IAEA/IRAN: JOINT P5+1 STATEMENT FOR IAEA BOARD OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000417

SIPDIS

FOR P, IO, ISN, NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP MNUC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: JOINT P5+1 STATEMENT FOR IAEA BOARD OF
GOVERNORS HITS RUSSIAN ROADBLOCK

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies, reasons 1.4 (b) and (c)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) At a German-convened P5 1 meeting on September 4,
Russian Ambassador Zmeyevskiy refused to discuss the
German-proposed text for a joint P5 1 statement on the Iran
issue at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting opening Monday,
September 7. Over the course of nearly two hours, and
seconded by China, Zmeyevskiy asserted that he could not
engage on a text that his Political Director could not agree
to in discussions at that level in Germany on September 2.
Zmeyevskiy said his instructions were only to discuss whether
a joint statement was desirable, but if others insisted on
discussing a text, the basis of the discussion would have to
be the German host's press summary of the September 2
political director's meeting. The Russians asserted a joint
statement was only desirable if it accentuated the positive
in order to encourage Iran to engage us. In the end, German
Ambassador Luedeking pledged to take one more shot at a
productive discussion of text by re-circulating a new draft
that would combine elements of the original German draft with
elements from the September 2 press summary. Amb. Davies, as
well as his German, French, and UK colleagues made clear that
any statement that was out of step with the predominantly
negative August 28 IAEA Director General's report would be
inappropriate. P5 1 Ambassadors will convene again Monday,
September 7 to discuss a revised German draft. Comment: The
Russian (and to lesser extent Chinese) behavior in today's
meeting leaves very little room for hope that an acceptable
text can be agreed, and we will be surprised if the Monday
morning session is not the last of this German-inspired
effort. End summary and comment.

--------------
Russians (and Chinese) Unwilling to Talk Text
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador Luedeking opened the meeting by noting
the recent and negative DG's report on Iran, as well as
Iran's now familiar eleventh-hour ploy to cooperate on
routine safeguards matters to get undeserved "bonus points"
while still avoiding the fundamental issues at hand with the
IAEA. Luedeking recalled that in light of this report the
political directors on September 2 had agreed to authorize
Vienna Missions to consider text for joint P5 1 statement on
the Iran issue at the following week's IAEA Board of
Governors meeting. Zmeyevskiy disagreed with Luedeking's
characterization of the political director's outcome and the
meeting went downhill from there. He said there was no
mandate to discuss the German circulated text, and in fact he
could not do so given that his political director had not
agreed to that text. Zmeyevskiy said the purpose of the
meeting should be only to discuss whether a joint statement
is desirable. He said he saw little changed since the last
P5 1 joint Board statement in March, and feared that a
statement focused on the negative could "scare away" the
Iranians, when instead our goal is to get them to engage. A
statement would only be helpful, therefore, if it stressed
the positive and encouraged Iran. China seconded Russia's
interpretation of the mandate from political directors and
also said they couldn't comment on the text in any case
because they had just received it.


3. (C) German, U.S., French and UK Ambassadors took turns
rebutting the Russian interpretation of the PolDirs' meeting
mandate and marshaling arguments as to why and how productive
work on a text could proceed so that capitals could consider
more concretely the option of a joint statement. Luedeking
repeatedly noted that any discussion of text was ad ref, the
Russian Ambassador could comment in his personal capacity, as
were all the others in the room. Amb. Davies echoed his
point and stressed the imperative for a statement in the
context of protecting the integrity of the IAEA regime even
beyond the immediate Iran issue. French Amb. Mangin also
said the mandate was to discuss text, even while
acknowledging there was as yet no agreement on principle to
issue a joint statement. UK Amb. Smith addressed the Russian
query as to the desirability of a statement. He said the
DG's latest report is sobering. More than one-third of the
text is devoted to a review of outstanding issues suggestive
of "possible military dimensions" to the Iranian nuclear

program. This report reflects mounting frustration on the
part of the Secretariat and suggests inspectors may be moving
toward concluding that Iran has no "innocent answers" and
indeed must have been engaged in nuclear weapons-related
work. Smith said the UK thought the German draft statement a
good one, and not issuing a statement would send Tehran the
wrong signal and risk reinforcing the impression that Iran
can continue to expand its program and the P5 1 will not even
take note. Addressing Zmeyevskiy's earlier point that
"little has changed," Amb. Davies agreed, and underlined that
that is precisely the problem.


4. (C) Zmeyevskiy proved impervious, asserting that he was
for "balance," in any statement, but "balance the other way,"
asserting the statement should be positive. Zmeyevskiy then
suggested that if the group wanted to discuss text, it could
discuss the September 2 press summary from the political
directors meeting, which Zmeyevskiy thought could serve as a
good joint statement that was "balanced and concise."
UK/Smith replied that the press summary was written to
reflect a meeting of political directors. Any joint statement
at the Board should instead focus on the developments
relevant in Vienna, the latest of which was the DG's new
report, which was overwhelmingly negative except for
cooperation Iran should have undertaken long ago. Amb Davies
labeled the press summary "cotton candy," when what was
needed was "meat and potatoes" in light of the DG's report.
It would be a dereliction of the task put before us by
political directors not to at least attempt a text that, at
the end of the process, is acceptable. The UK, Germany, and
France all expressed the view that anything similar to the
press statement would likely not fly with their capitals as
statement for the Board.

--------------
Comment
--------------


5. (C) In the end, Luedeking pledged to take one more run at
convening a productive discussion on text. He said he would
circulate a revised, more concise text that integrated
elements of both the German draft text and the September 2
press summary. He has called a meeting the morning of
Monday, September 7 to discuss the text, which Mission will
forward to Department via email once received. Especially in
light of Zmeyevskiy's parting warning that he might not have
instructions for Monday morning, Mission sees very little
chance this process will bear fruit. Absent a surprising
turn around on the part of the Russians Monday morning,
Mission will (unless otherwise instructed) join a 3 1
consensus to bring this effort to a speedy conclusion so we
can turn our energies to other BoG priorities.


DAVIES