ABDUL MINTY SKETCHES AGENDA FOR COOPERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000371

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, S/SANC, ISN/RA, ISN/NESS AND IO/T

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
TAGS: PREL IAEA KNNP ENRG IR SA
SUBJECT: ABDUL MINTY SKETCHES AGENDA FOR COOPERATION

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Geoffrey Pyatt, reasons 1.5 b and d


1. (C) Summary: In an August 4 conversation with Charge,
South African IAEA Governor Abdul Minty commented on U.S.
priority issues for the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors and
General Conference meetings, arguing that an objective for
both sides should be healing the rift between developed and
developing countries that surfaced in the course of the long
IAEA Director General election. In our first private
exchange since his unsuccessful campaign for DG, Minty was
surprisingly gracious, emphasizing his hopes for the upcoming
bilateral talks to be led by SNAC Einhorn. On Iran, Minty
expressed concern about how the new NAM troika of Cuba, Iran
and Egypt could feed into the Iranian misperception that they
might normalize their status at the IAEA without coming clean
on their past nuclear activities. He pledged continued tough
South African statements in the Board room and said he had
reached out to newly appointed AEOI head Salehi to urge an
early constructive response to the renewed P5 1 offer. On
fuel assurances, Minty counseled a further cooling off period
to dispel developing country concerns about a "Western group"
rush to push through a fuel bank arrangement that could be
used to deny NPT rights. Recalling his previous role in
brokering an IAEA General Conference compromise on the Middle
East resolutions, Minty welcomed our commitment to working
for a consensus formula, but underlined that Egypt's position
(and even its agenda) remain unclear, despite private
Egyptian statements of concern about Iran's nuclear
activities. Asked about prospects for the upcoming "Future
of the Agency" discussion on safeguards, Minty invoked his
past complaints that European governments have done much less
than the U.S. and South Africa to expose and prosecute the AQ
Khan network. He argued that completing the take down of the
Kahn network's facilitators should take precedence over any
safeguards-related structural reforms at the IAEA. End
Summary.


2. (C) Charge met privately with Minty on August 4 to review
our agenda for a busy September of IAEA meetings. Minty
planned to meet the next day with the incoming IAEA General
Conference President to offer his assistance in navigating
the always contentious Middle East issues, which he feared
could become even more enflamed now that Egypt has won NAM
endorsement of the annual Arab Group resolution on Israeli
nuclear capabilities. Minty welcomed Charge's assurance that
the U.S. would give substance to our Board room commitment to
seek a consensus outcome to this year's General Conference
debate on the Middle East. However, Minty expressed
uncertainty about how to engineer such a consensus in view of
the various Middle Eastern audiences engaged. Recalling his
own role as General Conference President when a consensus was
last achieved, Minty argued that it was impossible to sketch
out a road map in advance. The conference President had to
commit to extensive consultations then try to identify a
middle ground from that exercise. Minty acknowledged that
deepening Arab concern about Iran's nuclear program might be
helpful to bringing states together, but cautioned that
Cairo's agenda remained unclear. Like us, Minty had a
favorable view of the role that might be played by this
year's Arab group President (Lebanon) but he also warned of
the dynamic where Arab positions are defined by the most
vociferous of the group. Egypt is key.


3. (C) Turning to Iran, Minty offered a generally positive
impression of AEOI Director and former IAEA Governor Salehi
-- but was quick to point out that Salehi will not be calling
the shots, any more than his predecessor did. Minty shared
that he had used a recent meeting in Geneva to press the
Iranians to respond quickly to the renewed P5 1 offer. He
worried that Iran would use the new NAM troika to convince
itself that international pressure was abating. Recalling
the dynamic at the G8 Summit (where he was part of President
Zuma's delegation) Minty observed that President Obama will
not be able to keep the focus on diplomacy indefinitely. It
is therefore in Iran's interest to respond constructively to
the P5 1 before September. Minty pledged that South Africa
will continue its recent pattern of forthright Board
statements on Iran, and argued that it is the IAEA's
responsibility to report objectively on developments such as
the safeguards impediments at Natanz discussed in the last
IAEA technical briefing. He expressed frustration that the
Iranian authorities are so unwilling to take the P5 1 offer
and the Obama Administration's outreach at face value,
instead looking for a U.S.-led trap in every action. Based
on meetings with Iranian officials in Pretoria, Minty
insisted the GOI still did not understand the specifics of
freeze-for-freeze. Drawing from recent discussions with
Iranian counterparts, he reported an atmosphere of unease
inside the Iranian MFA, with many officials "sitting on their
hands" uncertain which way the regime was headed.


4. (C) Recalling conversations with then U/S Bolton about the
possibility of capping Iran at 200 centrifuges, Minty
lamented that we had missed opportunities to constrain the
Iranian nuclear program at much lower levels of development.
In this context, he also recalled a South African proposal to
train several hundred Iranian nuclear scientists in reactor
safety for the Busher project, suggesting that South Africa
would remain open to helping in this way if Iran engages with
the international community and returns to the path of
cooperation with the IAEA.


5. (C) Charge flagged the IAEA debate on nuclear fuel
assurances as a U.S. priority for the September Board
meeting, explaining that we would not push for a vote at this
stage, but did think an agenda item was important to keep the
discussion going among member states. In his only allusion
to his unsuccessful campaign for Director General, Minty
argued that the DG race had deepened polarization within the
IAEA Board and heightened concern among developing countries
that proposals like the IAEA nuclear fuel bank were intended
to circumscribe rights under the NPT. Charge underlined the
U.S. commitment to an intensified dialogue on IAEA fuel
assurances and argued against a pause in the debate, since
that would play into the Iranian contention that fuel
assurances are not a legitimate area of work for the IAEA
Board.


6. (C) Charge also raised the September 3-4 "Future of the
Agency" debate on IAEA safeguards, noting this would be
germane to the newly formed working group on strategic
priorities that will address the IAEA budget and safeguards
financing. Returning to a favorite theme, Minty insisted
that one of the greatest threats to the safeguards regime is
the failure of many European governments to take strong legal
action against those companies and individuals that
cooperated with the AQ Khan network. Highlighting (as he has
done before) the political risks he took in pushing the
prosecution of Wisser and the Khan collaborators in South
Africa, Minty argued that the U.S. and South Africa, as the
two countries that had done the most to take down the Khan
network, should now work together to put pressure on European
governments (and Pakistan) to take analogous steps. Pressed
several times on the recent IAEA budget debate and the wider
issue of safeguards financing, Minty returned to the Khan
episode as fundamental to any effort at strengthening
safeguards.


7. (C) Comment: Referring several times to President Obama's
G8 meeting with Zuma, Minty seemed eager to put the acrimony
of the DG race behind us and reestablish a shared agenda at
the IAEA. He spoke with particular passion about Iran,
characterizing it as one of the most urgent challenges
confronting the IAEA. However, he was also quick to lament
the missed opportunities of past years, noting that the
political environment for negotiations has become much more
difficult, even as the expansion of Iran's enrichment program
has made a negotiated resolution more urgent. Minty heard us
out on the IAEA fuel bank, but showed little sign of
compromise (he claimed to have shared the same message with
Senator Nunn at an NTI event in Oslo). One idea that may
provide a basis for moving ahead was his suggestion of a
dialogue on fuel assurances involving only the permanent
members of the IAEA Board. One advantage of this format is
that it would divide South Africa from Egypt and Pakistan
(non-permanent members),perhaps providing a lever to break
up the unfortunate G-77 versus developed countries dynamic
around this issue. End Comment.
PYATT