IAEA/IRAN: INITIAL JUSCANZ REACTION TO QOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000447 SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, T, ISN/RA, IO/GS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2019 TAGS: PREL AORC KNNP IAEA IR SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: INITIAL JUSCANZ REACTION TO QOM DISCLOSURE REF: STATE 100153 Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) Ambassador Davies briefed JUSCANZ (Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) counterparts, joined by Board-member ROK, September 28 on the disclosure of the Qom enrichment facility and solicited views on next steps at the IAEA. He stressed the imperative for immediate access by the IAEA, and JUSCANZ members agreed to support the Secretariat in that regard. There was a general sense that "something should be done," whether a Special Board, technical briefing and/or interim DG report before the late November Board meeting, but our specific tactical approach and sequencing would depend on developments, including the progress of the IAEA investigation of the facility. A Special Board could be convened to demand IAEA access, if it is not already forthcoming, or await the conclusion of a safeguards mission so that the IAEA has something to report (and depending on the substance of that report.) Canada underlined the need to consider what we want from a Special Board, besides being an opportunity to "ventilate." Australia expressed concerned that we may not get a clear outcome from a Special Board, given the influence of NAM members and an unhelpful Malaysian Board Chair, and all agreed that the Secretariat's posture during any such Board meeting would be a key defining factor in the Board's outcome. At the same time, all agreed it would be preferable, if possible, that we not play into Iranian delaying tactics should Tehran not allow IAEA access until November. (Note: The primary purpose of the next scheduled, November Board, a two-day session starting on Thanksgiving Day, is to approve technical cooperation; that meeting may not be conducive to a full discussion on Iran, besides lying too far off in the future. End Note.) The JUSCANZ further recognized that the results of the October 1 P5 1 meeting with Iran will have a bearing on next steps in Vienna and agreed to regroup after October 1. (Comment: Meanwhile, continuing speculation in Vienna as to the convening of a Special Board also has the advantage of turning up pressure on Iran. End Comment). ¶2. (C) The JUSCANZ discussed the implications of Iran's violation of Code 3.1 modified of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement, by not informing the IAEA of the Qom facility as required prior to construction of the facility. However, there was also general acknowledgement of the danger of playing Iran's game and getting bogged down in legalities as to the application of modified 3.1, as this would detract from the overall focus on the breach of confidence implied by a covert enrichment facility and violation of UNSCRs. Canada noted the IAEA Legal Advisor's "nuanced" opinion (relayed to the Board in June 2009) on reversion to the earlier Code 3.1 not constituting "in itself" non-compliance, although the IAEA has rejected since March 2007 Iran's unilateral decision on 3.1 as "inconsistent with" its safeguards obligations, and that construction of the Qom facility began while Iran still recognized its obligations under Code 3.1 modified. ROK Ambassador Shim advised, however, that it may be worth clarifying this issue up front with IAEA Legal, particularly as it applies to the specific case of the Qom facility, as it is an issue Iran will use in its argumentation. There was some further discussion of the Board finding Iran in "further non-compliance" but also recognition that Iran has already been referred to the UNSC for non-compliance, and that the Security Council may be best positioned to respond. ¶3. (C) JUSCANZ members had few substantive observations as to the background (reftel) that Mission presented on the Qom facility. Australia noted that Iran's letter to the IAEA did not specify Qom and the fact Iran only began referring to Qom after the disclosure by the P-3 could imply there is more than one undeclared enrichment facility in Iran. Canada and Australia asked if there was any connection between the Qom facility and the IAEA outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's program, noting that such a covert enrichment site has been the "missing link" with respect to PMD issues. Korean Msnoff also observed that Ahmadinejad had raised Iran's request for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor when asked about the Qom facility during a press interview, implying a connection. ¶4. (C) The French are coordinating an EU HOM meeting to discuss the Qom disclosure and next steps September 29, along the lines of our JUSCANZ meeting. JUSCANZ members also underlined the urgent need for outreach to NAM Board members and the Malaysian Board Chair, as Iran will once again seek to influence NAM views. Mission will be coordinating outreach with P-3 Missions over the next few days and Safeguards DDG Heinonen plans to brief the Board Chair and select NAM upon his return to Vienna the week of October 5. For now, we will continue to stress the need for Iran to allow quick IAEA access and for the Secretariat to report the results of its engagement with Iran as soon as possible, while not committing to any particular tactical approach in the Board (i.e., special Board, early report/technical briefing from DG, or sticking with scheduled November Board discussion). We will continue to press the Secretariat's thinking on the Code 3.1 violation and on appropriate and timely reporting to the Board. DAVIES