Japan stated the existence of Qom was "deeply regrettable," and urged Iran to realize the meaningful steps of the TRR efforts. New Zealand expressed deep concern with what the DG's report contained and said it was troubled with Iran's lack of cooperation on PMD issues and late notice of the FFEP. ¶13. (SBU) South Korea delivered a short statement noting that a number of outstanding issues remain and encouraged Iran to respond to its international obligations, including the suspension of enrichment and heavy water-related activities. The Ukraine remarked that some of the positive cooperation Iran had provided was obscured by everything else, especially the lack of implementation of the UNSC resolutions and the IAEA's inability to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. The Ukraine also noted that Iran needed to provide deeper cooperation with the IAEA, cooperation that goes beyond their normal obligations. Switzerland gave a stronger statement than usual and noted that the IAEA needs more comprehensive information from Iran in order to understand the purpose of its program and that Iran remains bound by Code 3.1 modified. The Swiss also took note that the DG had reported that there had been no progress on PMD for over one year. Switzerland observed that despite the hope that came out of the Geneva P5 plus 1 meeting with Iran, only one of the "agreements" undertaken had actually come to pass and called the TRR proposal "interesting," and describing it as a possibility for an opening that would require both sides to have political courage. -------------- Turkey Strives for Middle Ground -------------- ¶14. (C) Turkey's statement was again weak but somewhat balanced in what the Governor described privately was an attempt to prevent from putting too much pressure on Iran that might cause them to reduce cooperation. The statement noted "with satisfaction" Iran's cooperation on the Fordow facility but also said that Iran should address the outstanding issues "without delay." Turkey also marketed its efforts in bringing the TRR proposal to agreement and stated its appreciation for the DG's trust in Turkey to play a possible role in finding a solution. The statement made clear, as did the Governor in private, that Turkey perceived that it is still possible for the TRR deal to be accepted by all parties and that its own efforts will continue in an effort to reach a settlement. In addition, once the Iran issue is "resolved," the IAEA can dedicate more resources to other activities, a statement that seemed to match Soltanieh's own pleas for more balance in the Agency. -------------- Israel Speaks Up, Chastising Iran -------------- ¶15. (SBU) In a rare turn, Israel spoke on the Iran issue, condemning Tehran's secret activities and continued defiance of international obligations. Israel explained Iran only told the IAEA about the FFEP near Qom because it was afraid "the West" knew about the facility's existence and would tell the IAEA first. Noting that Qom was "born in sin," Israel stated that it should not be accepted and urged the Board to take action and not allow Iran to make a mockery of the IAEA. Israel further remarked Iran's deception, noncompliance, and brazen defiant attitude should not be rewarded and that "play time is over." -------------- NAM Supports Iran, Not Resolution -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Egypt, speaking on behalf of the NAM, read a statement which was largely unchanged from the draft received by the Department. Based on NAM Summit language it reaffirmed the inalienable rights of states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, that the IAEA as the sole competent authority for verification of safeguards obligations, and that verification and safeguards issues in Iran should be resolved within the IAEA and based on solely legal and technical grounds. With respect to the report, NAM pointed to all the positive elements in the report - the conclusion of non-diversion of nuclear material, the number of regular and unannounced inspections, and that the design inspection verification (DIV) confirmed that the FFEP near Qom conformed to the design information questionnaire submitted (DIQ) by Iran. Finally, the NAM called on all Member States which had provided information related to the "alleged studies" to provide all related documents to Iran. It is interesting to note that the NAM intervention did not reference Code 3.1 modified, which was included in the draft NAM text. (Note: In the NAM Plenary in which the statement was discussed, Chile raised objections (but did not block) the NAM draft which Chile noted did not reflect recent developments including the disclosure of the FFEP. Singapore sent a letter formally disassociating from the NAM position, arguing that the draft NAM statement did not take accurate account of the DG's reports. The UAE (see below) also spoke critically of Iran.) ¶17. (SBU) In its national capacity, Egypt called on Iran to implement Code 3.1 modified. However, it also noted the discussions on Iran should not take place in isolation and referred to the General Conference resolution on Israel, deploring the double standards in the region. Egypt expressed hope that the TRR negotiations would be successful. Cuba focused on the FFEP, pointing out in particular para 10 of the DG's report, which stated the DIV in Fordow conformed to Iran's DIQ, and hoped for further cooperation at Fordow; Cuba also reiterated the positive aspects of the report. Cuba deplored the leaks of the report, noting incomplete and imprecise information misinformed the international community, and called on the IAEA to better protect information from leaks. Cuba noted many complications were a result of pressure and sanctions, which were not the right path forward. As such, it called on Germany to retract the draft resolution. ¶18. (SBU) Malaysia underscored the rights to peaceful use of nuclear energy inherent in the NPT and that a state's decisions on its obligations needed to be respected. Iran had fulfilled its legal obligations under its safeguards agreement, reminded the Board that confidence-building measures (CBMs) should not be confused with legal obligations, and noted the IAEA must be a neutral player. Malaysia expressed hope that the TRR deal could reduce the mistrust among the relevant countries. It concluded by noting the resolution was counterproductive. Venezuela reiterated the right of all states to peaceful uses of nuclear technology and opposed any situation that would impose a dual standard. It also noted the positive aspects of the report--all declared activities under safeguards, no diversion of declared material--and stated that negotiations with Iran should take place without preconditions, especially "illegal" preconditions. ¶19. (SBU) Additionally, five NAM states spoke under Rule 50. Libya gave a rambling intervention that was all over the map, quoting a President Qadhafi statement that reiterated the right of all states to peaceful nuclear energy, but also noting "a red line and a green line" with respect to the fact that uranium enrichment can be used either for an atomic bomb or for peaceful uses. Indonesia "deeply" associated itself with the NAM statement and said the negotiations should continue and nothing should be done to provoke the situation. Syria also said there was no proof the Iranian nuclear program was not peaceful and pointed out the double standard of requiring an AP in Iran but nothing in Israel. Sri Lanka pointed to all the positive elements of the report and strongly believed the negotiations should take place on the basis of mutual trust, noting that several channels of negotiations were still open. -------------- NAM-Moderates Note Iran's Failures -------------- ¶20. (SBU) Mongolia delivered a strong statement on Iran, noting that although the IAEA was able to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material, no movement had been made on the serious outstanding issues in over a year. Mongolia also voiced support for the TRR deal as well as support for the German-sponsored resolution. Peru noted Iran's rejection of Code 3.1 modified was inconsistent with its safeguards agreement. It also regretted the state of negotiations on the TRR deal and expressed its hope that Iran would resolve all issues with its nuclear program with the IAEA. ¶21. (SBU) South Africa noted Iran's facilities were operating as declared, but expressed concern Tehran had not suspended its enrichment program. South Africa remarked that Iran had provided a DIQ for the FFEP to the IAEA, which the IAEA had confirmed, and encouraged Iran to continue to cooperation on the DIQ process. It called upon Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA and take steps to improve transparency by implementing the AP and Code 3.1 modified. With New Delhi's instructions in flux on Thursday, India delivered a short statement, aligning itself with the NAM, noting that all states must comply with their legal obligations and Iran must be transparent in its program. ¶22. (C) Speaking under rule 50, the UAE largely focused on peaceful uses of nuclear energy with both safety and security measures in mind and the appropriate path for acquiring such technology-a clear message on how the U.A.E. is going down this path the "right way." The U.A.E. also stated that the region must take a bigger role in the Iranian issue and welcomed the DG's proposals for resolving the outstanding issues. -------------- Latins Note the Importance of Additional Cooperation -------------- ¶23. (SBU) Among the non-NAM Latin American countries, Argentina's strong statement once again stood out as on a par with the like-minded, followed closely by that of Mexico. Argentina expressed serious concern over Iran's continued failure to abide by UNSC resolutions and stated it was necessary for Iran to provide all the requested information and access to issues related to PMD. Mexico, speaking under Rule 50, said Iran's failure on the later declaration of the FFEP was not in line with its safeguards agreement and further undermines the confidence in Iran. Mexico noted serious concern with Tehran's lack of implementation of Code 3.1 modified and requested cooperation with the IAEA resume. Mexico also reiterated the DG's request to all Member States for information sharing with Iran, but even this was cast in a neutral manner. ¶24. (SBU) By contrast, the typically tepid Brazilian intervention noted Iran's right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology and acknowledged Iran's cooperation so far has led t the resolution of many issues. Brazil asked Iran to continue to cooperate with the IAEA so that the nature of its program could be resolved. Brazil noted support for the TRR proposal and remarked that all people should refrain from any action that could interfere with dialogue. -------------- Iran Responds with Forced Calm -------------- ¶25. (C) Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh was deliberately and unusually measured and calm in delivering remarks, seeming strained and purposeful. Nevertheless, he delivered many of the very familiar points from previous Boards. He thanked the NAM for its support and chastised other states for their politicization of the IAEA and attempts to "change its mandate," presumably from its "real" purpose of facilitating the sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as Soltanieh has argued on other occasions. He praised Iran for its "voluntary cooperation" through temporary implementation of the Additional Protocol and implementation of Code 3.1 modified, which he called "voluntary" despite the DG's clear statement to the contrary in his report. Soltanieh repeated his admonition from the technical briefing that the IAEA should not be including so many details in its report or putting value judgments on cooperation, rather, the Secretariat should just be reporting the facts on the ground. Immediately preceding the Board meeting, Iran sent a letter to the IAEA putting on record its complaint that the IAEA is inappropriately citing technical details about Iran's program in its reports to the Board. (Note: A contact in the Secretariat saw the Iranian letter as a follow-on to the earlier Iranian tactic of limiting which inspectors the IAEA could send to Iran, i.e., now Iran is trying to "squeeze" the amount of information the IAEA reports to the Board. End note.) On the newly declared and inspected Fordow enrichment site, Soltanieh characterized Iran's cooperation as good and beyond its obligations, citing the inspectors' characterization of cooperation during their visit. Soltanieh also reprised lengthy comments on the TRR proposal giving Iran's perspective on the history of discussions on the topic and repeating Iran's need for "firm, objective guarantees" in order to move forward. Otherwise, he said, "other options will be considered," although he did not elaborate. ¶26. (C) Soltanieh also took a swipe at India, noting that if Iran were not in the NPT, it would benefit from "complete freedom from inspection and control, punitive measures (sic)" and, in fact, would be "rewarded" if it acquired and developed nuclear weapons, although the first part of this comment probably also referred to Israel. The Indian Charge told DCM that India took note of this comment and thought it was directed at them. (Comment: Mission sees a potential opportunity to further create a divide between India and Iran over this comment, which could be useful given India's prominent and respected NAM position. End Comment.) ¶27. (SBU) Soltanieh ended his intervention with comments on the German resolution, advising Germany not to take this action which would "jeopardize cooperation." He warned that this would discourage Iran from voluntary cooperation such as early declaration of facilities and granting full, unobstructed access. Giving one more history lesson, Soltanieh challenged the room to give him one example when Iran had taken a desired step in response to pressure and threats. Rather, Iran has cooperated voluntarily when approached in a friendly manner. -------------- U.S. Statement -------------- ¶28. (SBU) Begin text of U.S. statement: Mr. Chairman, At the outset, my delegation wishes to express its appreciation once again for the professionalism shown by the Director General and Secretariat in their efforts to verify Iran's compliance with its Safeguards Agreement and report on the implementation of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions on Iran. This latest report is a testament to the Secretariat's tireless efforts to resolve the outstanding questions and gain a full understanding of the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program. Unfortunately, Iran has not responded with the transparency and cooperation necessary for the Secretariat to complete this important task. Indeed, with one disturbing exception, each of the issues and concerns in front of this Board today are the same that have been with us for years: Iran continues to refuse to address the significant body of information presented to it by the IAEA regarding a possible military dimension to its nuclear program; Iran refuses to suspend its uranium enrichment and heavy water-related activities as required by multiple resolutions of the UN Security Council; Iran has failed to implement the Additional Protocol, which the Director General has stated is essential for ensuring the correctness and completeness of Iran's declaration to the IAEA; and, Iran has denied its continuing obligation under the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. The Director General has consistently stated that Iran does not have the authority to unilaterally modify this obligation. Instead of fulfilling obligations, Iran doles out what it deems voluntary access for the IAEA to the Arak reactor and design information for the Darkhovin reactor project, constantly claiming that Iran can at any point decide that such cooperation is unwarranted. Mr. Chairman, Prior to the DG's latest report, the issue of Iran's Code 3.1 compliance may have struck some as academic. However, with the revelation of the Fordow enrichment facility, we have seen that Iran is willing to escalate its defiance of its obligations to suspend its enrichment program under several Security Council resolutions and Board requirements, and to pursue the program in secret. It remains unclear whether Iran would have declared this facility to the IAEA if it had remained unknown to the world, despite its obligation to notify the Secretariat. We fully support the IAEA's clear warning in its latest report that the existence of the Fordow plant gives rise to concerns as to the possible existence of other such facilities, and we note that Iran has not given the IAEA an unambiguous answer as to whether it does or does not possess other such facilities. Iran has also not fully disclosed the purpose of this facility and how it fits into Iran's nuclear program, questions raised by the IAEA in the Director General's latest report. As we look at the Iranian nuclear file today, we see an enrichment program that is continuing to produce substantial quantities of low enriched uranium, a heavy water reactor that remains under construction, and a clear Iranian refusal to address the acute concerns expressed by many in this Board room for the past several years. These concerns are not academic; they reflect a worry that Iran's program could pose a real threat to international security. We also see the international community offering yet another opportunity to Iran to confirm the peaceful nature of its nuclear program and to make progress toward a peaceful resolution of international concerns. We remain firm supporters of the IAEA's constructive proposal in response to Iran's request for assistance in securing a supply of fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor. If Tehran could simply say "yes" to that proposal, we believe there would not only be a confidence-building effect, but also a direct and positive humanitarian impact on the Iranian people in light of the medical nature of the TRR's work. We regret that Iran has not responded positively to the IAEA's proposal, which would fulfill Iran's own request, and which we believe is fair, balanced, and an opportunity for further progress on this issue. Mr. Chairman, In light of these recent events, the United States strongly supports the resolution submitted by Germany. The resolution has been discussed among, and has the support of, all P5 1 partners. This would be the first IAEA resolution on Iran adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors since 2006. It is intended to reinforce our serious concern that Iran continues to defy relevant IAEA Board of Governors and UN Security Council resolutions. The revelation of the Fordow facility heightened our concern and reduced the international community's level of confidence as to the absence of other undeclared facilities and the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Given these developments and Iran's continued failure to fully cooperate with the Agency, we believe it is time for the Board to take action registering these concerns. While the resolution will speak for itself, we believe the main provisions are something all members of this Board should be prepared to support, including: Urging Iran to comply fully and without delay with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions, and to meet the requirements of the Board of Governors, including by suspending immediately construction at Fordow. Urging Iran to comply fully with its safeguards obligations to apply Code 3.1 modified and the Additional Protocol, as well as to confirm that there are no other undeclared facilities in Iran. Urging Iran to engage with the IAEA on the resolution of all outstanding issues concerning Iran's nuclear program and, to this end, to cooperate fully with the IAEA by providing the access and information that the Agency requests to resolve these issues. The United States remains committed to a diplomatic solution and wishes to resolve our collective concerns with Iran's nuclear program through constructive engagement. We hope Iran will demonstrate a similar willingness to address international concerns and make progress on the many issues laid out in the DG's latest report. In the absence of Iranian cooperation, we have no choice but to support the adoption of a resolution and urge our colleagues on the Board to do the same. Thank you Mr. Chairman. End Statement. DAVIES