IAEA/IRAN: SOUTH AFRICA,S MINTY SUGGESTS LEANING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 UNVIE VIENNA 000493

SIPDIS

S/SANAC FOR EINHORN, NSC FOR RYU, TALWAR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2023
TAGS: PREL IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: SOUTH AFRICA,S MINTY SUGGESTS LEANING
ON NAM TO HEM IN IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e)


1. (S) On October 15, South African IAEA Board Governor
Abdul Minty shared his opinions on Iranian nuclear strategy
with MsnOff. On the proposal to fuel the Tehran Research
Reactor (TRR),Minty commented that it will be good if Iran's
LEU "goes away," so he is supportive of the TRR deal as he
understands it. He recommended that the U.S. capitalize on
the deal by trying to get NAM members to "endorse" it,
although he did not believe that full NAM endorsement would
be possible given the "difficult" NAM troika of Cuba, Iran,
and Egypt. Minty also suggested using key NAM states to
further entrench what could then be called a precedent of
limiting Iranian enrichment to five percent. Those states
could engage Iran on the point privately, telling Iran that
they are pleased that Iran has chosen to cap its enrichment
at that level and calling it a good, positive signal. Iran
might find it more difficult to backtrack if a norm has been
created by its actions and is then expected among a usually
supportive group of states.


2. (S) In response to MsnOff's question about whether Minty
was surprised that President Ahmadinejad had said publicly in
mid-October that Iran would ship its LEU to Russia for
further enrichment, Minty said that he was not and recalled
Iran's interest in the 2004 timeframe in shipping its UF6 to
South Africa for storage, to increase confidence that its
nuclear activities were peaceful in nature. Shipping out its
LEU was not inconsistent with this earlier Iranian strategy,
Minty said. Despite Iran's obvious interest in using this as
a confidence-building measure, Minty noted that this act
alone told us nothing about the nature of Iran's nuclear
program. If Iran has a covert program, it would be happy to
ship out its declared LEU to improve confidence. If it does
not have a covert program, then it is also an important
confidence-building measure with the added benefit of taking
away the option from those who want nuclear weapons. Minty
thought that the idea of Iran using its own LEU in the TRR
was quite positive.


3. (S) On the Qom enrichment facility, Minty said that Iran
had made a large mistake by not disclosing it early.
Whatever Iran's motivations for building this facility, he
opined, it will be important to go and inspect the facility,
but Minty predicted that Iran would set up a number of
hurdles to comprehensive inspections and access, not the
least of which was the fact that the facility is on a
military base. He agreed that the last DG's report on Syria,
which noted that there is no barrier to inspecting military
facilities, would be helpful in pressing Iran for access.
Minty said that it was clear to him that Iran was trying to
"beat the U.S. to the punch" in declaring the facility when
it did. He also recommended that the U.S. not "make a big
deal" about the clear violation of Code 3.1 modified, but
then tempered to say that it would be appropriate--and
perhaps even necessary--to call attention to Code 3.1 in the
Board room, although it would not make a useful public
argument.


4. (S) Minty further pressed his recommendations about
utilizing NAM states for creating additional pressure on Iran
and argued that the U.S. should be asking other countries--he
cited the Philippines, India, and Chile--to make stronger
Iran statements in the Board room, again noting that South
Africa cannot stand alone among the NAM in doing so. He
noted that when he made such a plea with other Board members,
it was successful in strengthening their statements. If the
U.S. does lean on these countries, he asked that the USG let
him know. Without letting on that he was informed by the
U.S. of the push, he would follow up by making similar
requests and asking these states to be more forceful in NAM
meetings. He would directly request that they send
ambassadors rather than lower-level officials to the meetings
so that stronger and "more rational" statements could be made
and the dynamic could be changed.


5. (S) In general, Minty remarked, the U.S. should be giving
a variety of states roles to help follow up on the positive
meetings on October 1 between the P5-plus-1 and Iran.
Especially important are Turkey, Brazil, and India, all of
whom could impress key points on Iran. He noted that South
Africa would continue to try to be helpful, but repeated his
familiar refrain that South Africa cannot continue to be the
only NAM member that the U.S. relies upon for such messages
with Iran. Minty also suggested that other Muslim countries
could help to hem in Iran on issues of nuclear weapons by
pressing Iran on its declaration of a fatwa against nuclear
weapons. If other countries told Tehran that they are
interested in the fatwa and developing it as a Muslim

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principle and that this could contribute to world peace, it
might "change the norm" and be more difficult for Iran later
to build nuclear weapons.


6. (S) Minty also expressed thanks for U.S. statements on
the NPT in New York (NFI),calling them helpful even though
the EU took a hard line, and suggested that there be interim
meetings (possibly in Europe) that would bring S/SANAC or
other appropriate officials to follow up on the U.S. position
and create positive movement moving into the 2010 NPT Review
Conference.
DAVIES