HELPING UNODC TO HELP AFGHANISTAN

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000046 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SNAR KCRM PREL PINS PTER AF SUBJECT: HELPING UNODC TO HELP AFGHANISTAN REF: A) KABUL 00179, B) UNVIE 0033 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Among issues handled by the UN Organization for Drugs and Crime (UNODC),none looms larger in the U.S. national interest than the Afghan narcotics trade and its impact undermining stability and contributing to terrorist activity in the region. UNODC's Afghanistan strategy compliments and supports the U.S. counternarcotics strategy. US's leadership in establishing the Paris Pact initiative in 2003 has brought together 56 countries in regular dialogue to produce recommendations to strengthen the fight against Afghan opium and has helped raise the profile of the Afghan counter-drug issue. The Paris Pact meetings have also provided a venue for the Mission to promote USG interests, such as the Good Performers' Initiative (GPI). Mission's encouragement of UNODC's longstanding advocacy for greater ISAF engagement on counternarcotics in Afghanistan contributed to UNODC Executive Director Antonio Costa's presentations to NATO which in turn led to the October 2008 decision of the NATO Defense Ministers to permit ISAF, in conjunction with Afghan forces, to strike drug facilities and facilitators supporting the insurgency. ¶2. (SBU) On a program level, we should work with UNODC and the government of Afghanistan to encourage the GOA to take a grassroots approach to incentives such as the Good Performers' Initiative (GPI); encourage UNODC's expansion of its provincial and local programs in Afghanistan, including building on the relevant commitments of our allies; promote UNODC's regional approach to combating counternarcotics, including possible assistance to its activities in East Africa; help UNODC build upon its successes in interdicting precursor chemicals; strengthen its efforts to help Afghanistan to fight corruption in the country and encourage it to establish programs to help countries to implement crime conventions that could serve to disrupt the vast underground economy fueled by drug money. UNODC depends on voluntary contributions to fund 85-90% of its activities. USG contributions have been made on a year-to-year basis. A longer time frame for such contributions could give UNODC critical stability. END SUMMARY. -------------- Working the Provinces -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Per Ref A, UNODC plans to broaden local operations in the south and southwest, specifically Herat and Nimroz provinces. Canada, which has become the largest donor to UNODC's Afghan programs, intends to focus on Kandahar with its next tranche of donations of Cdn$25 million for two years starting 4/1/2009. (Note: Canada gave Cdn$27 million to UNODC for its Afghanistan programs over the two years 2007-2009. End Note.) We should support UNODC's efforts in those three provinces. UNODC's local operations could improve border control between Heart, Nimroz and Iran. Nimroz and Kandahar are among the five southern provinces which account for 90% of Afghanistan poppy production. We could build on Canada's efforts to have UNODC expand its activities in Kandahar province which shares a long border with Pakistan. -------------- Continuing Regional Efforts -------------- ¶4. (SBU) UNODC's regional strategy reflects recognition that there are many countries that lie between Afghanistan and the market countries in western Europe. The UNODC first focused on improving control of the long border between Afghanistan and the Central Asian states, such as mobile interdiction teams and border liaison offices. In 2006 it started the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC) to strengthen the analytical capability of the border control agencies. With ratification of the CARICC MOU from four of the member states, CARICC will formally enter into force in 2009. In 2007, UNODC also launched the Triangle Initiative among Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. USG support for such regional initiatives will help to stem the export of Afghan opium. UNODC has also made forays into Eastern Europe and East Africa, seeking ways to disrupt these trafficking routes. Given the excellent law enforcement and counternarcotics infrastructure and abundant resources in Europe (e.g., EC, EUROPOL),the U.S. may want to direct resources to East Africa, where the Europeans have displayed less enthusiasm. -------------- REWARD SUCCESS IN PRECURSOR INTERDICTION -------------- ¶5. (U) UNODC, with the cooperation of a number of countries, including the United States, helped Afghanistan and the surrounding countries to launch Operation TARCET in late 2007-early 2008. TARCET aims to disrupt the flow of precursor chemicals (acetic anhydride and others) into Afghanistan, which is needed to convert opium into heroin. The program trains law enforcement officers in detection techniques and methodology and promotes information/intelligence sharing among the countries. The results have been impressive -- with seizures in 2008 of 19 tonnes of acetic anhydride, and over 20 tonnes of other chemicals in Iran, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. ¶6. (SBU) According to UNODC, recent intel operations suggest that most chemical precursors enter Afghanistan from the Republic of Korea and EU countries, especially the Czech Republic and Hungary. The government of Afghanistan in December notified the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) that there were no legitimate requirements for acetic anhydride in Afghanistan. The announcement renders all shipments of the chemical contraband, which should improve interdiction. ¶7. (SBU) The next phase of Operation TARCET would focus on intelligence-driven operations to facilitate "backtracking" of chemicals across borders, building forensics capacity, and fostering greater cooperation among key players like India, China, the UAE (a major transit country),and the ROK. Recently the USG contributed more than $370,000 to UNODC for such purpose (Ref Paris Pact cable). USG should reward UNODC's success in chemicals interdiction by further financial contributions to TARCET, and support UNODC programs to build forensics capacity in Afghanistan to analyze drug seizures. -------------- Drugs, Money, and Crime -------------- ¶8. (SBU) In a recent meeting with Ambassador (Ref B),UNODC Executive Director Antonio Costa highlighted the "unexplained economy" worth billions that results from the link between drug trafficking and organized crime. In fact, in a recent press interview, Costa claimed that drug money had entered the legitimate capital market to provide liquidity in times of financial crises. In his view, there is lagging implementation of the existing crime treaties. Paris Pact members at a recent meeting agreed to a new action plan to address financial flows related to Afghan drugs. U.S. support for programs to strengthen legal capacity of nations to implement the crime treaties (e.g., the UN Convention against Corruption, and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime) and to the Paris Pact action plan would contribute to progress in this regard. -------------- Fighting Corruption -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Afghanistan became a party to the UN Convention on Corruption (UNCAC) in December. This opens the door for us to work with UNODC to develop an overall anticorruption strategy. UNODC has a $3.2 million program to provide practical assistance to build Afghanistan's capacity to fight corruption which is not fully funded. Main beneficiaries include the newly formed High Office for Oversight and the Supreme Court. UNODC is also conducting an analysis to identify the large gap between UNCAC requirements and national legislation. The emphasis is on the reform of the judiciary and prosecution services and on legal and administrative reforms. USG financial support for this program may now be appropriate. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (SBU) UNODC receives 85% to 90% of its operating budget from voluntary contributions. Most of its Afghan activities are subject to voluntary funding. The USG has made contributions on year-to-year basis because of own budgeting process. Any contributions on a longer time frame would provide UNODC with some financial stability critical for its long-term planning in Afghanistan. End Comment. SCHULTE