IAEA GC/MIDDLE EAST: ISRAELI AMBASSADOR REVIEWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000333 SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, T, S/SANAC, S/SEMEP, ISN - BURK ISN/MNSA, ISN/RA, IO/T E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2019 TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA EG IS SUBJECT: IAEA GC/MIDDLE EAST: ISRAELI AMBASSADOR REVIEWS BIDDING REF: UNVIE 326 Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R, Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) Having just returned from Tel Aviv consultations on IAEA General Conference (GC) Middle East issues, Israeli Ambassador Michaeli provided an assessment to Charge July 10 of this year's versions of the "Egyptian" Middle East Safeguards (MES) and the Israel Nuclear Capabilities (INC) resolutions. Michaeli was surprised that the Arab Group had already circulated the INC text (he had expected Arabs to spring it at the last moment this year),but still expected Egypt to wait on circulating its resolution and then adopt a "take it or leave it" approach. Egypt remains key to the outcome on ME issues at the GC and Michaeli was instructed to seek a meeting with the Egyptian Ambassador. He encouraged us (and others) to send the same message to Cairo that Egypt should engage, though he personally did not believe Egypt would agree to direct negotiations with Israel. Michaeli speculates that Egyptian intentions are reflective of Cairo's real objective, which is the outcome at the NPT Revcon; in that regard, he did not see how another GC mess in Vienna would advance Egyptian goals vis--vis the NPT. He also contrasted Egypt's handling of nuclear issues in Vienna and New York, noting that Egypt's more accommodating approach in New York is directed by the President's office, rather than the MFA. Egypt's posture in Vienna was not entirely rational from Michaeli's perspective. ¶2. (C) As to the INC, Michaeli was pessimistic about winning another "no action motion," though an unnamed counterpart (we suspect Canada) seemed inclined to try, and levying this as a threat continued to be useful. He also did not believe that blocking the INC agenda item in the General Committee would be productive since the Arab Group would just call a vote in Plenary to seek its insertion on the agenda. Although Michaeli said one G-77 Ambassador suggested otherwise, i.e. that many states do not want to deal with this item on the agenda, Michaeli was not convinced, though he suggested we also keep this possibility "in the air." At the same time, Michaeli saw a "reasonable chance" of defeating the INC resolution if it came to an up-or-down vote, particularly if coupled with a no action motion, but "others" were not so �00A;sure. He based his assessment on the expectation that some Latin American and African delegations could split their vote against "no action" but oppose the resolution on Israel. (Comment: The Arab Group's likely main objective is to see an up or down vote on the INC, which has not happened since the early 1990s. End Comment.) ¶3. (C) Michaeli acknowledged that the EU landscape was more complex this year under the stewardship of the Swedish EU Presidency and thought it likely the EU would splinter on a vote on the INC resolution. He recalled that in the past the only agreed EU position (by default) has been with respect to "no action" and some EU states (such as Ireland) may support the INC resolution on Israel's non-NPT status on its merits. Michaeli sees need for "deep discussion" with the EU on Middle East GC issues. The Swedish EU Presidency is deploying its considerable diplomatic skill to seek consensus and preserve EU unity and Michaeli reported that FM Bildt would be dispatched to Cairo on this issue. Still, Israel was uneasy about the prospect of the EU negotiating text with Cairo and could easily foresee it doing so. Even the UK was privately frank with Michaeli in advising that many states could lose patience with a hard-line Israeli position. Personally, Michaeli could envisage a consensus if the Arab resolution were revised to deal with the "Middle East" (vice Israeli) nuclear capability or the universality of the NPT, but he doubted the Arab group would agree to this given its main objective of naming Israel. Charge advised that Arab Group inflexibility remained Israel's trump card and we should pursue tactics that highlight that inflexibility. Michaeli doubted that moderates such as the Lebanese Arab Group Chair or Morocco would have much influence on the Arab position. ¶4. (C) Finally, Michaeli also raised Iran's proposal in previous Board sessions to request a GC agenda item aimed at Israel that would address military strikes against nuclear installations. He expected that the General Committee would block such an item, were it proposed, but if not, was prepared for the contingency of offering amendments citing Syria's covert nuclear activities in the context of such an item. (Note: We have not heard anything further on Iran following through on its proposal, which in the context of the Syria investigation would come close to implying an admission of guilt that Al-Kibar was a nuclear site. End note) ¶5. (C) Comment: We did not share reftel ideas about a possible consensus based on a single Middle East GC resolution with Micaheli at this juncture. The Canadian Mission has called a expert-level meeting July 14 with the U.S., Sweden, Australia and New Zealand to compare notes in advance of individual consultations with the Arab Group later in the week. The Arab Group will undoubtedly attempt to exploit any divisions in the Western camp, particularly with the EU and among individual EU members. In addition, as Charge noted to Michaeli, we will have a new cast of like-minded Ambassadors in Vienna, including those of Canada, Australia and France, states whose departed Ambassadors played important roles in the past (while a potentially unhelpful German Ambassador remains in Vienna.) Mission believes it to be in our interest to support and steer Swedish attempts at consensus in an acceptable direction, and seeks guidance to this effect. While Mission judges Sweden's consensus-building skills as formidable, even if they fail the effort will likely fulfill our tactical goal of demonstrating Arab inflexibility. We will continue to stress our bottom line that any consensus cannot be predicated on singling out Israel. PYATT