IAEA/GC/MIDDLE EAST: ISRAEL AND EGYPT TALK ABOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000353 SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, T, S/SANAC, S/SEMEP, ISN - BURK ISN/MNSA, ISN/RA, IO/T E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2019 TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA EG IS SUBJECT: IAEA/GC/MIDDLE EAST: ISRAEL AND EGYPT TALK ABOUT TALKING WHILE A DIVIDED EU HOPES FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP REF: A) UNVIE 326 B) UNVIE 333 C) UNVIE 343 C) 2008 UNVIE 546 Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b and d Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Israeli Ambassador Michaeli briefed Charge July 22 on his consultations that morning with Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi on Middle East GC issues. Michaeli was encouraged that Fawzi agreed to receive Michaeli, who delivered a conciliatory message from capital on reengaging in negotiations. The atmospherics of the meeting were good even if there were no major breakthroughs. Michaeli said he stressed with Fawzi the need for a new approach to Middle East GC issues, though he told Charge that he doubted Egypt would agree to a proposal he put forward that would reflect divergent views on the Middle East Safeguards (MES) resolution. The fact that Israel is open to a new approach involving a single new text is nevertheless noteworthy. Charge advised that, while uninstructed, he agreed strongly that a new approach was needed (including for tactical reasons) but did not elaborate further on a possible single resolution (reftels.) For his part, Fawzi, who Michaeli believes has limited negotiating authority, adhered to the Egyptian line. He rejected last year's Israeli amendments to the Egyptian MES resolution and linking its disposition with the treatment of the Arab League text. Fawzi promised to relay Israel's message and will return to Cairo for consultation in early August. Both Michaeli and Swedish Ambassador Lundborg (EU Presidency) in a separate meeting July 21 told us they expected Egypt will table its original MES text at the last minute. However, they also both reported considerable debate in Cairo on the GC resolution issue, which could provide an opening. Charge suggested, and Michaeli readily agreed, that Michaeli should immediately brief Lundborg on his meeting with Fawzi. Sweden is reaching out to Cairo (to include possible involvement of FM Bildt) and Michaeli asked if the U.S. also plans to do so. ¶2. (C) Lundborg confirmed deep divisions within the EU on GC Middle East issues; finding an EU consensus was the Presidency's priority. France, the Netherlands and UK were arrayed against Spain and Ireland, which were under instructions to support Egypt. Lundborg reported bad blood in the EU as well as in Cairo over France's role last year and its hard-line negotiating position again this year. EU HOMs are inclined to proceed along separate negotiating tracks with Cairo and the Arab League (which we discouraged), but Lundborg was open to ideas about a possible new consensus "package" to include a single resolution. He had begun consulting with Israel and Egypt in Vienna and had also met with the Arab Group, which he found to be hard-over and resolute in its determination to bring the Israeli Nuclear Capabilities (INC) resolution to a vote, discounting any "no action" motion as doomed to failure. Lundborg doubted the Arabs would settle for a debate and Presidential Statement on the INC, as GC President New Zealand was hoping, and said he would participate in further consultations with the Arab Group and GC President in mid-August. However, it appears the EU currently intends not to meet again on this issue at HOM level until early September; should we want to champion a new single resolution approach, it would require much earlier engagement with and within the EU. Lundborg observed that the GC outcome "depended on" the U.S. He welcomed U.S. re-engagement in the Middle East and hoped to find a common U.S.-EU position in the GC given the high stakes not just for the IAEA but for the 2010 NPT Revcon. ¶3. (C) Meanwhile, the IAEA Secretariat has circulated a revised agenda for a Middle East Forum, proposed to be held September 22-23, to Israel and Arab states for comment. There is little enthusiasm for the Forum idea and Israel regards this annual kabuki to be a waste of time and a sideshow, while understanding that when the music stops it should not be Israel that is perceived to be at fault for preventing the Forum from coming to fruition. The revised IAEA proposal incorporated 90 percent of Egyptian comments unacceptable to Israel, including deletion of a key reference to the fact that this would not be a forum for negotiation. Israel's response will also predicate the Forum on restoring consensus in the General Conference. The timing of the proposed Forum just after the GC is "ridiculous" and probably an effort to squeeze this in before DG ElBaradei's term ends. In any case, the Forum is unlikely to materialize. Michaeli said Fawzi did not support it either. Our one concern, as noted to Michaeli, is if the Arab Group should decide to raise no objections to the revised agenda, Israel could indeed be blamed for blocking the Forum. End Summary. Egypt-Israel Bilats -------------- ¶4. (C) Israeli IAEA Michaeli told Charge July 22 he was encouraged that Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi had agreed to meet with him and had half-expected a last minute cancellation. Michaeli said he had conveyed the following message from capital: In order not to repeat last year's General Conference outcome, Israel proposed direct negotiations of the MES text with Egypt in Vienna, or elsewhere, noting that Egyptian good will could allow for a compromise acceptable to both sides. Fawzi first took the opportunity to chastise Israel for last year's GC outcome; he argued that negotiations with Israel had led nowhere and accused Israel of complicity with France in sabotaging the Egyptian text. Michaeli disputed this interpretation of events, but urged Fawzi to set aside history and try a different approach, stressing Israel's readiness for compromise. Michaeli observed that there were three basic approaches in principle: first, the old consensus focused on common ground, i.e. on the commitment of all regional states to a free zone, while ignoring disputes. Second, placing the emphasis on disputes, as in the last few General Conferences, and seeking to impose one's interpretation. While Israel still preferred the consensus approach, Michaeli offered a third way -- to recognize differences rather than ignoring them, while still emphasizing common ground. He explained to Charge that under this creative (if unusual) approach, the MES resolution could, for example, take note of divergent views of the role of the peace process on the establishment of a WMD free-zone. Fawzi was a bit dismissive, snipping that he had not seen anything like this in the UN system. Michaeli acknowledged that he did not believe Egypt would realistically agree to this unorthodox proposal. Still, Fawzi, who Michaeli believes has limited negotiating authority, promised he would report the Israeli overture to Cairo (and is himself going to Cairo for consultations in early August.) ¶5. (C) Fawzi otherwise hewed to the Egyptian position that the Israeli amendments on the peace process and compliance do not belong in the MES resolution. Michaeli predicted Egypt would table last year's original MES text, probably at the last minute so as to not allow room for negotiations. He did not see any reason to expect a change in Egypt's tactics, but hoped to be proven wrong. Michaeli told Fawzi that many in Israel believe Egypt prefers conflict over cooperation, while Fawzi noted that many in Egypt have the same perception of Israel. Michaeli responded "try us," offering to return to consensus on the 2005 MES text. On the INC resolution, Fawzi retreated to the usual Egyptian line denying any linkage with the MES text. Pressed by Michaeli on this being disingenuous given Egypt's leadership role among Arab states, Fawzi insisted that there was no way for the Arab League to withdraw the INC resolution unless Egypt names Israel in its MES resolution. ¶6. (C) Charge reported his discussion with the Swedish EU Presidency (below) on EU divisions and queried Michaeli about the French position that the final MES text as amended be a starting point for negotiations. Michaeli had met with the new French Ambassador twice already and believed this was probably tactical and meant as a caution to Egypt -- in light of France's clear understanding that Egypt would not table the Israeli-amended text -- that Egypt was headed down a road that would again not glean EU support. Michaeli also had met recently with Spain, which he agreed was a "hard knot," among the most difficult of the EU members. ¶7. (C) Overall, Michaeli reported that the general atmospherics of the Fawzi meeting were good and very diplomatic. Charge welcomed the fact that Egypt had agreed to meet with Israel and encouraged Michaeli to relay the discussion to Swedish Ambassador Lundborg. Noting that he was uninstructed, Charge agreed with Michaeli on the need for a constructive new approach, even for tactical reasons if negotiations are ultimately unsuccessful. He added that all of this seems to have catalyzed an internal debate in Cairo, also a good thing. Michaeli asked whether we will raise the GC issue in Cairo and Charge advised him that it was incorporated as a point for the forthcoming U.S.-Egypt strategic dialogue. Middle East Forum Kabuki -------------- ¶8. (C) Meanwhile, the IAEA Secretariat has circulated a revised proposal for a Middle East Forum to Israel and the Arab Group, soliciting their views and suggesting that the Forum be held on September 22-23, just after the General Conference. Michaeli shared the IAEA proposal (emailed to the Department). He assessed that there was no realistic prospect for a Forum, that no one, including Fawzi, was enthusiastic about it, and that this was all a waste of time, but Israel would play along. Michaeli complained that the Secretariat's revised Forum proposal adopted 90 percent of the changes Egypt had proposed last year. Israel's response would note that it had accepted the 2004 Forum proposal and would take issue with specific changes, most importantly, the deletion of a reference to the fact that this would be solely an information and discussion event and "not a forum for negotiation." Israel strongly objected to the IAEA Secretariat injecting itself into ME WMD-free zone negotiations in principle, were they actually to take place, in part because non-nuclear WMD issues that would have to be considered went beyond the IAEA's mandate. Israel was further troubled by the deletion of two references in the proposal, at Egypt's suggestion, to the potential relevance of other NWFZs, especially taken in tandem with the deletion of the Israeli reference to this not being a forum for negotiation. A single reference to the experience of other NWFZs was retained in the last paragraph, which Israel would highlight as the "heart of the matter" on the expectation that Egypt would find it objectionable. Israel will also predicate any Forum on reaching consensus in General Conference on Middle East issues and underline the need to discuss compliance, consistent with the 2008 MES resolution as adopted. Asked by Msnoff as to whether there was any concern the Arabs could agree to the revised proposal, making Israel appear to be the recalcitrant party, Michaeli did not discount the possibility of DG ElBaradei colluding with theArab Group to that end. As to the proposed dates, Michaeli dismissed as "ridiculous" any prospect of holding a Forum just after the GC and noted that in 2004 the Forum had been planned for the January after the September GC. ¶9. (C) Comment: Mission checked separately with IAEA EXPO official Tariq Rauf, who authored the letter on the Forum sent to regional states. Rauf explained that Israel had not submitted objections to the agenda proposed last year, so the Secretariat reflected the comments received, i.e., from the Arabs. He noted that while the Forum continued to be part of the Director General's mandate under the MES resolution, there probably was no real prospect of agreement to hold a Forum. He also said his understanding of Egyptian instructions for the GC were to "play a spoiler role." Rauf attributed the proposed date to venue scheduling conflicts, but it seems clear to Mission (and Michaeli) that the reason for the early date was a desire to hold any Forum during DG ElBaradei's term of office, which ends November 30. Bridging the EU Divide -------------- ¶10. (C) In a separate meeting with Charge July 21, Swedish Ambassador Lundborg stressed EU unity as the Presidency's priority and repeatedly underlined that finding common ground within the EU would be difficult. He confirmed deep EU divisions and would be meeting with the "hardline" faction, France, the Netherlands and the UK in the next few days. Lundborg advised Charge of bad blood with France within the EU, as many felt the French Presidency during the last GC did not play straight with them. Lundborg said the same bad blood exists between Paris and Cairo on the issue. Charge reported that the new French Ambassador proposed negotiating on the basis of the 2008 MES text as amended, which Lundborg agreed was a clear nonstarter for Egypt. The Dutch were also a concern as their FM is "an extreme friend of Israel," he noted, adding that the UK could be brought around by moderate views. On the other side, he reported that Spain had strict instructions to support Egypt, as did Ireland. Charge cautioned that the Arab Group was smug in its perception that it could divide and conquer the EU. (Comment: A split EU would doom any "no action" motion. End Comment.) ¶11. (C) Lundborg also confirmed that based on initial consultations, EU HOMs were still inclined to deal with the two ME resolutions separately. Part of their calculus was based on rumors of the third, Iranian-sponsored agenda item on Israeli strikes against nuclear facilities, believing that we should not mix this all together. He agreed with Charge, however, that this rumored third agenda item did not seem likely, especially since the Arabs are increasingly disinclined to allow Iran to play a leadership role on Middle East issues. Charge reported on his meeting with Arab Group (ref c) and encouraged a holistic approach to ME issues rather than negotiating on separate tracks. Noting that he was uninstructed, Charge shared the personal view that if we play the same cards, we will end up with the same result; what was needed was a substantive new approach. Egyptian Msnoff had told Charge separately that Cairo recognized this as well. Lundborg wholly agreed and was receptive to the idea of a single resolution/package deal in principle, and though he was skeptical the Arabs would agree, intended to float the idea with them. ¶12. (C) Lundborg had already met with Israel and the Arab Group and would meet with Fawzi in mid-August upon the latter's return from consultations in Cairo. He reported two competing views in Cairo of the MES resolution but thought it most probable that Egypt would end up tabling its original text from last year minus the Israeli amendments. (Note: Lundborg did not elaborate the competing views but the Indian Ambassador told Counselor that Cairo is in a quandary as it could not expect success on its original MES text nor accept the amended version; not knowing what to do, Egypt is considering championing the AL resolution. End Note.) Lundborg confirmed Cairo's extreme sensitivity and bitterness; the Swedish Embassy is speaking to MFA and he had also encouraged FM Bildt to engage. As to the Arab Group, Lundborg found them to be "hard over" on the INC text and resolute in their determination/expectation to defeat any no action motion. Interestingly, Syria participated in the Arab Group meeting with the EU Presidency but was not present at ours. Lundborg discussed the INC with EU HOMs who were seeking instructions. He added that the Arab Group had delivered the same message to New Zealand as GC President. While New Zealand Ambassador Macmillan was not convinced the Arabs could win a vote on the INC and still hoped that they would settle for a debate and PRST, Lundborg was not so sure on either account. (Comment: Why would the Arab Group not bring the INC to a vote if the EU is divided and they could win? End Comment. ) On a positive note, the Arab Group (including Egypt) trusts Lundborg as an interlocutor due to his role on the CTBT Palestinian Observership issue. Macmillan advised him to not bring Germany and France into the negotiation for the time being or to the Chatham House Rules lunch with the Arab Group she will host in August (ref a). ¶13. (C) Lundborg was generally pessimistic about the IAEA General Conference, viewing the Middle East issues as a projection of the negative atmosphere in the region. The Obama Administration's reengagement with the Arab world was the one reason for optimism. He observed that the GC outcome "depends on the U.S." and hoped to find a joint EU/U.S. position if possible. Lundborg understood the stakes, both with respect to the IAEA General Conference getting worse every year and more broadly with respect to the 2010 NPT Revcon, agreeing with Charge that if we get this right, we can contribute to a positive outcome for the Revcon. PYATT