IAEA/BOARD: NEW TURKISH AMBASSADOR ON IRAN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000526 SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, ISN/RA, EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019 TAGS: PREL IAEA KNNP TRGY TU IR SY SUBJECT: IAEA/BOARD: NEW TURKISH AMBASSADOR ON IRAN, SYRIA AND NSG REF: A) ANKARA 1583 B) ANKARA 1660 Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d 1.(C) Newly arrived Turkish Ambassador Tomur Bayer paid his first courtesy call in Vienna on Ambassador Davies November ¶10. Most of the discussion focused on Iran but also touched on Syria and NSG issues. Although relatively new to the nonpro portfolio, Bayer, who spent the bulk of his career on NATO issues, was well-briefed but hewed to GOT views on Iran and Turkey's willingness to play an intermediary role. He did not yet have a readout of Erdogan-Ahmadinejad discussions on the margins of an OIC meeting in Istanbul November 9 but said he had passed a message from DG ElBaradei on a potential Turkish role to salvage the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) refueling arrangement. Bayer was apologetic as to PM Erdogan's October 20 public comments in Tehran downplaying Iran's nuclear program as "gossip" in contrast to that of Israel (ref a). He characterized the comments as "difficult" and not what his Prime Minister meant to say, blaming a problem of interpretation. Bayer did not expect a retraction. Ambassador Davies noted that Iran could well be one of the first issues President Obama raises with Erdogan during his December visit. 2.(C) Ambassador Davies stressed the need to send Iran a unified signal, including with respect to its failure to accept the TRR offer so as to demonstrate peaceful intent. Bayer affirmed that this has been the consistent GOT message to Iran from the start -- build confidence and cooperate with the IAEA -- and it was unfortunate Tehran had not availed itself of this opportunity. PM Erdogan had urged Iran to do so during his visit to Tehran and Iran seemed to understand the message but was beset by internal political opposition on the TRR deal. Ambassador Davies noted this was no excuse and assessed that Iran had given an effectively negative answer. He did not see a deal happening prior to the November Board meeting, which would focus on Qom, and solicited Turkish support in the Board. Bayer characterized the Iran nuclear issue as a matter of Turkey's national interest. He noted Turkish concern over the Qom facility and Iran's missile program, in particular, and President Gul's view that the worst case scenario for Turkey was to have another nuclear neighbor. At the same time, Turkey also had to live with Iran as a neighbor, supported continued dialogue, and sought to be a facilitator. Bayer also noted useful discussions with ISN DAS Kang in Ankara in October on Iran. 3.(C) On Syria, Bayer agreed that Syria's failure to provide IAEA inspectors access was negative and suspicious. Although the Syria issue should remain on the Board's agenda, Bayer assessed that it was secondary to that of Iran, i.e. that it was less acute and should not detract focus from Iran. Ambassador Davies noted that it was not a zero sum game -- the Iran nuclear issue was front and center but we should not downplay IAEA concerns about Syria. Bayer agreed that pressure should be kept on Syria. However, he offered a second caveat against bundling Iran and Syria together lest we push Damascus back to Tehran's fold while Syria was moving away from Iran and slowly trying to integrate and engage with the international community. ¶4. (C) Comment: Based on this initial meeting with Bayer, we would not expect Turkey to take a more forceful stance in the Board of Governors on Iran and Syria, given the balancing role it seeks to play in the region. Asked about the Russian LEU fuel reserve proposal, with is also on the agenda of the November Board, Bayer said generally Turkey was open-minded and hoped for a consensus decision, but he was awaiting instructions from Ankara (ref b). Ambassador Davies cautioned that a few recalcitrant countries may force a vote. In discussing other Board issues, Bayer relayed a savvy understanding of NAM dynamics based on his experience in other international fora. He noted that five or six countries set the NAM agenda and he was particularly critical of Egypt's unhelpful role (beyond Vienna) as it seeks to assert itself as a regional leader and defender of developing countries. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Davies also sought to better understand Turkey's position on ongoing disagreements within the NSG, noting that Turkey may be misreading intentions with respect to conditions of transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies (ENR). Bayer regretted that near agreement on paragraph 6 (relating to the IAEA Additional Protocol) had been reopened due to last-minute French and Russian concerns. Para 7 restrictions on ENR technology were more problematic due to Turkey's sensitivity about labeling every country, Turkey included, as a potential proliferator. He noted that this aspect had been discussed by the Turkish Deputy Director General with DAS Kang and was an issue being debated by the Turkish interagency. In view of good nuclear cooperation with the U.S., including a 1-2-3 agreement, Bayer asked for U.S. help in finding a compromise formulation in the NSG. He did not expect any decisions to be made at NSG meetings in Vienna the week of November 16. DAVIES