NUCLEAR FUEL BANK ASSURANCES: THORNY ISSUE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000047 SIPDIS FOR S, D, P, T, IO, AND ISN FROM AMBASSADOR SCHULTE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2014 TAGS: PREL ENRG TRGY KNNP SUBJECT: NUCLEAR FUEL BANK ASSURANCES: THORNY ISSUE IN IAEA'S NORTH-SOUTH THICKET REF: A. 08 UNVIE 605 ¶B. UNVIE 0045 (NOTAL) Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The President and Secretary have publicly endorsed the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank under the auspices of the IAEA, and advancing that goal is one of UNVIE's top priorities. A fuel bank would give the Agency the means in "last resort" circumstances to effect the delivery of nuclear fuel to a country facing a politically-motivated cut-off. U.S. advocacy is grounded in nonproliferation; states like Iran intending to obscure a military nuclear option would be stripped of the pretext that their civil power requirements justified independent national enrichment, but for this reason, the concept remains controversial among Member States. ¶2. (C) To advance toward implementation, one or more concrete proposals for an IAEA role in assuring reliable access to nuclear fuel (RANF) must come to the Board of Governors for approval. IAEA DG ElBaradei's staff aims for a first Board action, ideally in March but more realistically in June, to have the Board accept donated funds and authorize the Secretariat to elaborate on the broad outlines of a fuel bank; approving the details would require a second Board decision. Beyond the legal and financial complexities, the tough political issue is the eligibility of states to receive fuel; ElBaradei's principle of equal treatment under the IAEA Statute collides with Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines and the export controls of countries that can conceivably supply the LEU, including our own. ¶3. (C) Several leading states in the G-77 and NAM complain that fuel assurances will carry the obligation that states renounce national acquisition of enrichment capability, and thereby reinforce what they see as the "discriminatory" economic circumstances of today's nuclear landscape under the NPT and NSG guidelines. In a political atmosphere he views as "poisoned," ElBaradei has renounced his own leadership role and is leaving to proponents of fuel assurances the task of overcoming this distrust. Privately, ElBaradei tells us establishing IAEA nuclear fuel assurances is a priority for his remaining ten months in office, but that a setback would be likely if he sought Board approval too early and failed. Ultimately, ElBaradei must engage, as he is the most influential advocate to many of the leading skeptics. This should be an early and repeated message from the Secretaries of State and Energy and in senior U.S. officials' contacts with ElBaradei. Parallel to activating the DG on this issue, we are reaching out to a cross-section of states to broaden the dialogue and relate fuel assurances concepts to the increasingly sophisticated and pragmatic consideration states are giving to the nuclear power option. End Summary. The Nonproliferation View -------------- ¶4. (C) Part of the Vienna context of the nuclear fuel assurances issue remains the February 11, 2004, NDU speech by former President Bush. That and subsequent statements made explicit that the USG advocated nuclear reactor fuel supply assurance only for states that forego enrichment and reprocessing. Our policy aim was to address what IAEA DG ElBaradei also had referred to as the "loophole" in the NPT that enabled countries, Iran being the case in point, under the guise of a civil nuclear energy program to acquire facilities capable of producing high enriched uranium or plutonium. Countries truly interested in developing nuclear power would have the assurance of fuel for their power plants from foreign suppliers, while those intending to keep open a military nuclear option would be stripped of the pretext that their civil power requirements justified independent national enrichment. ¶5. (C) For five years, the USG and partners have advocated a variety of voluntary mechanisms the IAEA could implement for reliable access to nuclear fuel (RANF) as a "viable alternative" to the spread of sensitive fuel cycle technologies. Even after the Bush Administration climbed down from the initial enrichment conditionality, the debate here remained clouded by suspicion over U.S. motives. We point to Jordan and the U.A.E. as newcomers that have committed publicly to the development of nuclear power relying on the market, making national decisions not to acquire enrichment capability. South Korea and Sweden are among the countries producing a significant share of their electricity from nuclear, but without domestic enrichment. These countries demonstrate that foregoing costly enrichment can be the right economic decision for a peaceful nuclear power program, in addition to being good nonproliferation policy. Nevertheless, Iran and some compatriots in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Group of 77 (G-77) groups in the IAEA keep alive the suspicion that the true aim of the U.S. and others putting forward concepts of national or international fuel assurance is to oblige beneficiary countries to forfeit the (NPT-documented) "inalienable right of all countries to research, development, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." For some states, the negative image of closing a door on their own potential development, to the advantage of the nuclear "haves," is a strong one. Speaking privately on his country's objection to the fuel bank, the Ambassador to the IAEA from Brazil, itself a "have," told DCM "we don't want a third discriminatory nonproliferation regime" added to the NPT regime itself and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Egypt's DCM here also recently cast the issue as a skeptical question, as to why "only now" when developing countries plan to be part of the nuclear power renaissance does it become a priority to internationalize fuel supply. At lunch with Ambassador Schulte January 29, South Africa's Ambassador suggested that the fuel assurances issue may only see progress in linkage with other issues, including disarmament. The Responsible Nuclear Development View -------------- ¶6. (C) In a late-January 2009 seminar at the IAEA (septel), representatives of major commercial suppliers of natural uranium, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication made clear there is ample production capacity to provide each stage in the fuel cycle that leads to loading fuel in a specific power plant. Planned growth in those industry capacities would accommodate even the most ambitious projected growth in the number of civil power reactors around the world through 2030 or beyond. After hearing the day's presentations, a Canadian counterpart of ours -- personally a hardliner on proliferation concerns with respect to Iran and Syria -- asked rhetorically about IAEA fuel assurances, "Why are we doing this?" (Comment: Canada is also a budget hardliner and weighs the value added of an IAEA fuel assurance mechanism, spending donated funds, against the staff and legal costs of implementation, thus far covered by the regular budget funded by all. End Comment.) Brazil's ambassador drew a similar conclusion about the satisfactory scale and diversity of supply in the fuel market in a January 27 lunch with Latin American Board members and Ambassador Schulte; he said it was "unclear what problem we are trying to solve and whether it is worth the effort." ¶7. (C) From a consumer standpoint, the contingency that an IAEA fuel assurance mechanism should remedy is that of a state being cut-off for political reasons from commercial procurement of any one or more stages in the production of fuel for its specific reactor(s). Leaving aside a cut-off triggered by international concern about the safe and secure operation of a reactor per se, the issue as seen by some enrichment "have-nots" is whether they can trust that a politically neutral mechanism will keep their reactors going in the event they run afoul of the country or countries controlling their specific fuel technology. If they could believe it would, consumer states ought to support having the IAEA play a neutral role in underpinning energy reliability in countries that go nuclear responsibly. But as noted above, the mantra in the G-77 and NAM encourages disbelief. (Comment: The U.S. should also be clear about our preparedness for LEU fuel to be delivered to keep the lights on in a state under sanctions unrelated to nuclear matters, say for genocide. End Comment.) Moreover, clear differences among leading countries in the G-77 and NAM regarding which states may be eligible to receive LEU make the issue divisive within their camp. The Issue for the Board -------------- ¶8. (C) Initiated with the September 2006 offer by the NGO Nuclear Threat Initiative, the IAEA is close to fulfilling a funding challenge to establish an international nuclear fuel bank. Warren Buffet's original USD 50 million, available through NTI but contingent upon Board action to implement a fuel bank by September 2009, spurred donations by DoE (aprox USD 49.5 million after rescission),Norway, the U.A.E., and the EU totaling close to the USD 150 million target. NTI and the IAEA tell us they have asked Kuwait to match the U.A.E.'s USD 10 million pledge and thereby conclude the funding challenge. In parallel, after two years of negotiations the Agency is close to concluding agreements with Russia that would afford the Agency the ability to acquire and export LEU sourced from the International Uranium Enrichment Center at Angarsk under explicit circumstances, for use to fuel a specific reactor in each case. Most states on the Board of Governors, which must yet approve these Agency activities, profess to lack information about these two proposed mechanisms. The landscape is made foggier by recollections of and passing references to the numerous other proposals, floated 2-4 years ago in varying levels of detail and market-based realism. These are collected by the IAEA Secretariat as attachments to its June 13, 2007, report (IAEA document GOV/INF/2007/11), which remains indicative of the principles and structure the Secretariat foresees for a fuel bank. ¶9. (C) In the September 2008 Board of Governors meeting, Pakistan as G-77 spokesman and CUBA on behalf of the NAM made statements under sevQal agenda items to declare the Board should make no decisions about a fuel bank or related mechanisms without a thorough analysis of all political, legal, financial, and other aspects -- code for "never." Privately, Pakistani Ambassador Shahbaz said the fuel bank would gain approval "over my dead body." The skeptics also complained to IAEA DG ElBaradei that a lunchtime public briefing on the various fuel assurance proposals, planned during the ensuing week's General Conference, was an unauthorized activity. Unnerved, ElBaradei withdraw agency co-sponsorship and the event went on under U.S. and Russian invitation. In a political atmosphere he views as "poisoned," ElBaradei is leaving to Member State proponents of fuel assurances the task of overcoming others' distrust. In public, ElBaradei regularly sets out a visionary goal of multilateralizing the fuel cycle to support power generation as a development imperative. Privately, he tells the U.S. and other Ambassadors that establishing IAEA nuclear fuel assurances is a priority for his remaining tenure (through November 30, 2009),but that a setback would be likely if he sought Board approval too early and failed. We judge, and have told him and his staff, that he (and not the USG) can be the most effective advocate to many of the leading skeptics among the G-77. As the previous Administration came to a close, the U.S. was seen in Vienna as the most public advocate. But as former Secretary Shultz pointed out in a recent CSIS panel, an initiative carried forward by a broad coalition and grounded in the national interests of many has greater chances than one seen as a U.S. project to which we are signing up others. In order to support the fuel bank concept more effectively, we are working now with a cross-section of states to broaden the dialogue and relate fuel assurances concepts to the increasingly sophisticated and pragmatic consideration states are giving to the nuclear power option. ¶10. (C) Both the Russian and Secretariat proposals for involving the IAEA as supplier of last resort in nuclear fuel procurement and transfer must come to the Board of Governors for approval. The Board must also formally accept the USD 150 million donated thus far and authorize its expenditure on a fuel bank. ElBaradei's staff aims for a first Board action, ideally in March but more realistically in June, to have the funds accepted and to receive authority to elaborate on the broad outlines of a fuel bank. The issue is not on the provisional agenda for the March 2-6 Board meeting, and without Russian preparedness to circulate at least a paper for information on its arrangement, ElBaradei will hold back as well from formally notifying the Board of the donations or Secretariat concept. As we reported last fall (ref A),the IAEA's concept would entail a series of contractual arrangements under which the Agency relies on market suppliers to hold a reserve of LEU and when needed trigger transport, fuel fabrication, and other services enabling the delivery of reactor-specific fuel elements. Beyond the legal and financial complexities, the tough political issue is the eligibility of states to receive fuel; ElBaradei's principle of equal treatment under the IAEA Statute collides with NSG guidelines and the export controls of countries including the U.S. that can conceivably supply the LEU. This issue is divisive even among the opponents, as non-NPT signatory Pakistan stands to be excluded, while Egypt and other Arab states may oppose "universality" that includes non-NPT states, as it would open any mechanism to Israel as well. The DG Must Stand Up as We Broaden the Dialogue -------------- -- ¶11. (C) Comment and Recommendations: As reported ref B, ElBaradei and his staff wrapped themselves readily in the mantle of Obama Administration support for a fuel bank, posting quotes from the Secretary's confirmation hearing on the Agency's public website. One week after the Inauguration, the web item on U.S. support for the Agency was removed, reportedly because the external relations and policy office (EXPO) was concerned the G-77 would criticize it as an endorsement of the fuel bank and an inappropriate effort by the Secretariat to influence a Board decision. The U.S. must overcome this excessive caution on ElBaradei's part and activate him to advocacy. An inquiry about the status of the fuel bank initiative and Russian proposal and encouragement of his personal action should be among the talking points in early Cabinet-level or other senior USG contacts with the DG. In particular, he must bring the case to Pakistan, South Africa, and those others that are inflating it as an emblematic North-South dispute. ¶12. (C) Comment Contd.: We must also work bilaterally on the hardest opponents and recruit close allies to do likewise. South Africa, Egypt, and Brazil are among the most influential countries leading the opposition. Their protection of national "rights" is political and emotional but also, in varying degrees, tied to retaining national industry options that may or may not be economically feasible. Consistent with the Secretariat's advice to us to have other champions come forward, UNVIE is reaching out to non-enrichment nuclear power countries and likely newcomers to spur a broad dialogue about how international fuel assurances would support national energy planning by closing a thin, conceivable gap in supply. We should be able to leverage the fuel bank as part of a broader Obama Administration renewal of the NPT framework. This theme should figure in initial senior Administration contacts with counterparts in India, China, and potential nuclear power newcomers including U.A.E., Vietnam, Jordan, Turkey, Morocco, Thailand, and others. SCHULTE