HCOC: EU WORKSHOP ON STRENGTHENING THE HAGUE CODE

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000335 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC KSCA ETTC KNNP TSPA SUBJECT: HCOC: EU WORKSHOP ON STRENGTHENING THE HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT, JUNE 26 REF: UNVIE 314 ¶1. Summary: In its role as European Union (EU) President, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a workshop in Prague on June 26 to promote further enhancement and improved functioning of the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) against ballistic missile proliferation. The informal workshop brought together academics and governmental experts from nearly 40 countries. The 'Foundation for Strategic Research' (FSR),a French think tank with experience in implementation EU decisions, provided presentations and moderated the workshop discussion. The result of the workshop will be a "forward-looking" paper from the FSR for subscribing states' consideration. The EU appreciated the wide participation and was enthusiastic about the exchange of information. However, by contrast, there was little direct interaction between academic and governmental attendees and by the end of the day about a third of the seats were empty. End summary. EU Promotion of HCOC -------------- ¶2. One of the aims of the decision of the Council of Europe in supporting the HCOC (Decision 2008/974/PESC) was to promote further enhancement and better functioning of this organization. The EU views HCOC as an important tool in preventing and countering ballistic missile proliferation. The Prague workshop was an awareness-raising event and also provided a forum for the exchange of ideas on how to enhance HCOC. Participants included representatives from thirty HCOC subscribing states, two non-subscribing states (Israel and Mexico) and two experts from academia and non-governmental organizations (NGOs.) Presentations & Discussion -------------- ¶3. The FSR presented a broad overview of the trends in ballistic missile (BM) and space launch vehicle (SLV) programs. (Note: presentation material sent to ISN/MTR. End Note.) FSR reminded participants that countries can hide their BM programs behind SLV programs; it is difficult for outside countries to detect the level of development in a BM program if a country chooses to hide it. While a country's BM program can grow out of a SLV program, according to the FSR Chair, a BM program requires additional skill sets and further development. Japan, for example, has foregone a BM program but has an advanced SLV program. ¶4. The FSR pointed to BM programs as the "tip of the iceberg" for WMD programs because most countries that possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have active BM programs. Therefore, they contend, HCOC can help identify the tips of these icebergs, as BM programs must make use of testing for their development. By observing testing of a subscribing state, the other states can make a more informed judgment of the launching county's program. ¶5. Professor Goetz Neuneck, from the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, as well as other academics present and the FSR in its presentations, argued that cruise missiles and even unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) should also be pre-notified. There is a trend towards small and medium launch vehicles they noted, and WMD could be added to these means of delivery as readily as to BMs. The trend to lighter SLVs brings SLV programs even closer to a country's BM program. ¶6. The Chair, summing up the academics' views, spoke of a "crossroads" in missile controls because the blurring of lines between the means of delivery could create confusion. He used the example of country launching an SLV being misinterpreted by its neighbors as a hostile missile. Therefore, the Chair concluded, HCOC is a practical tool, among others, in providing transparency in BM programs: its implementation and universalization would increase global security. Current State of HCOC -------------- ¶7. The FSR Chair stressed that current HCOC Pre-Launch Notification (PLN) reporting is poor. Some 80 percent of the (approx.) 60 BM launches reported in open sources last year were from the U.S. or Russia. However neither country currently submits PLNs in HCOC. Of the remaining 20 percent, only a few come from non-subscribing states. One of the reasons for this is that developing countries are finding it simpler to contract SLV business to another country than to create and maintain a national launch capability. ¶8. In the session "Implementation of the HCOC: Results Achieved So Far," HCOC "Annual Declarations" were portrayed as a good tool to help build confidence and spread transparency. Last year, about 70 percent of the subscribing countries submitted an Annual Declaration and this was seen as a positive confidence building measure (CBM.) Promoting United Nations (UN) recognition was also seen by the Chair and the experts as a positive element of increasing awareness of HCOC because, unless specially prohibited by a UN Security Council resolution, all counties have the right to a peaceful BM program and HCOC can thus provide an element of transparency in states' programs. Bilateral and regional agreements to promote missile transparency were also encouraged, as was more general outreach. Cruise Missiles -------------- ¶9. On the scope of the HCOC reporting, the expert from the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) shared that HCOC was one of the reasons non-subscribing states were focusing on development of cruise missiles (CM) rather than a BM program. He alleged there are some 13 countries that have started a CM program since 2004 and some counties are working on hyper-sonic cruise vehicles, all with a military purpose. Some of these states, this expert contends, would prefer to keep their missile development clandestine yet didn't want to hinder their participation in HCOC if they found it advantageous in the future. Also, he pointed out, as missile defenses get better, cruise missiles are needed for states in addition to BMs. The reasons he gave for this are that CMs are more accurate and can be used for up to 500 lb. of payload. And while they are slower then BMs, they are harder to detect because of point of launch and trajectory and the 'shock value' is the same as delivery from BMs. Other experts agreed with the MIIS representative that CM programs are intrinsically linked to BM programs and the two cannot be separated as is currently the case with HCOC reporting of only BM programs. ¶10. France did not see cruise missiles as being incorporated into the HCOC mechanism in the near future. It took nearly five years to define "ballistic missiles" and merely defining "cruise missiles" will take some time. The French representative pointed out too, with economic incentives, nothing is being concretely discussed for HCOC adherence. A more basic reason why countries may choose not to join, the French participant acknowledged, is some countries don't want other countries to see their missile development. Yet, because it is the "responsible thing to do" for a co-operating country, there is, nonetheless, a great desire from France for universalization. Concluding Remarks -------------- ¶11. The Chair recognized that HCOC was a good starting point for BM non-proliferation. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research expert reflected this view, pointing out the "demands" of HCOC are almost trivial. By not using the PLNs and annual declarations, subscribers are wasting a valuable opportunity. He saw parallels with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) noting the OPCW implementation support unit "keeps the ball rolling." Also, he noted that the India-Pakistan exchange could be used by HCOC as a good example of regional agreements on missile transparency. ¶12. The expert from Chinese Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA) indicated that the current low reporting of missile launches through PLNs was not very encouraging. (Note: Technically CACDA is a NGO but likely to have very strong PRC government connections. End note.) He asked whether HCOC had any measures to enforce this requirement and whether there were any assessment measures to ensure adherence. He pointed out that missile defense tests involve multiple counties and that regional issues impact the perception of threat to any one country. CBMs, on a voluntary and flexible basis, are to be encouraged. This expert pointed out that if HCOC showed more flexibility, then more countries would become subscribers. ¶13. The Czechs, speaking on behalf of the EU, saw the HCOC as 'their child' and the EU policy in the HCOC regards PLNs as a central element of transparency. The EU presidency has made strong demarches concerning HCOC. The Czech presidency is encouraged by the change in atmosphere as evidenced by U.S. President Obama's speech in Prague, even if it contained nothing specific about HCOC. The hope of the EU is PLNs will be de-coupled with the implementation of the Russia - U.S. Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC),as the JDEC is a very complicated process and is, they believe, "a bilateral issue". HCOC is not a perfect tool, the Czech representative emphasized, but it is a start for creating better trust. ¶14. The Chair pointed out that while the HCOC was "a child of the EU" in a historical sense, it is now the responsibility of the 130 subscribing states to help it through its "teenage growth crisis." Until the HCOC mechanisms work as they should, the organization will remain in "crisis". The Chair saw some ideas emerging from the workshop as practical, but others were contradictory and needed further debate. He used North Korea (DPRK) as an example of why a country may want to join HCOC: if the DPRK wants to be seen as a country in good standing in the international community it is for them to become an HCOC subscriber and implement its commitments -- which are not very difficult. Some 90 HCOC subscribers do not have Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) membership and HCOC could also be seen as a way to enhance that very important regime. Follow-up -------------- ¶15. The I-ECC, an electronic means of communication for the HCOC, is being developed by the FRS. The EU contends that such a means of communication will further the objectives of the HCOC. By September, a pilot system will be discussed within the EU. Afterwards, a trial version will be made available for all subscribing states to view and provide comments. The FRS Chair stressed that at next year's HCOC annual meeting, the I-ECC will not be presented as a "take it or leave it" product; rather, it is very much a work in progress and the EU would welcome comments and suggestions on the I-ECC proposal. ¶16. A follow-up workshop will be hosted by a future EU Presidency. It will focus on the future of HCOC, and feedback from the Chair's report of the Prague workshop will be taken into account in shaping that agenda. All subscribing states will be asked for input. Comment -------------- ¶17. The EU continues to make their best case for all HCOC subscribing states to move to full compliance with the HCOC "requirements." The use of FRS to research and present the current state of affairs with BM program and the HCOC as an organization was well received. However, while the intent to have an exchange between academics and government experts was well intended, the actual exchange was formal, at best. The afternoon session of the workshop was not well attended; unfortunately, it was in the afternoon when some of the more interesting exchange took place. The two non-subscribers in attendance (Mexico and Israel) were not engaged in the discussions, apparently even on the margins. It is likely the EU and the FSR will enthusiastically use the results of the workshop as partial input for their next workshop. The U.S. position on JDEC implementation before HCOC PLN reporting is the '800 pound guerrilla' in the room; everyone at this workshop hope that issue will be resolved so further progress can be made with HCOC as a CBM. PYATT