IAEA/IRAQ: WITH IRAN IN THE BACKGROUND DG

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000369 SIPDIS ISN/RA FOR DANIEL; NEA/I FOR NOTAR, KENNA; L FOR MITCHELL, HIRSCH; BAGHDAD FOR FINGARSON, AHN, SWINEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2034 TAGS: AORC IAEA IZ KNNP IR SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAQ: WITH IRAN IN THE BACKGROUND DG ELBARADEI WRITES TO IRAQI FM ON IRAQI COOPERATION REF: A. UNVIE 00281 ¶B. SECSTATE 61807 Classified By: CDA GEOFFREY PYATT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Following Iraq's ref request for Iraq to be added to the IAEA's September Board agenda for purposes of confirming Iraq's compliance with its safeguards agreement, IAEA DG ElBaradei sent a letter to the Iraqi Foreign Minister reiterating the Agency's 2008 Safeguards Implementation Report conclusion that declared nuclear material remains in peaceful uses. DG ElBaradei also urged Iraq to bring its Additional Protocol into force in order for the Agency to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material. (Note: During June 17 IAEA Board of Governors deliberations, Iraq requested that an item be added to the September Board meeting agenda that addresses the cooperation between Iraq and the IAEA related to implementation of Iraq's IAEA safeguards obligations. Iraq asked for the Board item in hopes of laying the groundwork for the UN Security Council to remove restrictions that are still in force regarding the scope of Iraq's permissible nuclear activities. The IAEA Secretariat sees this letter as sufficient action for now and does not intend to have a September Board agenda item. The deadline for adding items to the September 14-18 Board of Governors meeting is August 28.) -------------- Background -------------- ¶2. (S) During June 17 IAEA Board of Governors deliberations, Iraq requested that an item be added to the September Board meeting agenda that addresses the cooperation between Iraq and the IAEA related to implementation of Iraq's IAEA safeguards obligations. Iraq asked for member states' support for such an agenda item with the end goal of recovering its "natural rights" to establish nuclear programs for peaceful purposes, currently constrained by UNSCR 707 (1991). The Secretariat, including the DG, noted that the formulation of UNSCR 707 (which calls for "full compliance") raises questions about the scope and nature of how the Secretariat should express itself on Iraq in light of the fact that Iraq has yet to bring into force the Additional Protocol and therefore the IAEA cannot certify the "completeness" of Iraq's declarations. The U.S. and Japan supported Iraq's call for a September agenda item to underline the responsibility of the Board in determining compliance with safeguards agreements. -------------- DG Sends Letter -------------- ¶3. (S) Since the June Board, Herman Nackaerts, Director of Safeguards Operations B, which has responsibility for safeguards in Iraq, told MsnOff that the DG sent a letter to the Iraqi Foreign Minister (text copied in para 6 below) following the June Board noting that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful nuclear activities, as noted in the 2008 Safeguards Implementation Report. Nackaerts said the Secretariat has no further plans to address the issue, including at the upcoming September 7-11 Board meeting, and expects Iraq to use the letter as it sees fit. MsnOff noted that we were treading new ground in that an issue of noncompliance (resulting from a Board report to the UNSC) will apparently be brought to closure for the first time. Both member states and the Secretariat will want to be mindful of setting an appropriate precedent. (Comment: Nackaerts did not agree or disagree, and is clearly taking his cue on this from the DG. End Comment.) -------------- Bringing AP into Force -------------- ¶4. (S) Nackaerts said the DG's letter to the Iraqi FM urged early action by Iraq to bring the additional protocol into force, which Iraq signed in October 2008. He said the AP would allow the IAEA to verify both the correctness and completeness of Iraq's nuclear activities. This, he said is how the IAEA defines "compliance." He recognized that at the time of UNSCR 707, the AP did not exist and therefore the definition of compliance was different then. MsnOff asked how long it would take for the Agency to determine "completeness" once the AP is in force. Nackaerts said that Iraq would need to submit a declaration after bringing the AP into force, and then the IAEA would have to verify it, including via visits to selected sites. He expects that Iraq's AP declaration will be minimal, and it could be done rather "quickly" but did not provide a more specific timeline. (Comment: Mission believes that 1-2 years is a more realistic estimate of how long it would take to verify an initial Iraqi AP declaration.) -------------- Iran a Driving Factor -------------- ¶5. (S) Nackaerts reiterated that the IAEA had no concerns about nuclear activities in Iraq - and that the real driving factor in consideration of how to deal with closing the Iraq file is the precedent it sets for Iran. He said that if the DG were to send Iraq a letter stating Iraq is in compliance because no nuclear material had been diverted to non peaceful uses, then the fear is that Iran would demand the same letter since its declared nuclear material remains in peaceful nuclear activities, per the IAEA. (Comment: This comparison does not take into account the large number of unanswered questions on undeclared activities for Iran as well as UNSC resolutions, unlike in Iraq. End Comment.) -------------- Text of DG Letter to Iraq -------------- ¶6. (SBU) (Opening and Closing Greeting removed by Iraq Mission) Begin Text: At the Board meeting, I stated that the IAEA had been receiving excellent cooperation from Iraq. In this context, I am pleased that in its Safeguards Implementation Report for 2008 the IAEA was able to conclude for Iraq that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. However, for Iraq as for other States with comprehensive safeguards agreements but without additional protocols in force, the IAEA is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the country. I am pleased to note that Iraq signed an additional protocol in October 2008. It would be helpful now for this to be brought into force by Iraq as soon as possible to enable the Agency to complete its work to draw the broader conclusion regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in Iraq. This conclusion by the Agency would also be important for Iraq in terms of meeting the requirements of paragraph 3(f) of United Nations Security Council resolution 707 (1991), which requires that Iraq "(h)alt all nuclear activities of any kind, except for use of isotopes for medical, agricultural or industrial purposes, until the Security Council determines that Iraq is in full compliance with the present resolution and with paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991),and the Agency determines that Iraq is in full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the Agency." Such a conclusion by the Agency could also enable the Security Council to reconsider the restrictions under the aforementioned resolution and Iraq to fully benefit from establishing nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the wish expressed by the Resident Representative of Iraq at the recent meeting of the Board of Governors. In light of these considerations, I look forward to the early entry into force of the Additional Protocol to Iraq's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. End Text. PYATT