GAINING IAEA BOARD MAJORITY FOR RUSSIAN LEU

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000424 SIPDIS FOR T, ISN, SCA/ISNB, S/SANAC, IO/GS, EUR/PRA AND EUR/RUS DOE FOR NA-20, NA-243 NSC STAFF FOR SCHEINMAN, HOLGATE NRC FOR OIP DOANE, HOLZMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2014 TAGS: ENRG TRGY PARM KNNP IAEA RS IN PK SUBJECT: GAINING IAEA BOARD MAJORITY FOR RUSSIAN LEU RESERVE WILL TAKE WORK - INDIA STILL A PROBLEM REF: A. MOSCOW 2248 ¶B. STATE 80019 Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) In their introductory meeting September 8, 2009, Ambassador Davies asked Russia's IAEA Governor, Ambassador Grigory Berdennikov, how he saw the state of play on the issue of assurance of nuclear fuel supply. Berdennikov said he was pleased Director General ElBaradei had referred encouragingly to the issue in his statement opening that week's meeting of the Board of Governors. Because of that statement, Russia, he said, would speak on the issue under Any Other Business (which we had encouraged the day before, and which Berdennikov did September 10; all statements to the Board on fuel assurances reported septel). ¶2. (C) Berdennikov said the GOR was planning to pursue Board approval of the Angarsk LEU fuel reserve proposal in November (when the IAEA Board next meets, November 26-27). He said some "unimportant missing pieces" remained between Russia and the IAEA Secretariat but that Moscow would pass the two agreement texts to the USG "immediately" after they are finalized. Russia was relying on U.S. approval of the arrangement, he said. The Ambassador indicated his understanding that we would be supportive. ¶3. (C) Berdennikov noted that the Board must authorize the Director General (DG) to sign the Russia-IAEA agreement and under defined conditions to enter into the model transfer agreement with purchaser countries. He asserted there was no prospect of gaining consensus support for the arrangement from the Board as currently constituted or in its next constellation, when, he noted, Pakistan will join. The only route to approval in the Russian view is to adopt the method by which indefinite extension of the NPT was gained in 1995: advocates draft a resolution and gather co-sponsors in excess of half of the Board's membership, so that upon introducing the resolution majority support is manifest. Berdennikov noted that Russia itself could likely not be the sponsor enlisting co-sponsors, and he recalled the role Canada had played in the NPT scenario. ¶4. (C) Berdennikov concluded that the arrangement should be pushed through as soon as it is ready, in order to avoid that it be delegated to a Board working group where skeptics could talk it to death. He was working with ROSATOM to have the project approved in November, he said, also because he was not sure how committed the next DG (Japan's Yukiya Amano) would be to an IAEA role in fuel assurance. "It seems he's a little afraid of alienating the G-77," Berdennikov said drily, before adding that Amano had "said the right things in capitals." Ambassador noted USG outreach in recent weeks in skeptical capitals. ¶5. (C) Comment: This will not be easy. Berdennikov neglected to mention the role South Africa played in 1995 enlisting G-77 support or acquiescence for NPT extension. A similar team effort is advisable if not indispensable in this case. Approving the Russia arrangement in a simple majority vote that splits along "North-South" lines would be a Pyrrhic victory. Looking at the roster of the Board that will convene September 22 for the ensuing twelve months, the Republic of Korea looks to be a credible champion/proxy to line up supporters for a resolution, but would need help working the G-77 side of street. Peru, Mongolia, one of the African members (one yet to be determined) or other candidates are possible. ¶6. (C) Comment cont'd: The proposal will need a contingent of G-77 states to vote on the technical merits over the strongest voices within the G-77/NAM on the issue, those of opponents (and non-NPT signatories) Pakistan and India. For the second Board meeting in succession, India delivered the most retrograde statement, positing that the Board should reach consensus on norms for any fuel assurance mechanisms submitted "to the Board or General Conference" before considering specific proposals; these norms should include that any mechanism operate under predetermined, Board-approved, non-discriminatory conditions, be available to all states in compliance with safeguards obligations, and not infringe a state's rights. Understandably fixated on its status under the NPT and suspicious perhaps of the market implications, India seems unwilling to weigh agnostically the Russian proposal as a facility being offered by one Member State under IAEA auspices that would provide benefit at the margins of the global LEU market to other, smaller states. End Comment. DAVIES