ASSESSING EGYPT'S ROLE AT THE IAEA GENERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000437 SIPDIS FOR T, P, AND IO FROM THE AMBASSADOR. NSC FOR SAMORE E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2019 TAGS: PREL MNUC KNNP IS EG SUBJECT: ASSESSING EGYPT'S ROLE AT THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies, Reason 1.5 (D, E) ¶1. (C) Recognizing that avoiding deadlock would require a changed approach to the Middle East issues that have hijacked multiple IAEA General Conferences, I sought to make Egypt the linchpin of our diplomacy at last week's 150-nation gathering. I began the process the previous week by making a point of paying my first bilateral call in Vienna on Ambassador Ahab Fawzy of Egypt. ¶2. (C) The gist of my message to him: let's find a new way of working together, after all the bitterness of the past. During the Conference itself, to a degree not seen since the mid-1990's, the United States -- joined by our EU partners -- engaged directly in negotiations between Egypt and Israel with the goal of building confidence on both sides and helping to identify a new consensus formula that would acknowledge the importance of nuclear safeguards and NPT issues in the Middle East without politicizing the debate or singling out any one country. ¶3. (C) Last Thursday, the penultimate day of the General Conference, after four days of intensive shuttling -- backed up by repeated, effective, Washington interventions with both sides -- the Swedish Ambassador and I had hammered out a text that almost all could support and a universally agreed procedural way forward on that text. All parties - especially Egypt and Israel - were quite pleased with this result. The IAEA General Conference had secured the first agreed outcome since 2005 on Egypt's "Application of Safeguards in the Middle East" (MES) resolution. Egypt Decides to Pile On -------------- ¶4. (C) Despite our extensive efforts, and the General Conference's almost unanimous approval of the Egyptian-authored resolution, Cairo was then unwilling to exercise leadership with the Arab Group to moderate a redundant Arab resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities. What happened? Egypt's agreement on the Safeguards Resolution did not include a firm commitment on Egypt's part to dispense with the Arab Group's "Israeli Nuclear Threat" resolution (INC),which ultimately passed by a vote of (49-45-16). The initial, effusive Arab reaction to the U.S.-led agreement on Middle East Safeguards left us optimistic that the Arab League initiative could be dealt with the next day through a Presidential Statement that would avoid nasty procedural or substantive votes that would inevitably cleave the non-aligned and western groups. ¶5. (C) Unfortunately, Egypt was unwilling to moderate the behavior of Arab hard-liners who subsequently pushed the Israel Nuclear Capabilities (INC) resolution to a vote, and then joined in tacky triumphalism by bursting into sustained applause when the INC resolution passed by just four votes. Indeed, in an earlier September 18 meeting called by the General Conference President with the EU and U.S. present, Egypt's Ambassador joined the Arab League and Lebanon in claiming they had run out of time to seek a revision of the Ministerial instruction to press the INC resolution to a vote and lamenting the inevitable confrontation between us. The Message for Cairo -------------- ¶6. (C) The close outcome of the non-binding IAEA vote on the INC resolution will be of little lasting importance. However, Egypt's failure of leadership -- even after the U.S. had worked intensively with the EU and Israel to seek consensus on Egypt's Middle East Safeguards resolution -- raises questions about Cairo's good faith in this exercise and should draw a firm rebuke from Washington. Rather than litigating the events of last week, we should reaffirm the strong U.S. commitment to rebuilding an environment where the IAEA can focus on its core technical missions and delegations can work together to advance shared non-proliferation objectives. Our work to build consensus on Egypt's resolution was part of that effort. ¶7. (C) Both Egypt and Israel have told us they believe the negotiated Middle East Safeguards resolution provides a positive starting point for next year's IAEA General Conference debate. The United States' more active role in this year's General Conference and our close partnership with the EU have positioned us well to pursue consensus on these issues. Looking ahead to this General Conference debate, we hope (and expect) Egypt will exercise its influence to discourage the introduction of an Arab League resolution that covers the same ground and singles out Israel. Shifting the Arab approach should begin immediately and Egypt will need to lead this effort. To focus Cairo on this requirement, we should make clear to Cairo our deep disappointment at Egypt's unwillingness to use its leadership of the Arab Group and NAM to avoid a nasty 2009 General Conference confrontation with Israel. DAVIES