MIXED EXPECTATIONS FOR SALEHI'S RETURN TO IAEA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000497 SIPDIS STATE FOR P, T, S/SANAC, NEA, ISN, IO, AND INR/B DUBAI FOR IRPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2023 TAGS: PREL AORC SA IR KNNP SUBJECT: MIXED EXPECTATIONS FOR SALEHI'S RETURN TO IAEA SCENE UNVIE VIEN 00000497 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head, Ali Akbar Salehi, previously served in Vienna as Iran's Permanent Representative to the IAEA, thus many diplomats in Vienna already know him well. Although at least one IAEA official is optimistic that Salehi will bring greater cooperation from Iran, others at the IAEA and in Vienna are less convinced and more pragmatic about Salehi's ability to deliver on the nuclear issue. In fact, Deputy Director General for Safeguards Olli Heinonen is very pessimistic about Salehi's entrance onto the scene and believes that other drivers will lead Iranian decisionmaking. South African Governor Minty described a mixed personal relationship with Salehi and warned that a Western focus on Salehi will weaken him in Tehran and torpedo any ability he has to influence Iranian officials to cooperate on the nuclear file. All described Salehi as an intelligent and skilled interlocutor and prefer dealing with him than some other Iranian officials. (Comment: Mission's experience onthe Tehran Research Reactor negotiations does not give us any confidence that Salehi will be able to deliver cooperation on long outstanding issues. End Comment.) End Summary. -------------- -------------- At Least One IAEA Official Optimistic About Salehi... -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head, Ali Akbar Salehi, previously served in Vienna as Iran's Permanent Representative to the IAEA from 1999-2003, thus many diplomats in Vienna already are well acquainted with him. On September 30, IAEA Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination Director Vilmos Cserveny and the Director General's Special Assistant for Science and Technology Graham Andrew shared their views on Salehi with visiting Iran Regional Presence Office Director Alan Eyre, IRPO Off, and Msnoffs. Cserveny started off the conversation by relaying his opinions on the Iranian nuclear file after the revelation of the enrichment facility at Qom, noting that this discovery does not produce necessary confidence in the nature of Iran's program and that Iran could have only this "backup facility," as Salehi described it to him. On the other hand, Cserveny continued rhetorically, Iran could have "four more." He also claimed that the IAEA would not abandon its investigation into pas t aspects of Iran's program, and that the IAEA needs to know the details of the past because these issues bear on Iran's present program. (Comment: Cserveny presumably was referring to issues such as Iran's work to adapt a missile re-entry vehicle to carry a nuclear warhead. End Comment.) ¶3. (C) Turning to Salehi, Cserveny called him a "good ambassador in a different time," but acknowledged that Salehi had been involved in the inception of the nuclear program in the post-Shah era and had been close to Supreme Leader Khamenei when Khamenei was Iran's president and relied on a number of advisers. According to Cserveny, Salehi had helped to convince the Islamic government to pursue the nuclear program. Cserveny was optimistic about Salehi's appointment, noting that he had been helpful in Vienna on the nuclear file. For example, Iran signed the Additional Protocol (AP) under Salehi's tenure in Vienna, an act for which Salehi was instrumental, according to Cserveny's account. However, he continued, many inside Iran were upset that the government had signed the AP, forcing Salehi to explain the reasoning behind the decision on television. ¶4. (C) On Salehi's short stint thus far as AEOI head, Cserveny highlighted Salehi's public and private statements about wanting a "fresh start" and to increase Iran's cooperation. Cserveny said he had been told that Salehi had personally "made happen" the recent agreements to improve safeguards at Natanz. Cserveny argued that Iran needs to abide by the AP and that Salehi might be the person necessary to "stand up and ask the government to implement" it. In contrast, Cserveny noted that he met with Majles Speaker Ali Larijani in February, who threw up his hands at the idea of implementing the AP because Iranian officials do not want to abide by it. Cserveny said that the conversation with Iran had already become easier and that Salehi is less rigid than Aqazadeh, making direct conversation possible. Cserveny also UNVIE VIEN 00000497 002.2 OF 004 had positive things to say about current Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh, calling him a popular figure in Vienna whom many respect: Cserveny acknowledged he was not sure what the relationship between Soltanieh and Salehi was like, other than the fact that they work closely together. (Comment: More often, Mission hears other delegations refer to Soltanieh as a clown and many are tired of his rants and repetitive diatribes. End Comment.) There are some rumors of a rivalry between the two officials, but Cserveny cannot confirm those stories, and Soltanieh is likely to implement decisions that will be forthcoming from Salehi. Cserveny also called it "clear" that Salehi works for the leadership and reports to the president. -------------- Others Not So Positive -------------- ¶5. (C) In the same meeting with Cserveny, the DG's Special Assistant Graham Andrew described Salehi as sophisticated and prescient and complimented his substantive expertise, but was less optimistic about dealing with him than Cserveny, noting that his own perspective was colored by a presentation that Aqazadeh made on Kalaye Electric during Salehi's tenure in Vienna that was "a set of direct lies." Andrew also noted that Salehi's demeanor is quite different from the joking nature of Soltanieh. In contrast, Salehi is cautious and reserved. He has been helpful so far on technical issues, but Andrew was skeptical, saying that one could not be sure the cooperation was not "for a different end." Nevertheless, Andrew thought that an agreement on the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) could "change the mood music" but the ball on this was in Tehran's court and it was not clear whether the Iranians would take advantage of the offer or "miss the boat." ¶6. (C) Both Andrew and Cserveny expressed general frustration over dealing with the Iranians, pointing out the fact that it is acceptable for Iranians to lie if in their interests, the bargaining culture, and, as Cserveny noted, their "arrogant" approach to the issues such as the work plan where the Iranians think that they are clever in disputing the agreement when all the parties know that Iran's interpretation "is not what the IAEA intended." Furthermore, Cserveny described the revolutionary generation as guarded. They want to be transparent, in his opinion, but not too transparent. At the same time, it is difficult to encourage the hardliners to cooperate because they are empowered by isolation. ¶7. (C) On October 8, IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards Olli Heinonen added his views on Salehi, which included even more pessimism than Andrew. He acknowledged the more positive views of Cserveny and Andrew and said they were influenced by Salehi's "ability" to facilitate an IAEA visit to Natanz in 2003 after it was publicly outed as a nuclear facility. However, Heinonen attributes this "cooperation" more to pressure the Iranian government felt over U.S. military action in neighboring Iraq than to Salehi's good nature and political faculties. Heinonen questions whether Salehi was really trying to "solve the problems" or delay. Heinonen said he had been working with Khatami for half a year to get access to the facility and did not think that Salehi was notably helpful. Nevertheless, when the IAEA found contamination at Kalaye Electric, Salehi was astute enough to realize that these were questions that needed to be addressed; Salehi clearly tried to get answers for the IAEA without delay. Hei nonen's perception is that Salehi was pulled from Vienna at the end of 2003 because Nuclear Negotiator Hasan Ruhani was given the nuclear file, and he was taking a new approach. At that point, for the first time, Heinonen was having meetings with Iran that did not include any AEOI officials. After Salehi left Vienna, he essentially dropped off the map, but Heinonen heard from Iranian colleagues that Salehi had tried to get the position of AEOI head in 2005 when Ahmadinejad came into power because Salehi believed Aqazadeh had mismanaged the nuclear file. Currently, Heinonen summed up, he cannot be sure about Salehi's level of influence in the regime and with the president, and said while it is clear that Salehi is "good at speaking," it's not clear whether he can "deliver." ¶8. (S) Heinonen also related Salehi's history with the Iranian nuclear program as it is detailed in his notes. Although it has not been confirmed by Iran, there is information that Salehi was one of the Iranians who attended UNVIE VIEN 00000497 003.2 OF 004 a radioisotope exhibition in Pakistan in 1986. Iran has said that this group was in Pakistan, but for another purpose. (Note: Heinonen said that this information is in the now famous IAEA "annex" on Iran. End Note.) -------------- And Minty in the Middle -------------- ¶9. (C) South African Governor to the IAEA Board of Governors Abdul Minty added his thoughts on Salehi on October 15, expressing a generally favorable but measured opinion. He began his comments by stating that any Iranian official's influence is based on what slot he fills in the complex decisionmaking system and describing the difficulty that officials have in gaining influence since different "cliques" vie for influence and it is easy to fall out of a clique. This kind of system makes it difficult for Iran to take part in diplomacy as we know it, especially since the Foreign Ministry has very little influence. We need to understand this system to understand why Salehi himself is irrelevant as a person, he is a product of the Iranian system. ¶10. (C) Minty described Salehi as very unreasonable in their first two meetings long ago in Vienna, causing Minty to wonder if he or Pretoria had done something wrong. Then, Salehi leaned too far in the other direction and was exuberantly collegial, leading them to work well together for the remainder of Salehi's tenure in Vienna. He described Salehi as having the capability to look at issues logically while many other Iranian interlocutors "override logic." He also is able to look above the issues at the broader landscape. Although he had heard many colleagues say that they thought the appointment of Salehi was designed to show a positive signal to the West, Minty was not convinced. He did not speculate as to the true reason Salehi was appointed but argued that "lots could be going on." Minty also warned that it will be difficult for the West to play on Salehi's positive qualities because he is being watched. He predicted that it will be nearly impossible to be able to talk directly and honestly to Salehi because he will never be alone. Furthermore, focusing on Salehi could make him more vulnerable in Tehran, so we need to be careful to not personalize our approach. We need to talk about the Iranian government and what they need to do, not about what Salehi himself can accomplish. The language we use, Minty explained, will be very important in how Tehran responds and the amount of influence Salehi will be able to build or preserve. In dealing generally with Iran, Minty believed that many interlocutors do not understand how offensive it is to the Iranians to pressure them or "be tough" publicly. In Iranian culture, such tough messages should only be relayed privately. -------------- He Needs to Prove It -------------- ¶11. (C) Comment: Although there is much talk in Vienna about the signal that Salehi's appointment sends and whether this means that Iran is more serious about cooperating, reviews of Salehi's ability - and even willingness - to resolve the outstanding issues in Iran's nuclear program are much more mixed. Likeminded states are generally pragmatic about this appointment, noting that it means nothing for the progress of the Iran file and the obligations Iran is under to clarify and suspend proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear program. We should not buy it if other states plead for more patience on the Iranian nuclear issue in order to allow Salehi to help resolve these issues. Mission will remind states that Iran's cooperation is long overdue and, though we would appreciate any efforts by Salehi to resolve outstanding issues, there should be no delay in doing so. ¶12. (S) Similarly, Mission's experience on the TRR negotiations - in which Director General ElBaradei reached out directly to Salehi because he is optimistic that Salehi could be a positive influence - does not give us great confidence in Salehi. Either Salehi directly lied to the DG about his intentions or he does not have the necessary influence to deliver on his promises of a cooperative and positive approach. Given Salehi's warning to the DG that he was receiving criticism in Tehran for being "soft," it is possible that he was directed not to come to Vienna to participate in the TRR negotiations because of worries about his reliability (although there are other possible reasons to UNVIE VIEN 00000497 004.2 OF 004 have held Salehi in Tehran). If so, ElBaradei's focus on him throughout the negotiations probably further weakened him in Tehran and we should not be confident that he will be willing or able to deliver increased Iranian cooperation on nuclear issues. Meanwhile, ElBaradei's decision to cut out Soltanieh in working directly with Salehi likely portends further complications in that Tehran-Embassy relationship. End Comment. DAVIES