ABDUL MINTY SKETCHES AGENDA FOR COOPERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000371 SIPDIS STATE FOR T, S/SANC, ISN/RA, ISN/NESS AND IO/T E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019 TAGS: PREL IAEA KNNP ENRG IR SA SUBJECT: ABDUL MINTY SKETCHES AGENDA FOR COOPERATION Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Geoffrey Pyatt, reasons 1.5 b and d ¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 4 conversation with Charge, South African IAEA Governor Abdul Minty commented on U.S. priority issues for the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference meetings, arguing that an objective for both sides should be healing the rift between developed and developing countries that surfaced in the course of the long IAEA Director General election. In our first private exchange since his unsuccessful campaign for DG, Minty was surprisingly gracious, emphasizing his hopes for the upcoming bilateral talks to be led by SNAC Einhorn. On Iran, Minty expressed concern about how the new NAM troika of Cuba, Iran and Egypt could feed into the Iranian misperception that they might normalize their status at the IAEA without coming clean on their past nuclear activities. He pledged continued tough South African statements in the Board room and said he had reached out to newly appointed AEOI head Salehi to urge an early constructive response to the renewed P5 1 offer. On fuel assurances, Minty counseled a further cooling off period to dispel developing country concerns about a "Western group" rush to push through a fuel bank arrangement that could be used to deny NPT rights. Recalling his previous role in brokering an IAEA General Conference compromise on the Middle East resolutions, Minty welcomed our commitment to working for a consensus formula, but underlined that Egypt's position (and even its agenda) remain unclear, despite private Egyptian statements of concern about Iran's nuclear activities. Asked about prospects for the upcoming "Future of the Agency" discussion on safeguards, Minty invoked his past complaints that European governments have done much less than the U.S. and South Africa to expose and prosecute the AQ Khan network. He argued that completing the take down of the Kahn network's facilitators should take precedence over any safeguards-related structural reforms at the IAEA. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Charge met privately with Minty on August 4 to review our agenda for a busy September of IAEA meetings. Minty planned to meet the next day with the incoming IAEA General Conference President to offer his assistance in navigating the always contentious Middle East issues, which he feared could become even more enflamed now that Egypt has won NAM endorsement of the annual Arab Group resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities. Minty welcomed Charge's assurance that the U.S. would give substance to our Board room commitment to seek a consensus outcome to this year's General Conference debate on the Middle East. However, Minty expressed uncertainty about how to engineer such a consensus in view of the various Middle Eastern audiences engaged. Recalling his own role as General Conference President when a consensus was last achieved, Minty argued that it was impossible to sketch out a road map in advance. The conference President had to commit to extensive consultations then try to identify a middle ground from that exercise. Minty acknowledged that deepening Arab concern about Iran's nuclear program might be helpful to bringing states together, but cautioned that Cairo's agenda remained unclear. Like us, Minty had a favorable view of the role that might be played by this year's Arab group President (Lebanon) but he also warned of the dynamic where Arab positions are defined by the most vociferous of the group. Egypt is key. ¶3. (C) Turning to Iran, Minty offered a generally positive impression of AEOI Director and former IAEA Governor Salehi -- but was quick to point out that Salehi will not be calling the shots, any more than his predecessor did. Minty shared that he had used a recent meeting in Geneva to press the Iranians to respond quickly to the renewed P5 1 offer. He worried that Iran would use the new NAM troika to convince itself that international pressure was abating. Recalling the dynamic at the G8 Summit (where he was part of President Zuma's delegation) Minty observed that President Obama will not be able to keep the focus on diplomacy indefinitely. It is therefore in Iran's interest to respond constructively to the P5 1 before September. Minty pledged that South Africa will continue its recent pattern of forthright Board statements on Iran, and argued that it is the IAEA's responsibility to report objectively on developments such as the safeguards impediments at Natanz discussed in the last IAEA technical briefing. He expressed frustration that the Iranian authorities are so unwilling to take the P5 1 offer and the Obama Administration's outreach at face value, instead looking for a U.S.-led trap in every action. Based on meetings with Iranian officials in Pretoria, Minty insisted the GOI still did not understand the specifics of freeze-for-freeze. Drawing from recent discussions with Iranian counterparts, he reported an atmosphere of unease inside the Iranian MFA, with many officials "sitting on their hands" uncertain which way the regime was headed. ¶4. (C) Recalling conversations with then U/S Bolton about the possibility of capping Iran at 200 centrifuges, Minty lamented that we had missed opportunities to constrain the Iranian nuclear program at much lower levels of development. In this context, he also recalled a South African proposal to train several hundred Iranian nuclear scientists in reactor safety for the Busher project, suggesting that South Africa would remain open to helping in this way if Iran engages with the international community and returns to the path of cooperation with the IAEA. ¶5. (C) Charge flagged the IAEA debate on nuclear fuel assurances as a U.S. priority for the September Board meeting, explaining that we would not push for a vote at this stage, but did think an agenda item was important to keep the discussion going among member states. In his only allusion to his unsuccessful campaign for Director General, Minty argued that the DG race had deepened polarization within the IAEA Board and heightened concern among developing countries that proposals like the IAEA nuclear fuel bank were intended to circumscribe rights under the NPT. Charge underlined the U.S. commitment to an intensified dialogue on IAEA fuel assurances and argued against a pause in the debate, since that would play into the Iranian contention that fuel assurances are not a legitimate area of work for the IAEA Board. ¶6. (C) Charge also raised the September 3-4 "Future of the Agency" debate on IAEA safeguards, noting this would be germane to the newly formed working group on strategic priorities that will address the IAEA budget and safeguards financing. Returning to a favorite theme, Minty insisted that one of the greatest threats to the safeguards regime is the failure of many European governments to take strong legal action against those companies and individuals that cooperated with the AQ Khan network. Highlighting (as he has done before) the political risks he took in pushing the prosecution of Wisser and the Khan collaborators in South Africa, Minty argued that the U.S. and South Africa, as the two countries that had done the most to take down the Khan network, should now work together to put pressure on European governments (and Pakistan) to take analogous steps. Pressed several times on the recent IAEA budget debate and the wider issue of safeguards financing, Minty returned to the Khan episode as fundamental to any effort at strengthening safeguards. ¶7. (C) Comment: Referring several times to President Obama's G8 meeting with Zuma, Minty seemed eager to put the acrimony of the DG race behind us and reestablish a shared agenda at the IAEA. He spoke with particular passion about Iran, characterizing it as one of the most urgent challenges confronting the IAEA. However, he was also quick to lament the missed opportunities of past years, noting that the political environment for negotiations has become much more difficult, even as the expansion of Iran's enrichment program has made a negotiated resolution more urgent. Minty heard us out on the IAEA fuel bank, but showed little sign of compromise (he claimed to have shared the same message with Senator Nunn at an NTI event in Oslo). One idea that may provide a basis for moving ahead was his suggestion of a dialogue on fuel assurances involving only the permanent members of the IAEA Board. One advantage of this format is that it would divide South Africa from Egypt and Pakistan (non-permanent members),perhaps providing a lever to break up the unfortunate G-77 versus developed countries dynamic around this issue. End Comment. PYATT