IAEA/SYRIA: TOUGH DG BOARD REPORT POINTS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000521 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CLASSIFICATION) SIPDIS ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL, IO/T FOR DETEMPLE, NEA FOR ABELL E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2034 TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: TOUGH DG BOARD REPORT POINTS TO POSSIBLE SAFEGUARDS FAILURES, SETS UP POSSIBLE MARCH 2010 BOARD ACTION Classified By: AMBASSADOR GLYN DAVIES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (SBU) The Director General's Syria report (GOV/2009/75) notes that "essentially, no progress has been made since the last report to clarify any of the outstanding issues relevant to the implementation of safeguards." The most significant development is that Syria has provided new explanations for the uranium contamination found at Syria's Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR). This explanation includes the revelation that Syria imported "previously undeclared" uranyl nitrate. ¶2. (C) Comment: Mission's understanding of Syria's safeguards obligations is that imported nuclear material, even if only in the form of yellowcake, must be declared to the IAEA (unless "specifically for non-nuclear purposes," which would not seem to be the case if used in experiments at the MNSR). Note that this "previously undeclared" import is in addition to the other domestically-produced uranium compounds Syria used in its undeclared experiments. Confirmation of the existence of undeclared nuclear material certainly will be the focus of likeminded statements in the Board and may influence the views of others. In a brief conversation with the Ambassador today shortly after the release of the Syria report, IAEA Public Affairs staffer Greg Webb commented that he thought the Syria report was more substantive and significant than the concurrently-released Iran report. Webb argued that the Syrian report contains previously unknown developments, whereas revelations about Iran's previously covert facility at Qoms date back to September. ¶3. (C) Comment continued: Despite the tough tone of the report, there remain as well the usual throwaway references to Israel (for NAM consumption). We fully expect that NAM hardliners and some Arab states will continue to turn a blind eye to the facts of the case, but the report also may foreshadow a March 2010 Board report that explicitly confirms safeguards failures. The IAEA is scheduled to visit Syria on November 17 to sample the uranyl nitrate and domestically produced yellowcake used in reftel experiments. The tone of the report should sound a cautionary note in Damascus, as any increased pressure in the wake of this report is set against the prospect of a special inspection request if Syria continues to block the IAEA's investigation. End Comment. ¶4. (SBU) The DG's report recalls that the IAEA took additional samples at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) and found more anthropogenic uranium particles at the facility, but did not find the uranium in the standard reference materials or on the shielded transport container that Syria said were the possible sources of the uranium particles. After being confronted with the IAEA's findings on November 2, Syria provided yet additional explanations for the source of the uranium, this time pointing to domestically produced yellowcake and small quantities of "imported, but previously undeclared, commercial uranyl nitrate." The source of the imported uranyl nitrate is not identified, and neither was the content of a document Syria provided to explain the presence of the uranyl nitrate in Syria. ¶5. (SBU) The IAEA plans to visit the MNSR on November 17 to take samples of the yellowcake and the uranyl nitrate, and will visit the locations where the materials are stored and used. The Safeguards Department will not have results of its sampling in time to report at the technical briefing for member states planned for November 18. The sample analysis will likely be reported to the March Board. (Comment: ¶6. (C) Mission will plan to question the compliance implications of the non-declaration of the uranyl nitrate and of any material Syria produced in experiments that should have been reported. We may also want to raise the same question at the November 26-27 Board meeting. End comment.) ¶7. (SBU) With regard to the investigation into the destroyed facility at Al Kibar, the IAEA notes its repeated requests for substantive discussions and access to locations, material, and information. However, Syria has not yet responded to the Agency's requests. The report indicates that Syria has not yet provided the cooperation necessary to permit the Agency to determine the origin of the anthropogenic uranium particles found in samples at Al Kibar (Dair Alzour). In a thinly veiled reference to the prospect of a special inspection request, the report says that the Agency will continue its verification activities to confirm Syria's statements "within the authority available to it and subject to the cooperation provided by Syria." The report also reiterates the IAEA's flat rejection of Syria's claim that inspection of military sites is beyond its safeguards mandate and again requests Syria to work out modalities for managed access. DAVIES