IAEA/GC/MIDDLE EAST: ARAB GROUP REJECTS GC PRESIDENT'S GOOD OFFICES

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000402 SIPDIS STATE FOR D(S),P, T, S/SANAC, S/SEMEP, IO, ISN, NEA DOE FOR S1, OIP, NA-20 NSC FOR SAMORE, SCHEINMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2019 TAGS: PREL, AORC, PARM, KNNP, XF, IAEA SUBJECT: IAEA/GC/MIDDLE EAST: ARAB GROUP REJECTS GC PRESIDENT'S GOOD OFFICES REF: UNVIE 400 (NOTAL) AND PREVIOUS Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b and d Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) The Arab Group (Lebanon and Syria) flatly rejected General Conference President Macmillan's efforts toward a consensus single resolution on the Middle East, standing by the Arab League Ministerial directive for a separate resolution naming Israel. Although both Egypt and Israel were more receptive to the GC President's efforts than the Arab Group, Israel is nervous about where this is leading. Thus far, we assured Israel, it is leading nowhere with Arab intransigence wholly to blame. Macmillan has not given up and appealed for U.S. support of her efforts, including in Arab Group capitals. The EU is supportive of the GC President but also inclined to open separate-track negotiations with Cairo on MES text, which Egypt reportedly will not share with anyone until introducing it formally at the opening of the GC. We have advised our closest EU supporters, UK, Netherlands, and France, that a separate EU negotiation is premature and a tactical mistake that could work at cross-purposes with the goal of supporting the GC President. Meanwhile, the EU is finalizing a response to the AL SYG letter on the INC which stipulates that a resolution naming Israel cannot be the basis for consensus. There remains no clear collective Plan B as to what to do about the INC should the GC President's efforts fail and should a "no action motion" also prove impracticable (though we continue to weigh options, such as killer amendments.) ¶2. (C) The Arab Group further stressed to Macmillan that the Iranian agenda item on military strikes against nuclear facilities be kept separate from the Middle East debate. The EU and like-minded support a General Committee challenge though the procedural argument against the Iranian agenda item has holes. Although we do not yet know the full composition of the General Committee, the vote outcome may come down to depending upon a handful of NAM moderates; killing the agenda item is not assured at this point, with several committee members sympathetic to the idea that "freedom of speech" requires the Iranian-authored agenda item to be heard. NAM Chair Egypt downplayed a NAM letter supporting the inclusion of the Iranian agenda item but this may be a complicating factor. Mongolia, a NAM member of the General Committee, warns that a discussion is unavoidable and efforts to abort it would deepen mutual antagonism. Even some close allies are concerned that General Committee disposition of the item would not be the final word. As with the INC, we will need to consider carefully Plan B options on the Iranian agenda item, in the event it is approved by the General Committee. In the interim, Mission recommends demarches in Arab Group capitals and Stockholm in support of the GC President's efforts, as well as outreach to NAM capitals against the Iranian agenda item. End Summary and Comment. Arabs Reject President's Effort -------------- ¶3. (C) General Conference (GC) President Jennifer Macmillan (New Zealand) reported to the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) and privately to Charge August 25 that the Arab Group had rejected her overture for a consensus text on a single Middle East resolution out of hand. Privately, she was disconcerted by her meeting with Arab Group Chair Lebanon and Syria, the latter of which did most of the talking (and was quite patronizing by her account). She confided to Charge that she was taken aback by how strongly the Arabs adhered to a political position premised on an Arab League Ministerial directive to table a separate Israeli Nuclear Capabilities (INC) resolution. They insisted that the point of the exercise was to name Israel and also rejected peace process language that "obfuscated" the issue of phasing, i.e., precedence of NWFZ vice peace process. While Egypt (not present in the Arab Group meeting),was initially more open-minded, it had since "fallen in line" according to Macmillan. She later told the WEOG that Egypt still plans to refrain from tabling its MES text until the opening day of the GC, September 14. ¶4. (C) Macmillan had presented three drafts to the Arabs and Egypt, also shared with Israel. The first was hybrid MES-INC text that included both the Israeli idea of reflecting differences in the preamble and 1995 NPT Revcon resolution language on all states in the region "that have not yet done so, without exception" adhering to the NPT, i.e., stopping short of naming Israel. She proposed alternative formulations on the peace process "contributing to, inter alia" a WMD free zone, also derived from the 1995 NPT resolution. The second draft was a stripped-down version of the fore-going and a third was premised on the original 2008 Egyptian text but adding in similar language on the NPT. Macmillan characterized Israeli Ambassador Michaeli's reaction as constructive. He intimated to Macmillan that Israel could probably live with "inviting" (as opposed to "calling upon") states to join the NPT and the 1995 NPT Revcon language on the peace process. However, Michaeli took a much harder line in subsequent exchanges with the Mission, insisting as he has before (reftel) that everything that went beyond the 2005 Middle East Safeguards (MES) consensus text was not agreed and would have to be highlighted as such. Michaeli underlined his fear that Israel not be blamed for failure of Macmillan's effort. Msnoff reassured Michaeli that to the contrary, Macmillan blamed Arab rejectionism. (Comment: There is zero chance of returning to the 2005 MES text per se, and we believe Michaeli understands this. End comment.) WEOG Supports President, EU Split on Separate Track -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) After meeting with Charge, Macmillan relayed a sanitized version of the Arab reaction to WEOG. Although she was disappointed and "recovering," she was not giving up on her effort. She was not sure how to address the Arab League political decision on the INC and welcomed any input on consensus language for a single resolution. Charge seconded her efforts, encouraged her not to give up, and called for ratcheting up demarches in capitals . 2008 GC President, Italian Ambassador Ghisi, also encouraged Macmillan to keep trying though he was pessimistic, based on his experience last year, that the Arab League would give up singling out Israel. However, the President's efforts would help limit the damage from Middle East disagreements upon other GC business even in the event of a "no action motion" and could prove useful to EU negotiations with Egypt on the MES text, he argued. Ghisi added that the EU must also prepare for a "Plan B" on dealing with the INC. (Comment: It is clear from his intervention and discussions with the Swedish EU Presidency that, while supporting the GC President, some EU states are already going down the path of negotiating the MES and INC on separate tracks, i.e. cutting a separate deal with Cairo. These two efforts could easily work at cross purposes. In separate conversations the following day, Mission affirmed to The Netherlands, UK, Germany and France that it is premature to give up on Macmillan and run to the Egyptians. End Comment). Meanwhile, the EU is still finalizing its response to Arab League SYG Moussa on the INC text. The letter draft circulating within the EU (shared in confidence with Mission) states that the EU "does not believe the League's draft, which focuses on a single country, would command consensus at the General Conference." The EU letter supports a Middle East WMD-free zone, comprehensive safeguards, and adherence by all states in the region to the NPT and CTBT, and refers to the EU statement on Middle East issues at the NPT Prepcom. ¶6. (C) Charge also covered these issues in private August 26 with Dutch Ambassador Hamer, who was one of our strongest allies in last year's debate. Hamer welcomed U.S. efforts to stiffen the EU line, noting that Sweden, Germany, and Ireland, among others, had been extremely eager to accommodate Egypt's concerns last year. He noted that in the current process, the Netherlands and UK had rejected the initial draft EU reply to Arab League SYG Amr Moussa on the INC resolution text, and indicated that the revised reply was being worked through EU capitals, with Vienna missions awaiting instructions. Hamer appreciated U.S. efforts to improve our tactical position but reiterated Dutch red lines regarding any effort to single out Israel or downplay linkage to the peace process. He noted that Belgium was unlikely to repeat its leadership role from last year, and urged further U.S. contacts in EU capitals to reinforce our message that the Egyptian and Arab initiatives will not find consensus in their present forms. How to Beat the Iranian Resolution? -------------- ¶7. (C) Macmillan also reported to WEOG August 25 that the Arab Group is anxious to keep the Iranian-proposed agenda item on military strikes against nuclear facilities separate from the Middle East discussion. Charge argued to the group that the Iranian resolution, a transparent red herring and distraction, was also inappropriate for the IAEA GC and should be withdrawn. Failing that, Charge advocated WEOG help vote down the Iranian agenda item in General Committee, even at the cost of an agenda fight. This debate needed to be understood in the wider context of efforts to keep an international spotlight on Iran's non-compliance issues, he argued. While fully supportive of an effort to kill the Iranian item in the General Committee (of which Italy will be a member),Italian Ambassador Ghisi cautioned that it will be a trickier issue than the INC. Unlike the INC item, on which one could argue redundancy, in that there was already a Middle East agenda item, there was no such procedural argument with respect to the Iranian agenda item. Furthermore, in Italy's view, one could not argue that this was a matter for the UNSC and not the GC since the General Conference had adopted three previous resolutions on the subject, Ghisi observed. He added that it may come to a vote in Plenary and advised that we start lobbying efforts in capitals. Canada pointed out that the Iranian draft resolution differed from the previous resolutions. (Comment: Be that as it may, Ghisi is correct about being on shaky procedural grounds. French Counselor suggested that we focus our arguments on the fact that this is an Iranian ploy, and that the UNSC or UNGA Sixth/Legal Committee is the more appropriate venue than the General Conference. End Comment). ¶8. (C) In a potential further complication for our efforts to defeat the Iranian agenda item in General Committee (or by Plenary vote),the NAM sent a letter to DG ElBaradei supporting inclusion of the Iranian agenda item, which the Iranian press spun as support by 100 NAM states. NAM Chair Egypt, which signed it on behalf of the NAM, privately downplayed to us the significance of this letter, and noted the general NAM position against barring pertinent items from the agenda. Egyptian Msnoff stressed, however, that there was no agreement on substance or discussion of an Iranian text. He was also personally sympathetic to our arguments against the Iranian ploy. However, with only five of the required eight vote majority in the 15-member General Committee assured thus far (U.S., Canada, U.K., Finland, Italy),NAM moderates such as Singapore or Mongolia (the latter of which has already told Charge it would not support blocking the item) and possibly Peru may hold the key swing votes on the Committee. New Peruvian Ambassador Garcia was very receptive to our arguments with respect to the Iranian agenda item in an introductory call on Charge August 25 and indicated that Peru is a candidate for a GRULAC seat on the General Committee. (Note: We learned of the NAM letter subsequently and Garcia had not seemed to be aware of it. The letter was reportedly introduced at a NAM Plenary and gaveled through without comment when no one voiced any objection. End Note). ¶9. (C) Comment: While a General Committee challenge still seems to be the most expedient course of action with respect to the Iranian agenda item, we need to formulate a Plan B for the likely events that the General Committee votes do not materialize or Iran makes a further effort in plenary. Options could include a Plenary vote against the General Committee recommendation (a risky course),a "no action" motion on the Iranian agenda item, or a vote on the resolution. Whatever we do runs the risk of expending capital we will also need on the Middle East agenda items, so the sooner we extinguish this, the better. End Comment. PYATT