NSC's Holgate Steers Vienna toward the Nuclear Security

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000428

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

NSC FOR HOLGATE, CONNERY, SAMORE; STATE FOR T; IO/GS FOR DETEMPLE,
HUSKEY; ISN FOR JENKINS, AMOROSO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC PREL PTER KCRM IAEA ENRG TRGY UN
SUBJECT: NSC's Holgate Steers Vienna toward the Nuclear Security
Summit

Ref: State 94449



1. (SBU) Summary: Laura Holgate, NSC Senior Director for WMD
Terrorism and Threat Reduction, visited Vienna to explain and build
support for President Obama's Nuclear Security Summit in April
(reftel). Holgate also laid the groundwork for the first "Sherpa
Meeting" in the lead-up to the Summit, scheduled for September 15 at
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Special Assistant to
the President and WMD Coordinator Gary Samore will lead the Vienna
event in his capacity as U.S. Sherpa. Enthusiasm for the Summit ran
high among Holgate's interlocutors, but she was nonetheless faced
with tough questions as to why some countries were intended to be
invited (and not others),how the Summit was distinct from the May
NPT Review Conference, what were the envisioned roles of the IAEA,
NGOs and industry, and how the Summit might spark "more doing and
less talking." Despite Holgate's explanations, Egyptian diplomats
meeting with her established an immediate link between nuclear
security and disarmament. The knee-jerk link distracts from
practical debate but will almost certainly make its way into the
Nuclear Security Summit dialogue at the highest levels. Meanwhile,
the majority of Holgate's interlocutors, whether diplomats, IAEA
employees, or NGO officials looked eagerly to the Obama
administration's first IAEA General Conference with an anticipation
that at times approached intemperance.

Summit Details
--------------


2. (SBU) The NSC's Laura Holgate met with a number of officials from
the IAEA, diplomatic missions, and NGOs to explain and build support
for President Obama's Nuclear Security Summit, scheduled for
mid-April in Washington. She also laid the groundwork for the first
of three "Sherpa Meetings," to be held in Vienna on September 15 on
the sidelines of the IAEA's annual General Conference. (The second
Sherpa Meeting will take place in Asia, and the third elsewhere.)
In her meetings, Holgate explained that the USG wanted high-level,
Nuclear Security specialists to serve as Sherpas rather than Foreign
Ministry representatives, in order to encourage practical debate
with measurable outcomes (the assignment of WMD Coordinator Gary
Samore as the U.S. Sherpa was intended to signal both the level and
the expertise expected of the other Sherpas).


3. (SBU) Holgate reiterated on several occasions that the Summit
goals were starkly different from the May NPT Review Conference in
New York. The primary goal of the Summit was to recommit heads of
state to international instruments of cooperation and resolve any
lingering doubts about the seriousness of the threat. The summit
was not intended to establish yet another initiative, but rather to
take advantage of existing ones. It should be viewed in light of a
series of administration steps to raise the profile of nuclear
security that included President Obama's April speech in Prague, the
July G8 Summit in l'Aquila, and the 2010 G8 Summit in Huntsville,
Canada. The Nuclear Security Summit would be high level, but would
focus on "doing, not talking." Nor would there be a discussion of
radiological material at this Summit, but rather fissile material in
all its forms and uses. At the forefront of her message, Holgate
emphasized that a key goal of the Summit was to help world leaders
understand - "as our President does" - that small groups of
terrorists plus available nuclear material implies Hiroshima-like
consequences.


4. (SBU) In nearly every meeting, questions arose regarding how the
37 countries had been picked for invites. Holgate explained that
Washington had been looking at all countries that could benefit from
enhanced nuclear security, whether due to large stockpiles or
advanced nuclear industries or because they served as transit
points. Holgate emphasized the pragmatic goals of the summit
irrespective of political allegiances. Israel, Egypt and Pakistan
are all invitees. The Summit also presented an opportunity to
engage with previously overlooked states such as Argentina and
Brazil. Countries such as Libya, Belarus, and even Iran had been
momentarily, but not definitively, passed over.


5. (SBU) Holgate described the role of NGOs and industry in a
meeting with representatives from the Vienna-based World Institute
for Nuclear Security (WINS). Holgate predicted that interested NGOs
would likely hold an event in advance of the Summit, but Holgate
signaled apprehension that such an event could become politicized.
The potential to move from nuclear security issues to disarmament
and NPT was high, and even "responsible" NGOs were not always
accurate in their portrayal of administration goals. Unlike NGOs,
industry would be more directly incorporated into the Summit, with a
breakout session on the margins of the Summit. Both WINS and the
London-based World Nuclear Association (WNA) might have substantive

roles to play in the industry event.

"Deliverables"
--------------


6. (SBU) Holgate took particular care in explaining that countries
invited to the Summit would be strongly encouraged to arrive with
"deliverables" as a sign of their commitment to nuclear security.
These deliverables could take the form of any concrete effort to
improve security either domestically or globally. For example, a
country might commit to signing the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM),the only internationally
legally binding instrument of its kind. The 2005 Amendment to the
CPPNM is also basic to nuclear security and, upon its entry into
force, would support the development of a global standard on nuclear
security. Signing the Amendment would therefore be considered an
even more welcome "deliverable." (Note: Only 22 countries have
signed the 2005 amendment. Even the U.S. has not yet completed the
process, an omission that discomfits Holgate, given the U.S. was a
primary champion of this effort.)

Fuel Bank
--------------


7. (SBU) In addition to the Nuclear Security Summit, several of
Holgate's interlocutors raised the ongoing effort to design and
adopt an IAEA mechanism for assurance of nuclear fuel supply.
Holgate did not dismiss the possibility that IAEA Member States
might still manage to establish a mechanism for fuel assurances
before the expiration of the NTI challenge grant, or in parallel
that NTI may extend the deadline for Board action a second time if
prevailed upon by Director General ElBaradei. Holgate heard from
Ambassador Bjorn Skala, the Swedish EU Presidency's special envoy
for multilateral nuclear arrangements, that the European Union
wanted to bring about a clear procedural path forward for the IAEA
Secretariat and Board on the issue. Holgate pointed to the lack of
congruence between the DG's proposed criteria for eligibility to
receive LEU from an IAEA bank, on the one hand, and NSG guidelines
on the other. She noted there was not yet a conclusive USG position
on how to reconcile the issue. Skala replied that the EU had not
determined a consensus position on transfer eligibility criteria;
Sweden's own national inclination, in view of the last-resort
character of the fuel bank, would be to accept facility-specific
safeguards of the IAEA INF/CIRC 66 type to be sufficient. (Key
points in Holgate's subsequent conversation with German Ambassador
on this issue were reported in UNVIE 419.)

The Secretariat Weighs In
--------------


8. (SBU) Holgate's meetings with Secretariat representatives focused
on the role of the IAEA at the Summit and arrangements for the first
Sherpa Meeting on Sept. 15. Office of Nuclear Security (ONS)
Director Anita Nilsson agreed to a short presentation during the
Meeting, tentatively titled "The Future of Nuclear Security at the
Agency." Nillson would focus on the IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan,
countries of special attention, their futures and ambitions.


9. (SBU) In terms of broader issues, Nilsson also noted that
non-nuclear countries must accept that many NS issues apply to them
as well in the areas of transport, trafficking, etc. Key countries
included Singapore, Georgia and the Nordic states. Nilsson
expressed the desire to shape common values and asserted that ONS
had the tools to do this. She felt that firm, self sustaining
support structures (regulatory, educational, and technical support)
would lead to a stronger nuclear security regime.


10. (SBU) Other members of the Secretariat warned Holgate of
potential pitfalls. Director of the IAEA's Office of External
Relations and Policy Coordination (EXPO) Vilmos Cserveny observed
that the Summit was at the head of state level yet some were not
invited. He recalled the troubles of the Anapolis Middle East
Summit of 2007, from which Iran had been excluded. Cserveny advised
that if the USG desired to communicate that nuclear security was an
issue for all, then inclusion was a must. He also asked that the
Summit move from the words promised in President Obama's Prague
speach to deeds. EXPO's Head of Verification and Security Policy
Tariq Rauf contributed that countries such as Pakistan needed
something to work toward that didn't imply that their nuclear
weapons were insecure. Such an admission, Rauf concluded, "would be
entirely unacceptable." Holgate agreed that inclusivity was
important but that so was a meaningful communiqu at the close of
the event; the two goals were sometimes at odds. She also noted
that the proposed threat briefing at the Summit would be focused on
the demand rather than the supply size, thus assuaging the fears of

potential provider states such as Pakistan.


11. (SBU) Holgate also learned that Japan would be holding a
technical meeting on nuclear security in September, and that the
IAEA and GOJ had offered to shape the meeting into a higher level
forum in support of the spring Summit. Holgate expressed
appreciation for the offer but declined elevating the biennial
technical meeting into something greater than its intent. She left
open the possibility, however, that Gary Samore might speak during
the technical meeting without direct reference to his role as U.S.
sherpa.

Egypt Previews Stumbling Blocks
--------------


12. (SBU) In a meeting with Egyptian diplomats, Deputy Chief of
Mission Aly Sirry signaled no disagreement over the issue of nuclear
terrorism itself. He asserted, however, that there were different
views on the extent of the threat. Predictably, Sirry counseled
Holgate that if the USG wanted to rid the world of nuclear
terrorism, then it needed to rid the world of nuclear weapons. In
the meantime, comprehensive safeguards should be established for all
countries. Sirrah also alluded to Egypt's "regional concerns"
(regarding Israel) and described Egypt as having been "super
patient."


13. (SBU) Second Secretary Bassem Ghanem followed up with the
assertion that the NPT was the only framework for a discussion of
disarmament and that other mechanisms were silent on this issue. He
also reminded Holgate (for the second time) that their immediate
neighbor, Israel, had not joined the NPT. Holgate reiterated that
all armed states would be invited to the summit with the intention
of bringing them closer to the NPT umbrella. She also noted that
reopening the START talks were an important disarmament step.

Comment: Riding the Wave of President Obama's Message
-------------- --------------


14. (SBU) Nearly all of Holgate's interlocutors, from the Egyptian
diplomats to members of the IAEA Secretariat, took the opportunity
of meetings with Laura Holgate to ruminate over the first General
Conference of the Obama administration. Many expressed their hopes
that there would be a "change in approach," and that President
Obama's expressed desire for renewed engagement and multilateral
effectiveness would be in evidence at this important, annual
meeting. At times their enthusiasm approached intemperance, as if
the U.S. had not only changed presidents but also its geographical
location and fundamental beliefs. For her part, Holgate made good
progress prompting her interlocutors to think pragmatically about
the Summit and its outcomes. Clearly the U.S. will have to work
hard to separate the associated issues of disarmament and terrorism;
issues that continue to bleed into one another, with the potential
to both politicize and mitigate USG nuclear security goals in the
months ahead.

Davies