IAEA/GC/MIDDLE EAST: SUPPORTING THE GC PRESIDENT,S

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000400 SIPDIS STATE FOR D(S),P, T, S/SANAC, S/SEMEP, IO, ISN, NEA DOE FOR S1, OIP, NA-20 NSC FOR SAMORE, SCHEINMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2019 TAGS: PREL AORC PARM KNNP XF IAEA SUBJECT: IAEA/GC/MIDDLE EAST: SUPPORTING THE GC PRESIDENT,S EFFORTS AND NEUTRALIZING THE IRANIAN AGENDA ITEM REF: A. UNVIE 384 ¶B. STATE 85128 (BOTH NOTAL) Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary and Guidance Request -------------- ¶1. (C) Like-minded Missions (Canada, U.S., Australia, Sweden, UK, France) meeting August 19 were generally supportive of GC President Macmillan's (New Zealand) effort to broker a single GC resolution on the Middle East. Sweden (EU Presidency) is cautiously optimistic that Egypt is open to the idea of a consensus resolution and has given the GC President until the opening of the GC September 14 to present a consensus text; others remain skeptical of Cairo's intentions. Separately, Israeli Ambassador Michaeli doubted Egypt's disposition to negotiate and questioned whether the GC President was fronting for the U.S., which we assured him was not the case. Should the GC President's effort fail, there is no clear "Plan B" among the like-minded given the poor prospects for a "no action" motion and the likelihood that the EU will splinter off and negotiate the draft resolutions on Middle East Safeguards (MES) and Israeli Nuclear Capabilities (INC) on separate tracks. The EU is finalizing a joint "non-committal" response to Arab League SYG Amr Moussa on the INC. Michaeli also reported that Moussa will meet Swedish FM Bildt in Stockholm August 28. Mission recommends a senior-level approach in Stockholm prior to this meeting to stiffen EU resolve on the INC. ¶2. (C) The like-minded reviewed the recently released DG report on Middle East Safeguards (for consideration by the September Board) and noted the report's glossing over of compliance issues and Egypt's agreement to the Forum agenda. Like-minded Missions also generally agreed with Mission's characterization of the Iranian agenda item on military strikes against nuclear facilities (emailed to Department) as a politically-motivated red herring that should be dispensed with, if possible, by removing it from the agenda in the General Committee. Canada raised other substantive issues with the Iranian resolution, which goes further than the three prior resolutions on the subject adopted by the GC in the 1980s and 1990s. The like-minded were inclined to see this as another anti-Israeli item, while Israeli Ambassador Michaeli wants to avoid any recurrent linkage between the Iran item and the MES and INC; he does not want this to become "part of the package" each year. ¶3. (C) Guidance request: Mission recommends a General Committee challenge to the Iranian agenda item as the most expedient way of neutralizing it, provided we can secure a majority of eight of 15 votes in the Committee. With the Arab Group lukewarm about the Iranian item, Iran is relatively isolated but may still call a Plenary vote against the agenda recommended by the General Committee should Iran's item not be included. Iran may also seek to import elements of its military strikes resolution into other GC resolutions. Should we fail in the General Committee or Plenary, it will be more difficult to defeat the Iranian resolution on substantive grounds, given the precedents and the disposition of countries (including Sweden) to agree with the substance, i.e., that military strikes against nuclear facilities are to be condemned and deterred politically. More importantly, a prolonged debate over this Iranian item will embolden those among the EU inclined to argue that we need to "give something" to the Arabs. In the run-up to the GC we will continue to argue that this is not an issue for the IAEA General Conference, and we request Department guidance on a General Committee challenge in the first instance, or other possible steps should that fail. End Summary and Guidance Request. Supporting GC President's Effort -------------- ¶4. (C) Canada convened a meeting of like-minded Missions (Canada, Australia, U.S., UK, France, Sweden as EU President) August 19 to discuss developments on GC Middle East issues. With respect to the Middle East Safeguards (MES) and Israeli Nuclear Capabilities (INC) agenda items, GC President Jennifer Macmillan (New Zealand) is proactively drafting a single resolution, which she has discussed with Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi. Separately, Macmillan reported that Fawzi was non-committal but willing to consider her proposals for a consensus approach. Sweden confirmed this open-minded Egyptian stance and reported that Fawzi has given the GC President up until the opening of the General Conference September 14 to broker a compromise; failing this, Egypt would table a MES resolution based on the original 2008 Egyptian text (i.e., minus the Israeli amendments.) Fawzi reportedly noted three obstacles to a consensus MES text -- any mention of the AP and finding alternative formulations for "compliance" and the peace process; he was also not positive about a hybrid MES-INC resolution that did not name Israel. Nevertheless, the Swedes felt heartened by their discussion with Egypt, which met with some skepticism from France, the French Counselor recalling that this was exactly Egypt's disposition last year. ¶5. (C) For the time being, the EU and like-minded are content to support the GC President's effort, as are we. (Note: The first EU HOM meeting to discuss the issue will be September ¶2. End note.). However, the like-minded also recognize the need for "Plan B" should the President's effort fail, though there is less clarity about what that should be. Canada continues to be skeptical about the prospects for a "no action motion" on the INC, but is still willing to explore the option if necessary. Other options might include killer amendments to the INC and/or bringing the INC resolution to a vote. Msnoffs advised that "Plan B" should not be to negotiate the MES and INC items on separate tracks, as the EU attempted last year. The Swedish Mission also confirmed that a joint EU response to the individual letters sent by the Arab League SYG to EU members seeking support for the INC resolution is being finalized and that the response would be non-committal. Middle East Safeguards Report -------------- ¶6. (C) The like-minded discussed two new developments -- the recently released DG report to the September Board on Middle East Safeguards (GOV/2009/44) and the Iranian submission of a request for a Supplementary GC item, "Prohibition of Armed Attack against Nuclear Installations, during Operation or under Construction" (emailed to Department.) Canada noted with respect to the DG report that Egypt's acceptance of the revised Middle East Forum meant that we were back to a situation where the agenda is accepted by one party but not the other. Canada shared our assessment that the DG's report cherry-picks from the 2008 MES resolution so as to exclude the core issue of compliance. Mission advised of Israel's objections -- to the agenda's deletion of the point that an IAEA Forum is not a forum for negotiation, and to the timing of the Forum after the GC. (Comment: Egypt will undoubtedly seek to blame Israel for failing to agree to the revised Forum agenda, which, the Secretariat has admitted, only took account of Egypt's objections to the 2004 agenda to which Israel had agreed. End Comment.) Disposition of Iran's Agenda Item -------------- ¶7. (C) Reviewing the substance of the Iranian draft resolution (obtained by Department),the like-minded agreed that it was poorly drafted; problematic in several respects, including going beyond the IAEA mandate; and directed against Israel notwithstanding Iran's effort to cast it in general terms. (Comment: We have heard subsequently that the Iranians may be floating a different draft, and will seek to obtain a copy. End comment.) Canada noted that the Iranian draft was markedly inferior to the short GC resolutions adopted by consensus in 1985 and 1987 and the 1990 Iranian resolution on the same subject adopted by a vote of 46-7(U.S.)-28. The IAEA was clearly not the forum to dictate UNSC action, nor to negotiate a new legal instrument on nuclear strikes, as the Iranian draft proposes. Canada also noted the resolution's inconsistent reference to "safeguarded" facilities and suggested a killer amendment could focus on compliance with safeguards obligation and UNSC and Board resolutions. Msnoffs characterized the Iranian item as a red herring, intended to deflect attention from its nuclear file and broader political context. The like-minded were generally receptive to our suggestion of a General Committee challenge to the Iranian item. To be successful, we noted the need to secure 8 of 15 votes on the Committee. (Note: EU and like-minded thus far have five votes. Iran and Arab Group Chair Lebanon are also on the Committee. End Note). While the General Committee can only "recommend" the agenda to the Plenary, Iran would be ill-advised to call a vote in Plenary to un-do the Committee's recommendation. Although Iran is rallying the NAM, support for this initiative seems lukewarm. Even Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi expressed unhappiness to the Swedes about this supplementary agenda item, which muddies the waters for the GC Middle East debate. The EU has not formulated a position on the Iranian item, but Swedish Msnoff agreed with the approach of trying to stack the General Committee in our favor. (Note: Mission also discussed this with Israeli Ambassador, who wholly endorsed the effort. End Note). The UK suggested that it would be even better if the GC President could persuade Iran to withdraw the item prior to a General Committee vote. France anticipated that even if the item is voted down or withdrawn, Iran would try to resuscitate elements in the context of other GC resolutions. French Counselor also reminded like-minded of Iran's hypocritical public statements promising to retaliate against Israeli nuclear facilities. ¶8. (C) Comment: Mission recommends that we dismiss the Iranian item as a political gambit and argue that the IAEA is not the appropriate forum, rather than trying to argue against the merits or substance. Another Swedish counterpart dispatched from capital to help the local Mission during the EU Presidency remarked that military strikes on nuclear facilities were a legitimate issue. Notably, Sweden had broken ranks with other Europeans to vote in favor of the 1990 resolution. Enough countries held this view to support the adoption in the past of three GC resolutions on the substance. End Comment. Israel's View -------------- ¶9. (C) Meeting separately with Msnoffs August 21, Israeli Ambassador Michaeli identified three parallel efforts on Middle East GC issues, by the EU, the GC President and the U.S., which did not appear to him to be fully coordinated and could be at cross-purposes. He had also learned from the Swedes that Arab League SYG Amr Moussa would be meeting with Swedish Foreign Minister Bildt in Stockholm August 28. On the MES, Swedish Ambassador Lundborg told Michaeli that he had discussed with Fawzi the three EU amendments (AP, compliance and peace process) from last year, and the prospect of dropping the AP amendment. Michaeli expected that the EU would seek to continue its MES-INC balancing act and noted that the Israeli amendments had upset that balance last year. At the same time, Michaeli reported that Lundborg was fully supportive of the GC President's effort and was optimistic that Fawzi had not rejected it outright. Msnoffs dispelled Michaeli's suspicions about a U.S. "new frame proposal" or the GC President fronting one on our behalf, and advised that we had not seen what GC President Macmillan was working on. Michaeli observed that devising a single resolution would not be easy. He noted that Israel viewed everything added to the MES resolution since the breakdown of the consensus in 2006 as "problematic." Just as Michaeli began to complain about Fawzi not following up on their earlier consultations, Fawzi walked by and contradicted him, explaining that he was only just back from Cairo. Michaeli continued to doubt Egypt would be disposed to negotiate with Israel. ¶10. (C) Strategizing on the Iranian agenda item, Michaeli mused about de-linking it from INC and MES agenda items, rather than dealing with all three together. He noted that the Iranian item could affect the MES-INC balance, and that the Arabs did not want Iran involved in the Middle East issues. Michaeli was not sure a General Committee challenge would work, or that Iran would not call a vote in Plenary. He suggested referring the Iranian item to the Committee of the Whole (COW),but we advised that the UK COW Chair and many other delegations would want to keep the COW focused on the technical resolutions. (Comment: There is little chance of importing this political issue into the COW, nor would we advise such a course unless we are prepared to see the whole GC descend into political debate. End Comment.) PYATT SCHELAND